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Source-of-Income Discrimination 
and the Fair Housing Act 
Robert G. Schwemm† 
Abstract 
Amending the federal Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) to ban “source-
of-income” discrimination has been discussed for over twenty years. 
During this time, a growing number of states and localities (including 
many of the nation’s largest cities) have taken this step by amending 
their fair housing laws to prohibit discrimination against Section 8 
voucher holders and others based on their source of income. Meanwhile, 
bills proposing such an amendment to the FHA have regularly been 
introduced, including four in the current Congress. 
Proponents of such an amendment say it would help fulfill the 
voucher program’s goal of providing low-income families with a wider 
choice of housing and eliminate a form of discrimination that has 
frustrated the FHA’s goals of ending racial discrimination and 
segregation. The refusal of many landlords to rent to people who rely 
on vouchers or other government assistance programs has undercut the 
ability of these programs to extend opportunities outside areas of 
minority concentration. Further, much of today’s racial segregation 
reflects economic segregation, and a crucial part of FHA litigation has 
always involved disputes over locating affordable housing projects in 
affluent white areas. 
What if the FHA were amended to ban source-of-income 
discrimination? The most obvious result, as experience shows in states 
and localities that have taken this step, would be a substantial rise in 
litigation against landlords who continue to engage in such disc–
rimination. Another likely area of increased litigation would be 
challenges to exclusionary zoning and other municipal practices that 
block affordable housing. A variety of other practices might also be 
challenged under an amended FHA. 
This Article reviews the experience of states and localities that have 
banned source-of-income discrimination in housing and then 
contemplates how the FHA, if amended to add this protected class, 
would work. Part I provides the legal background by describing the 
FHA, the Section 8 program, and the state and local laws that now ban 
source-of-income discrimination. Part II explores cases that have 
challenged source-of-income discrimination, first under these local laws 
and then under the FHA’s disparate-impact and other theories of 
liability. After Part III’s review of the arguments for and against a 
 
†  Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor, University of Kentucky 
College of Law. 
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source-of-income amendment to the FHA, Part IV examines the various 
types of claims that might arise if such an amendment were enacted. 
The Article concludes that a source-of-income amendment, though 
not a panacea, would be an important step forward in helping the FHA 
achieve its core missions of reducing segregation and ending arbitrary 
limits on housing choice. 
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Introduction 
Over twenty years ago, a law review note that called for an 
amendment to the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”)1 described source-of-
income discrimination as the “New Frontier” of fair-housing law.2 At 
that time, a few states and localities had banned housing discrimination 
against Section 8 voucher holders3 and others based on their sources of 
income.4 Today, seventeen states and over seventy localities, including 
many of the nation’s largest cities, have taken this step.5 Meanwhile, 
bills proposing such an amendment to the FHA have regularly been 
introduced,6 including three that are pending in the current Congress.7 
Proponents of such an amendment say it would help fulfill the 
federal voucher program’s goal of providing low-income families with 
more housing choices and would eliminate a form of discrimination that 
has frustrated the FHA’s goals of ending both racially segregated 
housing patterns and discrimination against certain minorities.8 The 
 
1. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801–19, 82 Stat. 73, 81–
89 (1968). The FHA, as amended, is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19 
(2012). 
2. See Paula Beck, Fighting Section 8 Discrimination: The Fair Housing 
Act’s New Frontier, 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 155, 160 (1996).  
3. For a description of the Section 8 voucher program, see infra Part I.B. 
4. See Beck, supra note 2, at 168 nn.81–85, 169 n.86 and accompanying text 
(noting that Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
North Dakota, Vermont, Utah, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia 
had such laws); see also infra app. II (identifying, in addition to the 
District of Columbia, some of the localities that had such laws at that 
time, such as Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia, Seattle, and Montgomery 
County, Maryland). 
5. See infra app. I (listing states), app. II (listing major localities). 
6. See infra app. III (“Before 2019”). 
7. See id. (“2019”). The non-discrimination provisions of these bills focus 
exclusively on housing. Meanwhile, on May 17, 2019, the House passed a 
wide-ranging civil rights bill that bans discrimination based on, inter alia, 
sexual orientation, gender identity, and sex-based stereotypes in 
employment, housing, public accommodations, public facilities, public 
education, and federally funded activities, by amending various existing 
statutes including the FHA. See Equality Act of 2019, H.R. 5, 116th Cong. 
(2019); see also Catie Edmondson, Civil Rights Bill Advances But Is 
Unlikely to Get Far, N.Y. Times, May 18, 2019, at A15 (noting that the 
likely response to this bill from the Republican-controlled Senate and 
White House is “a resounding no”). 
8. See infra note 87 and accompanying text (voucher program), infra Part 
IV.B (FHA). 
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refusal of many landlords to rent to people who rely on vouchers or 
other government assistance programs has undercut the ability of these 
programs to extend opportunities outside areas of minority concen–
tration. Further, much of today’s racial segregation reflects economic 
segregation, and a crucial part of FHA litigation has always involved 
disputes over locating affordable housing projects in affluent white 
areas.9 
A note about the difference between “income” and “source-of-
income” discrimination: the former deals with “how much,” while the 
latter deals with “where from.” Income-based discrimination has 
consistently been viewed as compatible with the FHA, as confirmed by 
the statute’s legislative history.10 Thus, landlords and other housing 
providers in FHA cases have always been perceived as having a 
legitimate interest in their tenants’ ability to pay the rent or to meet 
other financial obligations (e.g., to secure protection against default, 
property damage, etc.).11 Where this income comes from, however, is a 
different matter (e.g., wages, investments, trusts, government 
assistance, etc.). In theory, a tenant’s source of income should not 
matter to a landlord, so long as that income is reasonably likely to 
continue and does not impose on the landlord other risks or hardships.12 
What if the FHA were amended to ban source-of-income 
discrimination? The most obvious result, as cases from states and 
localities that have taken this step show, would be a substantial rise in 
litigation against private landlords who continue to engage in such 
discrimination.13 Another likely area of increased litigation would be 
 
9. See infra Part IV.B. Early cases involving such disputes include 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 
558 F.2d 1283, 1288–94 (7th Cir. 1977), and United States v. City of Black 
Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184–85 (8th Cir. 1974). Recent cases include Mhany 
Management, Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 617–19 (2d Cir. 
2016), and Avenue 6E Investments, LLC v. City of Yuma, 818 F.3d 493, 
496 (9th Cir. 2016). 
10. See, e.g., 114 Cong. Rec. 3,421 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale (the 
FHA’s chief sponsor)) (“[T]he basic purpose of this legislation is to permit 
people who have the ability to do so to buy any house offered to the public 
if they can afford to buy it. It would not overcome the economic problem 
of those who could not afford to purchase the house of their choice.”). 
11. See infra notes 224, 381, 386 and accompanying text; see also Robert 
G. Schwemm, Housing Discrimination: Law and Litigation § 10:2 
n.5 (2019) (gathering cases that note the FHA’s lack of a bar against 
economic discrimination). A separate issue is whether a landlord may 
require a certain minimum ratio of income to rent (e.g., that a tenant 
have wages or other income equal to at least three times the rent). See 
infra Part IV.G.2. 
12. See infra notes 213, 224. 
13. See infra Part IV.A. 
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challenges to exclusionary zoning and other municipal practices that 
block affordable housing.14 Beyond these types of suits, litigation under 
an amended FHA might include a variety of other scenarios.15 
This Article reviews the experience of states and localities that have 
banned source-of-income discrimination in housing. It then contem–
plates how the FHA would work if it were amended to add this 
protected class. Part I begins with the legal background, describing the 
FHA, the Section 8 program, and their goals and experiences, followed 
by a review of the state and local laws that now include source-of-
income among their prohibited bases of discrimination. Part II then 
explores cases that have alleged source-of-income discrimination, first 
under these state and local laws, and then under the FHA’s “impact” 
theory of liability. Part III considers the arguments for and against 
amending the FHA to ban source-of-income discrimination. Finally, 
Part IV examines the various types of claims that might arise if the 
FHA were so amended. 
I. Legal Background 
A. The Fair Housing Act 
The current FHA prohibits discrimination in most housing and 
housing-related transactions based on seven factors 16 : race, color, 
national origin, and religion were included in the original statute in 
1968;17 sex was added in 1974;18 and handicap (disability) and families 
with children were added by the 1988 Fair Housing Amendments.19 The 
statute also bars conduct that interferes with the FHA’s substantive 
rights, as well as retaliation for asserting those rights.20 The FHA 
authorizes three separate methods of enforcement: private suits; admin–
istrative complaints to the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (“HUD”); and Justice Department actions. It provides for 
remedies that include uncapped actual and punitive damages, civil 
penalties, and attorney’s fees,21 making its enforcement scheme among 
the strongest of all U.S. civil rights laws. In addition, the FHA 
mandates that HUD and other federal agencies administer their housing 
 
14. See infra Part IV.B. 
15. See infra Part IV.C–F. 
16. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603–07, 3617 (2012). 
17. See Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968). 
18. See Pub. L. No. 93-383 § 808(b), 88 Stat. 633, 729 (1974). 
19. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–06 (2012). 
20. See id. § 3617; 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(5) (2018); Schwemm, supra note 
11, § 20. 
21. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610–14 (2012). 
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programs in a manner that actively furthers fair housing,22 although 
this provision does not provide for private enforcement.23 
The FHA has also fostered the development of many state and local 
fair-housing laws and agencies, in part through its requirement that 
complaints to HUD be referred to these agencies.24 Over fifty localities 
and thirty-five states now have laws that are substantially equivalent 
to the FHA. 25  And many go farther in that they have narrower 
exemptions or additional protected classes, 26  both of which are 
specifically authorized by the FHA.27 
The original FHA sought to eliminate private and public practices 
that had for decades confined African-Americans to segregated, ghetto-
like neighborhoods. The FHA was passed in the wake of racial violence 
in many urban areas,28 which led the Kerner Commission to conclude 
that America was “moving toward two societies, one black, one white—
separate and unequal,” and to call for a national open-housing law.29 
The Senate responded in early 1968 by passing a fair-housing bill that 
was intended, according to its principal sponsor Senator Mondale, to 
replace “the ghetto . . . [with] truly integrated and balanced living 
patterns.”30 Shortly after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King,  
22. See id. § 3608; Schwemm, supra note 11, § 21:1 & nn.2–3; see also infra 
note 308 and accompanying text. 
23. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 21:7 & n.6. 
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(f) (2012). 
25. For a list of these states and localities, see Schwemm, supra note 11, at 
app. C. 
26. For examples of those that go beyond the FHA, see Schwemm, supra note 
11, §§ 30:2 & nn.1–2, 30:3. 
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 3615 (2012) (“Nothing in this subchapter shall be 
construed to invalidate or limit any law of a State or political subdivision 
of a State, or of any other jurisdiction in which this subchapter shall be 
effective, that grants, guarantees, or protects the same rights as are 
granted by this subchapter”); see also 24 C.F.R. § 115.204(h) (2018) 
(providing, in HUD regulations, that a state or local law’s protection of 
additional prohibited bases does not mean that that law is not 
substantially equivalent to the FHA for the purposes of justifying referrals 
of FHA-agency complaints). 
28. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2015) (noting that the FHA was passed in response 
to Martin Luther King’s assassination and the “new urgency” “the Nation 
faced . . . to resolve the social unrest in the inner cities”). 
29. See id. at 2525–26 (quoting Nat’l Advisory Comm’n on Civil 
Disorders, Report of the National Advisory Commission on 
Civil Disorders 1 (1968)). 
30. 114 Cong. Rec. 3,422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale); see also id. 
(“[T]he best way for this Congress to start on the true road to integration 
is by enacting fair housing legislation.”). 
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Jr., the House agreed to this bill, and President Johnson signed it into 
law on April 11, 1968.31 
Courts have interpreted the FHA broadly in accordance with its 
remedial purposes. In its first review of the statute in 1972 in the 
Trafficante case,32 the Supreme Court noted the FHA’s pro-integration 
goal and concluded that FHA violations hurt not only their minority 
targets, but also a broader community that, in this case, included 
residents of a large apartment complex whose landlord’s anti-black 
discrimination allegedly blocked the complex’s integration.33 Traffic–
ante was quickly followed by two other decisions that recognized FHA 
standing for other types of plaintiffs (e.g., municipalities and fair-
housing organizations).34 In 2017, the Court re-affirmed these decisions 
in Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami.35 Two years earlier, in 
Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc., 36  the Court recognized that the FHA 
includes a disparate-impact standard of liability.37 The Court again 
underscored the FHA’s mission of fostering integration38 and the Act’s 
important “role in moving the Nation toward a more integrated 
society.”39 Also, to the extent that lower courts had interpreted the 
FHA broadly by the time of the 1988 Fair Housing Amendments Act, 
 
31. See 114 Cong. Rec. 9,620–21 (1968) (House passage); see also Lyndon 
B. Johnson, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States: Lyndon B. Johnson 509–10 (1970) (remarking upon signing 
the Act). 
32. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). 
33. Id. at 211 (noting that the FHA was designed to “replace the ghettos” 
with integrated housing patterns and that the Act aimed to protect not 
only direct victims of housing discrimination but “the whole community”) 
(quoting 114 Cong. Rec. 3,422 (statement of Sen. Mondale) (1968)); id. 
at 2,706 (statement of Sen. Javits). 
34. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378–79 (1982); 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109–11 (1979). Also, 
in the 1970s and 1980s, lower courts regularly upheld housing developers’ 
standing to allege FHA violations by municipalities that blocked the 
developers’ proposals for affordable housing projects. See, e.g., 
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 689 F.2d 391, 393–
95 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Schwemm, supra note 11, § 12A:3 n.6 
(gathering cases). 
35. See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1303 (2017). 
36. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
37. Id. at 2525. 
38. See id. at 2521–22, 2525–26. 
39. Id. at 2526. 
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the Court in both City of Miami and Inclusive Communities held that 
the 1988 Congress intended to endorse these broad interpretations.40 
 Still, fifty years after the enactment of the FHA, severe racial 
segregation continues to characterize much of America’s housing. Using 
the 100-point dissimilarity index as a measure (with 100 indicating total 
segregation and 0 indicating a randomly distributed population by 
race), census figures show that the black–white segregation score for all 
of the nation’s metropolitan areas in 1970 was 79; 73 in 1980; 67 in 
1990; 64 in 2000; and 59 in 2010.41 Thus, while some progress has been 
made over the FHA’s fifty years, the pace of change has been extremely 
slow.42 The pace has also varied greatly across the country: in 2010, 
New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Cleveland, St. Louis, and Miami all 
remained in the 70-80 range, and Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., and 
Baltimore scored around 65,43 while some western metropolitan areas 
had scores of under 40.44 Also, the rise in “minority suburbanization” 
 
40. See City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1303–04; Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 
2519–20. 
41. See John R. Logan & Brian J. Stults, The Persistence of 
Segregation in the Metropolis: New Findings from the 2010 
Census 4 (2011). For Latinos and Asians, comparable figures in the 1970–
2010 period were about 50 and 41, respectively. Id. at 10, 17. Dissimilarity 
values “of at least 60 are considered high and those of at least 70 are 
considered extreme.” William H. Frey, The New Metro Minority 
Map: Regional Shifts in Hispanics, Asians, and Blacks from 
Census 2010, at 3 (2011). 
42. See Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the 
American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 Am. Soc. Rev. 629, 629 (2010) 
(“[D]ecades after the passage of the Fair Housing Act, residential 
segregation remains a key feature of America’s urban landscape. . . . In 
areas with large African American communities—places such as New 
York, Chicago, Detroit, Atlanta, Houston, and Washington—the declines 
have been minimal or nonexistent”) (citation omitted). 
43. See Logan & Stults, supra note 41, at 6; see also Paul A. Jargowsky, 
The Persistence of Segregation in the 21st Century, 36 L. & Ineq. J. 207, 
214 (2018) (providing 2010 indices of black–white dissimilarity for the twenty 
largest metropolitan areas). Based on 2013–17 data, the five most racially 
segregated cities—all with numbers well above 70—were, in order: Milwaukee, 
New York, Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland. See William H. Frey, Black–
White Segregation Edges Downward since 2000, Census Shows, Brookings 
(Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue [https:/ 
 /perma.cc/CSG9-YAXZ]. As for Latino–white segregation, many major 
cities had dissimilarity indices in the 57–64 range, including New York, 
Los Angeles, Chicago, and Philadelphia. See Logan & Stults, supra 
note 41, at 12. 
44. See Logan & Stults, supra note 41, at 7; Frey, supra note 41, at 14; 
see also Richard Sander, The Opportunity and the Danger of the New 
Urban Migration, 53 U. Rich. L. Rev. 871, 884–87 (2019) (identifying 
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over the life of the FHA—minorities now constitute about one-third of 
the suburban population in the nation’s largest metropolitan areas—
may just mean that minorities have mainly been “re-segregated in 
separate communities within the suburbs.”45 Thus, as Senator Mondale 
recently noted: “The evil of residential segregation has waned at some 
times and in some places, but in others . . . , segregation has only 
grown.”46 
What’s more, today’s racially impacted neighborhoods are in some 
ways even worse than those that existed in 1968. For one thing, 
predominantly black areas now tend also to be predominantly poor;47 
many of the upper- and middle-class black families who were confined 
to racial ghettos by blatant forms of discrimination before 1968 have 
moved elsewhere, leaving the current residents without professional 
services, role-models, and other advantages of a mixed-income neigh–
borhood. As a result, today’s heavily black and poor areas are beset by  
 
factors that led to greater black–white integration in western cities as 
compared to northern cities). 
45. William H. Frey, Ctr. on Urban & Metro. Pol’y, Melting Pot 
Suburbs: A Census 2000 Study of Suburban Diversity 13 (2001); 
see also Myron Orfield & William Stancil, The Summit for Civil Rights: 
Mission, Structure, and Initial Outcomes, 36 L. & Ineq. J. 191, 195 
(2018) (describing the suburbanization of people of color as revealed by 
the 2010 census). 
46. Walter F. Mondale, The Civil Rights Law We Ignored, N.Y. Times (Apr. 
10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/opinion/walter-mondale-
fair-housing-act.html [https://perma.cc/4LLY-CAH9]. 
47. See Kendra Bischoff & Sean F. Reardon, Residential Segregation by 
Income, 1970–2009, in Diversity and Disparities 208, 215, 225 (John 
R. Logan ed., 2013) (finding that “segregation of families by socioeconomic 
status has grown significantly in the last forty years” and that income-
segregation trends “among black and Hispanic families are much more 
striking than those among white families,” with income segregation among 
black families in 2009 being “65 percent greater than among white 
families”). 
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myriad problems, including poor air and water quality,48 lower-quality food 
and health services,49 shorter life expectancies,50 limited access to credit,51  
 
48. See, e.g., Ihab Mikati et al., Disparities in Distribution of Particulate 
Matter Emission Sources by Race and Poverty Status, 108 Am. J. Pub. 
Health 480 (2018) (finding in an EPA study that, in forty-six states, 
communities of color are exposed to dangerous pollution at higher levels 
than white communities); Peter Christensen & Christopher Timmins, 
Sorting or Steering: Experimental Evidence on the Economic Effects of 
Housing Discrimination (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 
24826, 2018) (noting correlations between minority neighborhoods and 
pollution, particularly at Superfund sites).  
49. See, e.g., Mariana C. Arcaya & Alina Schnake-Mahl, Health in the Segregated 
City, in The Dream Revisited: Contemporary Debates About 
Housing, Segregation, and Opportunity in the Twenty-First 
Century 165 (Ingrid Gould Ellen & Justin Peter Steil eds., 2019) (concluding 
that “poor, predominantly minority neighborhoods experience . . . worse 
outcomes on a range of health measures”); Dayna Bowen Matthew, Health 
and Housing: Altruistic Medicalization of America’s Affordability Crisis, 
81 L. & Contemp. Probs. 161, 167–70 (2018) (reviewing research 
establishing links between residential segregation and adverse health 
outcomes); Kelly M. Bower et al., The Intersection of Neighborhood 
Racial Segregation, Poverty, and Urbanicity and its Impact on Food Store 
Availability in the United States, 58 Prev. Med. 33 (2014) (finding that 
“living in an impoverished and a segregated black neighborhood presents 
a double disadvantage in access to high quality foods [such as] . . . fresh 
fruit, vegetables, low-fat milk, and high-fiber foods” ); see also John 
Eligon et al., Black Americans Bear the Brunt As Virus Spreads, N.Y. 
Times, April 8, 2020, at A2 (reporting that the coronavirus "is infecting 
and killing black people in the United States at disproportionately high 
rates . . . , highlighting what public health officials say are entrenched 
inequalities in resources, health and access to care”).  
50. See, e.g., Imogene Francis, Life Expectancy Gaps in US Cities Linked to 
Racial Segregation: Study, Globe Post Newsletter (June 13, 2019), 
https://theglobepost.com/2019/06/13/life-expectancy-racial-segregation/ 
[https://perma.cc/9NA7-V6S9] (reporting on a New York University 
School of Medicine study that showed the gap between white and black 
life expectancies can differ between ten and thirty years in the nation’s 
largest cities, with the gap being “widest in cities with extreme segregation”); 
Arcaya & Schnake-Mahl, supra note 49 (concluding that “poor, 
predominantly minority neighborhoods experience disproportionately high 
mortality rates”); N. Cambria et al., Segregation in St. Louis: 
Dismantling the Divide 5 (2018) (noting the eighteen-year life-
expectancy gap at birth between two zip codes in the St. Louis area less 
than ten miles apart—one heavily black, one heavily white). 
51. See, e.g., Rugh & Massey, supra note 42, at 632–33; see also Bank of Am. 
Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1300–02 (2017). 
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inferior schools,52 poor transportation and other public services,53 and 
fewer opportunities associated with a good life.54 
Why has the FHA failed to reduce America’s racially segregated 
housing patterns? Part of the reason is that residential segregation has 
causes other than discrimination—such as economic differences55—and 
thus ending racial discrimination does not automatically result in 
integration.56 But it is also true that the types of discrimination that 
 
52. See, e.g., Erica Frankenberg et al., Civil Rights Project, 
Harming our Common Future: America’s Segregated Schools 65 
Years after Brown 4 (2019); John R. Logan & Julia Burdick-Will, 
School Segregation and Disparities in Urban, Suburban, and Rural Areas, 
672 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 185 (2017); Sean F. Reardon, 
School Segregation and Racial Academic Achievement Gaps, 2 Russell 
Sage Found. J. Soc. Sci. 34 (2016). 
53. See, e.g., Partnership for Southern Equity, Opportunity Deferred: 
Race, Transportation, and the Future of Metropolitan Atlanta 
(2016); Brian S. McKenzie, Neighborhood Access to Transit by Race, 
Ethnicity, and Poverty in Portland, OR, 12 City & Community 134, 135 
(2013); Jeffrey A. Fagan, Policing and Segregation, in The Dream 
Revisited, supra note 49, at 153, 154–55. 
54. See generally Richard H. Sander et al., Moving Toward Integration: 
The Past and Future of Fair Housing 407–08 (2018) (noting that 
research shows housing integration is a powerful engine for reducing 
various forms of racial inequality). As Senator Mondale recently wrote, 
the approach of trying “to fix segregated neighborhoods without 
integrating them . . . has always failed . . . . We know even more clearly 
than in 1968 that integration is the clearest path for non-white families 
to acquire a foothold in the American education and economic system.” 
Walter F. Mondale, Afterword to The Fight for Fair Housing: 
Causes, Consequences, and Future Implications of the 1968 Fair 
Housing Act 295 (Gregory D. Squires ed., 2018). 
55. See, e.g., William H. Frey & Dowell Myers, U. of Mich. 
Population Stud. Ctr., Racial Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan 
Areas and Cities, 1990–2000: Patterns, Trends, and Explanations 
22 (2005) (concluding that the black–white dissimilarity levels reflected 
in the 2000 census are “significantly affected, most, by the relative 
household incomes of Blacks versus Whites”). 
56. See Logan & Stults, supra note 41, at 21 (identifying reasons beyond 
economic differences for the persistence of black–white segregation and 
concluding that “[p]art of the answer is that systematic discrimination in 
the housing market has not ended”). That economic differences account 
for only part of the answer is demonstrated by the fact that “minorities 
at every income level live in poorer neighborhoods than do whites with 
comparable incomes.” John R. Logan, US2010 Project, Separate 
and Unequal: The Neighborhood Gap for Blacks, Hispanics, and 
Asians in Metropolitan America 1 (2011) (finding that the “disparity 
between black and white neighborhood poverty in a metropolitan area is 
hardly related to blacks’ average income levels [and] racial segregation is 
a very strong predictor of unequal neighborhoods”). 
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the FHA condemns continue at discouragingly high levels. Although 
those levels have diminished since 1968,57 more needs to be done. 
B. The Housing Choice Voucher Program (“Section 8”) 
The Housing Choice Voucher (“HCV”) program is the federal 
government’s largest housing subsidy program, serving over 2.2 million 
low-income households comprising some 5.3 million individuals. 58 
Created by the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act,59 the 
program is sometimes called “Section 8” after the provision in that 
statute authorizing it.60 
Actually, Section 8 has two components: “tenant-based” assistance, 
which provides vouchers to low-income renters, and “project-based” 
assistance, which provides subsidies to owners of low-income 
apartments. 61  Under both the tenant- and project-based programs, 
 
57. See, e.g., Margery Austin Turner et al., U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & 
Urban Dev., Housing Discrimination Against Racial and Ethnic 
Minorities 2012, at 5 (2013) (finding that, in the most recent of HUD’s 
four national-tester-based studies, minority home-seekers are still often 
“told about and shown fewer homes and apartment than [comparable] 
whites”). For a description of the levels of rental and sales discrimination 
found in these four HUD studies, see Schwemm, supra note 11, § 2:4. 
58. See U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., New Picture of Subsidized 
Housing Fact Sheet (June 8, 2018), http://www.huduser.gov/portal/elist/ 
 2018-june_08.html [https://perma.cc/XU7K-NQ2B] [hereinafter New Picture] 
(reporting that in 2016, the HCV program had funding for 2,474,400 units, 
93% of which were occupied by 5,350,188 individuals). 
 The HCV program assists more families than the other two major federal 
rental-assistance programs combined: public housing has about one 
million units serving over two million residents; project-based rental 
assistance has about 1.3 million units serving some two million residents. 
See U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 2017 Office of Fair 
Housing and Equal Opportunity Annual Report to Congress 66 
(2018) [hereinafter 2017 HUD Report] (reporting that, in the eighteen-
month period ending September 30, 2017, there were 2,215,224 households 
assisted by tenant-based vouchers and 982,752 assisted by public 
housing); infra note 61 (providing comparable figures for the project-based 
rental program). 
59. Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 8(a), 88 Stat. 633, 662 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437f (2012)); see also 24 C.F.R. § 982.1 (2018) (providing an overview 
of the HCV program). 
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(D) (2012). Although the name was eventually 
changed to the Housing Choice Voucher program, see infra note 80, courts 
often still refer to it as the “Section 8” program. See, e.g., Hayes v. 
Harvey, 903 F.3d 32, 40 (3d Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
61. See Hayes, 903 F.3d at 36 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(f)(6)–(7) (2012); 24 
C.F.R. § 982.1(b)(1) (2018)) (describing both the tenant- and project-
based programs). A project-based owner enters into a long-term contract 
with the local public housing agency (“PHA”), under which the owner 
agrees to rent its property to eligible low-income families and the PHA 
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assisted families contribute a prescribed amount toward their rental 
payments62 with the government paying the balance up to a statutorily 
capped amount.63 
The basic features of the tenant-based voucher program have 
remained the same over the years.64  HUD funds the program and 
administers it through roughly 2100 local public housing agencies 
(“PHAs”) with which HUD contracts.65 Based on local-market data and 
statutory caps, HUD sets basic rent levels (“payment standards”) for 
 
agrees to provide HUD-funded rental-assistance payments to the owner 
on the assisted tenants’ behalf. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b) (2012); 24 C.F.R. 
§§ 983.202, .205 (2018). The owner then enters into written leases with 
particular families for individual units. See 24 C.F.R. § 983.256 (2018); 
24 C.F.R. § 982.308(b) (1998). In 2019, there were 17,335 project-based 
Section 8 properties comprising about 1.3 million units and 2 million 
people. See U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., Contract 
Renewal Information—All Contracts (2019), available at 
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Housing/documents/contractrenewaal
lcontracts.zip [https://perma.cc/8VTJ-2JRM]; see also supra note 58. 
 The project-based program and the housing units it subsidizes are subject 
to the FHA’s nondiscrimination commands and other applicable civil 
rights laws. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.53 (2018); see, e.g., Gresham v. 
Windrush Partners, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1417, 1422 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding 
that a Section 8 project-based landlord violated the FHA by failing to 
comply with certain HUD subsidized-housing regulations). Project-based 
developments have been involved in a good deal of FHA litigation, 
including a number of challenges to local governments’ efforts to block 
such developments. See, e.g., Atkins v. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 852, 857–
65 (E.D. Va. 1982); United States v. City of Birmingham, 538 F. Supp. 
819, 822 (E.D. Mich. 1982); see also infra Part IV.B (discussing FHA 
exclusionary-land-use cases). 
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2) (2012); see also id. § 1437a(a)(1). 
63. See id. § 1437f(c), (o)(1)–(2); Hayes, 903 F.3d at 36–37. 
64. See, e.g., Stacy Seicshnaydre et al., Missing Opportunity: Furthering Fair 
Housing in the Housing Choice Voucher Program, 79 L. & Contemp. 
Probs. 173, 174–84 (2016) (describing the HCV program’s structure and 
purposes). 
65. 24 C.F.R. § 982.151(a)(1) (2018). Local PHAs administer the program in 
accordance with a formal administrative plan that must both conform to 
HUD regulations and rely on HUD-established rent levels. See infra note 
66 and accompanying text. 
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each area (known as “Fair Market Rents” or “FMRs”),66 and voucher 
holders rent units that fall within these FMRs.67 
Low-income families apply for a voucher from their local PHA, 
which screens them for income and other eligibility requirements.68 For 
those who qualify, the PHA issues a voucher,69 or, more likely, puts 
them on a waiting list.70 Once a family is selected, the PHA provides 
them with program information that includes “a list of landlords [or 
other parties] known to the PHA who may be willing to lease a unit to 
 
66. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.503(a)(1) (2018). The local PHA adopts a schedule 
that sets voucher-payment-standard amounts per unit size for each FMR 
area in its jurisdiction. The payment standards are designed to cover the 
prevailing rent levels for all but the top end of the rental market and are 
between 90% and 110% of the relevant FMR. The amount of rent that a 
voucher family must pay is generally no more than 30% of the family’s 
adjusted income. See id. §§ 982.503, .505, .515. 
 Until recently, HUD calculated FMRs using rent levels for entire 
metropolitan areas or other large jurisdictions. This meant that an area’s 
FMR might not accurately reflect rents in the area’s higher-cost 
submarkets, which often resulted in payment standards being too low for 
“voucher holders to afford rents in high-rent, high-opportunity 
neighborhoods, consigning them to low-opportunity areas of concentrated 
poverty.” See Open Cmtys. Alliance v. Carson, 286 F. Supp. 3d 148, 154 
(D.D.C. 2017); see also Seicshnaydre et al., supra note 64, at 175 (noting 
that HUD’s “creation of a single-voucher payment standard for an entire 
region . . . steered voucher families to the lowest-cost neighborhoods”). 
“HUD recognized the shortcomings of FMR schedules . . . as early as 
1977.” Open Cmtys. Alliance, 286 F. Supp. 3d at 155 n.2. Thus, it began 
to address the problem in 2010 by considering the use of smaller-area 
FMRs (“SAFMRs”), and it eventually adopted a rule in 2016 that 
required PHAs in twenty-four major metropolitan areas to use SAFRMs. 
See id. at 152–59. The Trump Administration tried to suspend this rule 
in 2017, but that effort was enjoined for violating the Administrative 
Procedure Act, see id. at 161-79, and thus HUD's new SAFRM rule went 
into effect as scheduled in 2018. 
67. See U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., Housing Choice Vouchers Fact 
Sheet, https://www.hud.gov/topics/housing_choice_voucher_program_ 
 section_8 [https://perma.cc/JBA5-QNZZ] (last visited Mar. 9, 2020). A 
family may lease an apartment for more than this standard, but PHA 
assistance cannot exceed the standard; if rent exceeds the standard, the 
family must pay the difference. 
68. The selection criteria are set forth in HUD regulations and in the PHA’s 
administrative plan. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.151(a)(1) (2018). Eligibility for 
the HCV program depends primarily on household income. HUD’s income 
limits are set based on the number of persons in the applicant household. 
See generally U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., supra note 67. 
69. See U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., supra note 67; 24 C.F.R. 
§§ 982.202, .302 (2018). 
70. See New Picture, supra note 58 (noting that the average family receiving 
a voucher spent thirty months on a waiting list). 
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the family or . . . assist the family in locating a unit.”71 A family with 
a voucher then seeks housing on its own, generally paying no more than 
30% of its income for rent, with the PHA paying the remainder to the 
landlord with HUD funds.72 Vouchers are good for at least sixty days 
(and may be renewed),73 and they are “portable,” which means they 
may be used anywhere in the country, so long as the rental unit chosen 
is in the jurisdiction of a PHA that administers a HCV program.74 
In the voucher program, as in the non-subsidized market, landlords 
are responsible for screening prospective tenants,75 and they may use 
their regular selection criteria. 76  Once an assisted family finds an 
appropriate unit and a landlord willing to rent to them, the local PHA 
must approve the tenancy. To approve it, the PHA first must inspect 
the apartment and determine that the rent and lease terms conform to 
the program’s requirements.77 The PHA then enters into a contract 
with the property owner that specifies payment amounts and other 
 
71. 24 C.F.R. § 982.301(b)(11) (2018). 
72. See id. §§ 982.1(a)(3), .503(b); see also U.S. Dep’t of Housing & 
Urban Dev., supra note 67 (providing general rules and exceptions). 
73. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.303 (2018). 
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(f)(7) (2012); 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(b) (2012). For more 
on the portability of vouchers, see Housing Choice Voucher Program: 
Streamlining the Portability Process, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,564 (Aug. 20, 2015), 
as amended, 80 Fed. Reg. 52,619 (Sept. 2, 2015); U.S. Dep’t of Housing 
& Urban Dev., Notice PIH 2016-09(HA), Housing Choice Voucher 
(HCV) Family Moves with Continued Assistance, Family Briefing, 
and Voucher Term’s Suspension 4 (2016). 
75. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.307(a)(2) (2018). Under HUD regulations that give 
the landlord responsibility for screening prospective HCV tenants, the 
landlord may consider a family’s background and tenancy history with 
respect to payment of rent and utility bills, caring for the apartment, 
respecting the rights of other residents, drug-related or other criminal 
activity, and compliance with other essential tenancy conditions. Id. 
§ 982.307(a)(3). 
76. See id. § 982.308(b)(2). 
77. See id. §§ 982.302(b), .405. In order to approve the tenancy, the PHA 
must determine: 1) after an inspection of the apartment, that it meets the 
housing-quality standards established by HUD in 24 C.F.R. § 982.401 
(2018); 2) that the rent is reasonable, as defined by HUD’s guidelines set 
forth in 24 C.F.R. § 982.507 (2018); and 3) that the lease conforms to 
HUD requirements. 
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terms.78 The property owner also enters into a written lease with the 
assisted family.79 
Congress made some changes to the Section 8 voucher program 
during the 1980s and 1990s.80 For present purposes, the most significant 
was a 1987 provision mandating that landlords who participated in the 
program could not discriminate against other tenants who used 
vouchers (the so-called “Take One, Take All” requirement).81 This 
requirement ultimately came to be seen as discouraging landlords from 
participating in the HCV program, and Congress repealed it in 1998.82 
Thereafter, landlord-participation in the program was seen as 
“voluntary.”83 
 
78. 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(b)(2) (2018); see also Montgomery Cty. v. Glenmont 
Hills, 936 A.2d 325, 328–30 (Md. 2007). This contract covers only the 
single unit and the particular assisted family involved, and it may be for 
a term as short as one year. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.1(b)(2), .309(a) (2018). 
79. 24 C.F.R. § 982.308(b) (2018). The lease must be either the standard 
lease used by the landlord for non-assisted tenants or a model lease 
prepared by HUD, and it must include a HUD-prepared addendum that 
sets forth certain rights of the tenant and landlord. See id. §§ 982.162(a)(3), 
.308(b)–(f). 
80. See, e.g., Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2461 (merging the certificate and voucher programs 
and changing “Section 8” to “HCV”); see also infra note 81 and 
accompanying text. See generally Alex F. Schwartz, Housing Policy 
in the United States 227–37 (3d ed. 2015) (describing the Section 8 
program’s evolution). 
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1)(B) (1988) (barring affected apartment 
owners from refusing “to lease any available dwelling unit . . . to a 
holder of a voucher . . . , a proximate cause of which is the status of 
such prospective tenant as a holder of such voucher”); Knapp v. Eagle 
Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1276 (7th Cir. 1995). This requirement 
was designed to “prevent landlords from picking and choosing from the 
pool of Section 8 applicants who apply to rent apartments.” Salute v. 
Stratford Greens Gardens Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 1998). 
Cases accusing landlords of violating this provision included Graoch 
Assoc. # 33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Human Relations 
Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2007); Knapp, 54 F.3d at 1272; Glover 
v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corps., 746 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990); Bronson v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corp., 724 F. Supp. 
148 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
82. See Graoch Assoc. # 33, 508 F.3d at 391; Salute, 136 F.3d at 297. 
83. See, e.g., Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 
890, 900 (5th Cir. 2019), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 930 F.3d 660 
(5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1234 (2020); Salute, 136 F.3d at 
298 (noting “the voluntary nature of the Section 8 program”); Knapp, 54 
F.3d at 1280 (same). 
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Thus, although federal law bars discrimination against voucher 
holders in some types of government-assisted housing,84 it does not 
outlaw this type of discrimination by private landlords.85 And from the 
beginning of the Section 8 program, many housing providers have 
refused to accept voucher holders.86 
 
84. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(6)(B)(iv) (2012) (barring discrimination 
against voucher holders in the Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
(“LIHTC”) program); see also Poverty & Race Res. Action Council, 
Expanding Choice: Practical Strategies for Building a Successful Housing 
Mobility Program, app. B at 140, 145 (2020), available at https://prrac.org/ 
 state-and-local-source-of-income-nondiscrimination-laws_protections/ 
[https://perma.cc/U9LK-YAL9] (identifying HUD programs that bar 
such discrimination, such as HOME and the National Housing Trust 
Fund). 
 Since its inception in 1986, the LIHTC program has supported the 
creation of over 3.1 million affordable-housing units. See Off. of Pol’y Dev. 
& Res., Dataset: Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, U.S. Dep’t of 
Housing & Urban Dev.: HUD User, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/ 
 datasets/lihtc.html [https://perma.cc/6R8T-D58L] (last updated May 24, 
2019). 
85. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 920 F.3d at 900; Salute, 136 F.3d at 298; 
Knapp, 54 F.3d at 1280. 
86. See, e.g., Knapp, 54 F.3d at 1280 (noting that “non-participating owners 
routinely reject section 8 voucher holders”); Mary Cunningham et al., 
U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., A Pilot Study of Landlord 
Acceptance of Housing Choice Vouchers 9 (2018), available at 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/pilot-study-landlord-acceptance-hcv.html 
[https://perma.cc/5BZU-ZZVA] (reviewing “16 studies that examined the 
extent of landlord discrimination in jurisdictions nationwide between 2000 
and 2017,” and concluding that “research consistently finds evidence of 
both perceived and actual landlord discrimination against voucher 
holders”); Hiren Nisar et al., U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 
Landlord Participation Study: Multidisciplinary Research 
Team 13 (2018), available at https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/ 
 Landlord-Participation-Study-Final-Report.html [https://perma.cc/7PPD-
MXHS] (reporting that between 2010 and 2016, when voucher use 
increased, the number of landlords accepting vouchers “decreased from 
just over 700,000 to around 640,000”); Austin Tenants’ Council, An 
Audit Report on the Refusal of Housing Choice Vouchers by 
Landlords in the Austin MSA 3 (2012), available at https://www 
 .austintexas.gov/edims/document.cfm?id=211114 [https://perma.cc/PX9M-
NM6P] (reporting that 91% of private landlords in Austin, Texas, refuse 
to accept vouchers); Lawyers’ Comm. for Better Housing, Inc., 
Locked Out: Barriers to Choice for Housing Voucher Holders 11 
(2002), available at https://lcbh.org/reports/locked-out-barriers-choice-
housing-voucher-holders [https://perma.cc/PRW5-TA58] (reporting that 
over a decade after a Chicago law was enacted banning source-of-income 
discrimination, 70% of landlords tested there still discriminated on that 
ground). 
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Since its inception, the Section 8 voucher program’s goals have been 
to aid “low-income families in obtaining a decent place to live” and to 
promote “economically mixed housing.”87 The program was popular 
and grew rapidly because it provided assistance quickly, allowed 
families a better housing choices, was designed to disperse low-income 
families throughout the community, did not create local objections to 
public projects, and was relatively inexpensive per family assisted.88 
Despite its advantages, the voucher program has never achieved its 
full potential and continues to have many problems. Funding depends 
on yearly congressional appropriations, which ebb and flow with the 
political tide. Eligible families generally spend months on waiting lists 
and then have only a limited time to secure appropriate housing, leaving 
some vouchers unused.89 This also encourages assisted families to seek 
units in their current low-income neighborhoods, a tendency that has 
been reinforced by HUD’s method for determining appropriate rent 
levels.90 The program relies on hundreds of different PHAs, whose 
priorities, capacities, and abilities vary greatly. From a landlord’s 
perspective, having to deal with a local PHA and HUD—including the 
need for inspections and uniform lease provisions 91 —may appear 
daunting, and the economic incentives to participate in the program 
often depend on local-market conditions (e.g., landlords in high-
opportunity neighborhoods with tight rental markets may see no reason 
to deal with the voucher program). And to the extent that landlords 
choose not to participate, a voucher user’s housing search becomes that 
much more difficult. The result is an uncertain system in which most 
 
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2012); see also id. § 5301(c)(6) (declaring that the 
Section 8 program’s objectives include “the reduction of the isolation of 
income groups within communities and geographical areas and the 
promotion of an increase in the diversity and vitality of neighborhoods 
through the spatial deconcentration of housing opportunities for persons 
of lower income”). 
88. See Seicshnaydre et al., supra note 64, at 187 & nn.108–09. 
89. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text. 
90. See supra note 66. 
91. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
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vouchers are mainly used in low-income, low-opportunity areas,92 a 
practice that reinforces ethnic- and income-based segregation.93 
C. State and Local Source-of-Income Laws 
1. Locations and Variety 
By 2020, seventeen states and over seventy localities had enacted 
housing laws that ban some form of source-of-income discrimination94: 
The states are: California; Connecticut; Delaware; Maine; Maryland; 
Massachusetts; Minnesota; New Jersey; New York; North Dakota; 
Oklahoma; Oregon; Utah; Vermont; Virginia; Washington; and 
Wisconsin. 95  The localities include: New York City; Los Angeles; 
Chicago; Philadelphia; Washington, D.C.; St. Louis; Memphis; 
Milwaukee; Denver; Seattle; San Francisco; and San Diego.96 A handful 
of these laws date back to the 1970s, and another twenty were passed 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Most—over fifty—have been enacted since 
2000,97 with New York state and Los Angeles (both city and county) 
being among the most recent.98 
These laws reflect a variety of approaches. Some states prohibit 
only discrimination against Section 8-voucher recipients and other 
 
92. See, e.g., Alicia Mazzara & Brian Knudsen, Ctr. On Budget & 
Pol’y Priorities, Where Families With Children Use Housing 
Vouchers: A Comparative Look at the 50 Largest Metropolitan 
Areas 13 (2019), available at https://prrac.org/where-families-with-
children-use-housing-vouchers/ [https://perma.cc/TB87-F82Q]; Barbara 
Sard & Douglas Rice, Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, Realizing 
the Housing Voucher Program’s Potential to Enable Families 
to Move to Better Neighborhoods 1, 6 (2016), available at https:// 
 www.cbpp.org/research/housing/realizing-the-housing-voucher-programs-
potential-to-enable-families-to-move-to [https://perma.cc/Q3UE-QVNG]; 
see also supra note 66. 
93. See, e.g., Seicshnaydre et al., supra note 64, at 173 (noting that HUD “never 
structured the [voucher] program to address segregation, deconcentrate low-
income persons, expand housing choice, or further fair housing”); see also 
id. at 194–97 (proposing tools for reforming historical flaws in the HCV 
program). 
94. See Poverty & Race Res. Action Council, supra note 84. 
95. See infra app. I (providing these laws’ statutory citations, their years of 
enactment, and some of their key language). 
96. See infra app. II (providing a more detailed list of such localities). 
97. See Alison Bell et al., Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, 
Prohibiting Discrimination Against Renters Using Housing 
Vouchers Improves Results 2–3 (2018), available at https://www 
 .cbpp.org/research/housing/prohibiting-discrimination-against-renters-using-
housing-vouchers-improves-results [https://perma.cc/SBA8-U3WJ]. 
98. See infra apps. I, II (describing these laws in more detail). 
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government housing subsidies.99 Others outlaw discrimination based on 
a person’s having received governmental “assistance,” which may or 
may not include housing vouchers. 100  Others outlaw discrimination 
based on “source of income,” but exclude voucher holders from their 
protection, either explicitly in the statute or by court interpretation.101 
Other “source of income” laws have been interpreted to include voucher 
 
99. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151B, § 4.10 (2019) (making it unlawful 
“for any person furnishing . . . rental accommodations to discriminate 
against any individual . . . who is a tenant receiving federal, state, or 
local housing subsidies . . . because the individual is such a recipient”); 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4581-A(4) (2019) (making it unlawful 
“[f]or any person furnishing rental premises . . . to refuse to rent . . . to 
any individual who is a recipient of federal, state or local public assistance, 
including . . . housing subsidies, primarily because of the individual’s 
status as recipient”); infra app. I; infra notes 109–11. 
100. See Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 363A.03, .09 (2019) (barring housing 
discrimination because a tenant is “receiving federal, state, or local 
subsidies, including rental assistance or rent supplements”); see also N.D. 
Cent. Code Ann. §§ 14-02.4-02(19), .5-02(1)–(2) (2019) (barring 
discrimination “because of . . . status with respect to . . . public 
assistance,” which includes tenants “receiving federal, state, or local 
subsidies, including rental assistance or rent supplements”); Vt. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 9, § 4503(a)(2) (2019) (barring housing discrimination “because 
a person is a recipient of public assistance”); infra app. I. 
 The Minnesota statute was interpreted to allow landlords to refuse Section 
8 voucher holders n Edwards v. Hopkins Plaza Limited Partnership, 783 
N.W.2d 171, 175–79 (Minn. App. 2010). For a critique of Edwards, see 
Derek Waller, Leveraging State and Local Antidiscrimination Laws to 
Prohibit Discrimination Against Recipients of Federal Rental Assistance, 
27 J. Affordable Housing 401, 415–21 (2018). 
101. See Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1282–83 (7th Cir. 
1995) (interpreting Wisconsin law, which bans housing discrimination 
based on “lawful source of income” (Wis. Stat. Ann. § 101.22(6) (1995)), 
not to include Section 8 vouchers); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4607(j) 
(2019) (allowing, within Delaware’s “source of income” law, landlords to 
not participate in government rental-assistance programs). 
 Oregon’s source-of-income law, as originally enacted in 1995, explicitly 
did not include “federal rent subsidy payments under [Section 8] and any 
other local, state or federal housing assistance.” See Or. Rev. Stat. 
§ 659A.421(d)(A) (2010). It was amended in 2013, however, to include 
such assistance. See 2013 Or. Laws Ch. 740 (H.B. 2639). 
 California amended its fair housing law in 1999 to prohibit discrimination 
based on a tenant’s “source of income,” but this was interpreted in 2010 
not to cover Section 8 vouchers. See Sabi v. Sterling, 183 Cal. App. 4th 
916, 929–30 (2010). In 2019, however, this law was amended to include 
such coverage. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12955(p)(1) (amended by Cal. 
Stats. 2019, c. 600 (S.B. 329)). 
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holders,102 with some laws explicitly providing for voucher coverage.103 
Overall, as a result of these state and local voucher-antidiscrimination 
laws, about half of the households using vouchers are now protected.104 
The breadth of these laws varies in other ways as well. Some apply 
only to rental situations,105 but most cover a wider range of housing 
transactions by, for example, simply including in their fair housing laws 
“source of income” among the forbidden bases of discrimination.106 In 
addition, some state laws have foreclosed certain potential defenses 
(e.g., a landlord’s objecting not just to voucher holders as tenants, but 
 
102. See Comm’n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Sullivan Assocs., 739 
A.2d 238, 241 (Conn. 1999); Franklin Tower One v. N.M., 725 A.2d 1104, 
1112–13 (N.J. 1999); see also Montgomery Cty. v. Glenmont Hills Assocs., 
936 A.2d 325, 333–34 (Md. 2007) (interpreting Montgomery County’s 
source-of-income ordinance to require landlords to accept Section 8 
vouchers); Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey, 815 N.E.2d 822, 826–28 (Ill. App. 
2004) (same, regarding Chicago’s source-of-income ordinance). 
103. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.421(d)(A) (2013); Feemster v. BSA Ltd. 
P’ship, 548 F.3d 1063, 1069–71 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that the D.C. 
Human Rights Act, which bans discrimination in “‘any transaction in real 
property’ . . . ‘wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason based 
on’ . . . an individual’s ‘source of income,’” “expressly defines ‘source of 
income’ as encompassing the Section 8 program”) (quoting D.C. Code 
§ 2–1402.21(a)(1)–(2) (2007)); Bourbeau v. Jonathan Woodner Co., 549 
F. Supp. 2d 78, 89 (D.D.C. 2008) (concluding the same); see also City & 
Cty. of San Francisco v. Post, 22 Cal. App. 5th 121, 124–25 (2018) (noting 
that San Francisco’s fair-housing ordinance, as amended in 1998, outlaws 
discrimination based on a person’s “source of income” and defines that 
term to include government rent subsidies) (citing S.F., Cal., Police 
Code art. 33, § 3304(a) (1998)). 
104. See Poverty & Race Research Action Council, supra note 84, app. 
B at 1 (noting a 2018 study estimating the figure at 34%, see Alison 
Bell et al., supra note 97, but concluding in early 2020 that, due to the 
recent passage of source-of-income laws in two states (New York and 
California) and several municipalities, a better estimate now would be 
"almost 50%"). 
105. See supra note 99 (Massachusetts and Maine); infra app. I (New York, 
New Jersey, and Washington). 
106. See, e.g., infra notes 115–13 and accompanying text (Connecticut); supra 
note 101 and accompanying text (California); infra app. I (Oregon, Utah, 
Vermont, and Wisconsin); supra note 103 (Washington, D.C. and San 
Francisco); Montgomery Cty., 936 A.2d at 330–31 (Montgomery County, 
Maryland). 
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also to the requirements of the governmental program involved), either 
explicitly or by judicial interpretation;107 others allow such defenses.108 
Two New England states provide examples of the different 
approaches. In 1971, Massachusetts became the first state to enact a 
statute prohibiting landlords from discriminating against persons using 
government vouchers. 109  That statute did not apply to all of the 
transactions covered by the state’s fair-housing law, but dealt only with 
“rental accommodations.” 110  As originally enacted, this provision 
prohibited landlords from discriminating against any recipient of public 
assistance or housing subsidies “solely because the individual is such a 
recipient.”111 In 1987, the state supreme court interpreted “solely” to 
allow a landlord to refuse Section 8 voucher holders because he objected 
to the program’s mandated lease terms.112 Thereafter, the law was 
amended both to remove the word “solely” and to add a further 
prohibition barring landlords from discriminating “because of any 
requirement of such public assistance, rental assistance, or housing 
subsidy program.”113 As a result, Massachusetts landlords now may not 
reject recipients of any housing-assistance program, nor use as a defense 
their objection to the requirements of such a program.114   
107. See DiLiddo v. Oxford St. Realty, Inc., 876 N.E.2d 421, 427–31 (Mass. 
2007) (Massachusetts); Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d at 248–51 (Connecticut); 
Franklin Tower One, 725 A.2d at 1114–15 (New Jersey); see also 
Feemster, 548 F.3d at 1069–71 (D.C. law); Montgomery Cty., 936 A.2d at 
339–42 (county ordinance). 
108. See Dussault v. RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC, 86 A.3d 52, 58–60 
(Me. 2014) (interpreting Maine law); see also Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey, 
815 N.E.2d 822, 827 (Ill. App. 2004) (holding that, although Chicago’s 
source-of-income ban includes Section 8 vouchers, landlords who reject 
voucher holders may raise defenses related to the Section 8 program). 
109. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(10) (1971); infra app. I. 
110. See DiLiddo, 876 N.E.2d at 422 n.2. 
111. Id. at 427. 
112. Att’y Gen. v. Brown, 511 N.E.2d 1103, 1108–10 (Mass. 1987) 
(distinguishing between housing discrimination that occurs “solely” 
because a prospective tenant uses a voucher and discrimination that 
occurs because a landlord refuses, for economic or other reasons, to be 
subject to the voucher program’s requirements). 
113. See DiLiddo, 876 N.E.2d at 428–29 (describing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
151B, § 4 (1990)). 
114. See id. at 429–31. Thus, landlords cannot claim that their objections to a 
program’s requirements amount to a “legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason” for an otherwise unlawful refusal to rent. As the DiLiddo opinion 
put it, the amended law delineates what is “legitimate” and 
“nondiscriminatory” under the statute. Id. at 429. The law also does not 
permit a defense based on the fact that a housing-subsidy program’s 
requirements may cause the landlord “substantial economic harm.” Id. at 
429–30; cf. Burbank Apartments Tenant Ass’n v. Kargman, 48 N.E.3d 
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By contrast, Connecticut has reached a similar result through a 
broader statute that, in 1990, simply added to the state’s fair housing 
law “lawful source of income” as a prohibited basis of discrimination.115 
Nine years later, the state supreme court held that the statute’s new 
language prohibits landlords from refusing to rent to otherwise qualified 
Section 8 tenants.116 
2. Legal Challenges To 
State and local laws that ban some form of source-of-income 
discrimination obviously go beyond the current FHA. But they are in 
no danger of federal preemption on this ground because the FHA has a 
provision that explicitly allows any state or local law that “grants, 
guarantees, or protects the same rights as are granted by” the FHA.117 
Some of these laws, however, have been challenged as being inconsistent 
with—and thus preempted by—Section 8’s scheme, which makes 
landlord-participation in that program “voluntary.”118 Generally, these 
challenges have failed. 119  There is one exception, however: a 1995 
 
394, 406 (Mass. 2016) (holding that this law does not prevent Section 8 
project-based landlords from withdrawing from this program, which is 
appurtenant to the rental unit, not the tenant). 
 By contrast, Maine’s law outlawed discrimination “primarily” on the 
forbidden basis, which parallelled the original version of Massachusetts’s 
law. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4581-A(4) (2019). Maine’s law, 
however, was not amended, leading that state’s supreme court to interpret 
it to allow a landlord to reject voucher holders if the reason for doing so 
was to avoid the voucher-program’s requirements. See Dussault v. RRE 
Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC, 86 A.3d 52, 58–60 (Me. 2014). 
115. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-64c(a)(1)–(2) (1989); Comm’n on 
Human Rights & Opportunities v. Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d 238, 246 
(Conn. 1999). 
116. See Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d 238 at 241–42 (holding that the 
Connecticut statute bars landlords from requiring a lease that contains 
either tenant-income requirements beyond those contemplated by the 
Section 8 program or any other deviations from the voucher-program’s 
requirements). 
117. See supra note 27. 
118. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
119. See Austin Apartment Ass’n v. City of Austin, 89 F. Supp. 3d 886, 894–
96 (W.D. Tex. 2015); Bourbeau v. Jonathan Woodner Co., 549 F. Supp. 
2d 78, 87–89 (D.D.C. 2008); Montgomery Cty. v. Glenmont Hills Assocs., 
936 A.2d 325, 339–42 (Md. 2007); Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d at 245–46; 
Franklin Tower One, LLC v. N.M., 725 A.2d 1104, 1107–15 (N.J. 1999); 
Stevenson v. San Francisco Hous. Auth., 24 Cal. App. 4th 269, 280–83 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Att’y Gen. v. Brown, 511 N.E.2d 1103, 1105–06 
(Mass. 1987); see also 24 C.F.R. § 982.53(d) (2018) (explaining that the 
federal statutes creating the voucher program are not intended “to pre-
empt operation of State and local laws that prohibit discrimination 
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decision in which the Seventh Circuit held that Wisconsin’s “source-of-
income” law did not apply to Section 8 vouchers, in part because the 
court was hesitant “to allow a state to make a voluntary federal 
program mandatory.”120 
The scores of different local ordinances that ban some form of 
source-of-income discrimination reveal an even greater variety of 
coverage than the states’ laws. Many of these ordinances go beyond 
their state’s fair-housing laws, which has prompted some landlords to 
challenge local laws as being inconsistent with, and thus preempted by, 
their state’s law. 121  The results of these challenges have varied 
depending on the specific language of the particular state law involved. 
For example, California’s fair housing law—which since 1999 has 
banned source-of-income discrimination, but did not until 2019 cover 
vouchers and other government subsidies 122  —provides that it is 
intended “to occupy the field . . . encompassed” by its anti-
discrimination provisions. 123  San Francisco’s source-of-income 
ordinance, passed in 1998, explicitly includes voucher holders within its 
protection,124 leading landlords in that city to claim that this ordinance 
was preempted by the state law. The California court of appeals 
rejected that claim, reading the state’s preemption clause narrowly and 
thus leaving San Francisco’s broader law intact.125 
On the other hand, preemption challenges to New York City’s 
source-of-income law—which compels landlords to accept governmental 
vouchers—have achieved a modicum of success based on a state statute 
that prevents local governments from extending their rent-control 
regulations. While this law does not block the City’s basic mandate to 
 
against a Section 8 voucher-holder because of status as a Section 8 
voucher-holder”). 
120. Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995). 
121. See also Fletcher Props., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 931 N.W.2d 410, 
429 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019) (reversing trial court’s ruling that Minneapolis 
ordinance, which bars rental discrimination against voucher holders and 
other public-assistance recipients on the basis that “the requirements of a 
public assistance program,” violated landlords’ rights under state 
constitution’s due-process and equal-protection provisions); Apartment 
Ass’n of Metro. Pittsburgh, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 107 WAL 2019, 
2019 WL 4253476 (Pa. Sept. 9, 2019) (vacating and remanding for further 
review lower court's determination that Pittsburgh’s source-of-income 
ordinance was invalid under Pennsylvania’s “home rule” law insofar as 
the ordinance required landlords to accept Section 8 voucher holders). 
122. See Sabi v. Sterling, 183 Cal. App. 4th 916, 928–30 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). 
123. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12993(c) (2019). 
124. See City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Post, 22 Cal. App. 5th 121, 124–25 
(2018) (citing S.F., Cal. Police Code art. 33, § 3304(a) (2019)). 
125. Id.  
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landlords to accept vouchers,126 it has been held to narrow the City’s 
mandate so as not to compel landlords to accept a local subsidy 
program that requires them to extend leases at the same rent.127 
Texas and Indiana both passed laws in 2015 barring localities from 
outlawing discrimination against voucher holders in response to local 
ordinances (enacted by Austin and Indianapolis, respectively).128 Local 
landlords were initially unsuccessful in challenging Austin’s 2014 
ordinance, producing a decision that Texas’s current law did not 
preempt it.129 Thereafter the state passed legislation barring all of its 
localities from prohibiting landlords “from refusing to lease or 
rent . . . to a person because the person’s lawful source of income to 
pay rent includes funding from a federal housing assistance program.”130 
Austin responded with a federal lawsuit seeking to enjoin state officials 
from enforcing this law based on its alleged disparate impact on 
minorities.131 The district court upheld this claim based on the FHA 
provision that condemns any state law purporting “to require or permit 
any action that would be a discriminatory housing practice” under the 
FHA,132 but the Fifth Circuit ordered dismissal of the claim for lack of 
jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment.133 
 
126. See Tapia v. Successful Mgmt. Corp., 915 N.Y.S.2d 19, 22 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2010). 
127. See Alston v. Starrett City, Inc., 74 N.Y.S.3d 211, 215 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2018). 
128. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 250.007(a) (West 2019); Ind. Code 
§ 36-1-3-8.5 (2019). The Texas law was also prompted by concerns that 
Dallas would adopt a voucher-included source-of-income law, which it did 
in 2016. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Abbott, No. 3:17-CV-0440-
D, 2018 WL 2415034, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. May 29, 2018). 
129. See Austin Apartment Ass’n v. City of Austin, 89 F. Supp. 3d 886, 892–
93 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (denying preliminary injunction against city’s 
source-of-income ordinance that covers voucher holders, because plaintiff-
association failed to show likelihood of success under various theories). 
130. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 250.007(c) (West 2019); see also 
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 2018 WL 2415034, at *4–12 (dismissing on 
standing and jurisdictional grounds a private plaintiff’s challenge to this 
law). 
131. See City of Austin v. Paxton, 325 F. Supp. 3d 749 (W.D. Tex. 2018), 
rev'd, 943 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 2019); see also Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 
Inc., 2018 WL 2415034, at *2 n.1 (quoting plaintiff’s allegation that, 
although Texas’s renter households are only 19% Black, the “Texas 
voucher population is 86% minority with 55% Black, Non-Hispanic 
tenants and 30% Hispanic tenants”). 
132. See Paxton, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 759–60. 
133. See Paxton, 943 F.3d at 997-1004. 
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II. Past Experience 
A. State-and-Local-Law Cases 
1. Types of Cases and a Caution 
Virtually all of the claims brought under state and local housing 
laws banning source-of-income discrimination have been brought 
against landlords. This is explained in part by the fact that some of 
these laws are limited to rental situations. 134  Most of these laws, 
however, also ban discrimination in sales, financing, insurance, and 
other housing transactions, just as the FHA does;135 and even in these 
places, the vast majority of source-of-income cases have involved rental 
housing. 
For example, Chicago’s fair-housing ordinance covers a wide variety 
of housing transactions and has outlawed source-of-income 
discrimination since 1990.136 The agency that enforces this law—the 
Chicago Commission on Human Relations (“CCHR”)—has produced a 
total of eighteen decisions in fully litigated cases involving source-of-
income discrimination, and all were brought against landlords or their 
agents.137 A similar pattern exists in New York City and other places 
with an active source-of-income docket. 138  Indeed, source-of-income 
claims against defendants other than landlords have produced only a 
handful of reported decisions.139 
A word of caution: Experience in places with source-of-income laws 
shows that such prohibitions are not a panacea for this type of 
discrimination. In New York City and Chicago, for example, housing 
 
134. For instance, those in Massachusetts and Maine. See supra notes 99, 105 
and accompanying text. 
135. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. See generally infra apps. I, II 
(describing various state and local source-of-income laws). 
136. See Chicago, Ill., Mun. Code § 5-8-030 (2019). 
137. See Chi. Comm’n on Human Relations, Board Ruling Digest (2018), 
available at https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/cchr/ 
 AdjSupportingInfo/AdjFORMS/2018AdjForms/BoardRulingsDigestFEB
2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/FNN4-QE7R] (describing the CCHR’s rulings 
in cases from 2002 through February 2018, and reporting that all eighteen 
housing cases that alleged source-of-income discrimination involved rental 
situations). 
138. See N.Y. City Comm’n on Human Rights, Fiscal Year 2018 Annual 
Report 22 (2018). 
139. See, e.g., Sisemore v. Master Fin., Inc. 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 719, 724-25 (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2007); see also infra notes 181–185 and accompanying text 
(discussing source-of-income cases involving insurance companies that 
allegedly refused to provide coverage for landlords who rented to Section 
8 tenants); infra note 356 and accompanying text (discussing cases against 
municipalities and others accused of harassing Section 8 voucher users). 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 3·2020 
Source-of-Income Discrimination and the Fair Housing Act 
599 
providers’ substantial non-compliance has continued years after each 
city enacted a source-of-income law.140 In 2018, the N.Y.C. Commission 
on Human Rights, noting “the pervasive problem of landlords refusing 
to rent to tenants with housing vouchers,” established a special 
enforcement unit “focused exclusively on combatting source of income 
discrimination” and used testers “to verify reports of such pervasive 
discrimination.” 141  In Chicago, the CCHR, having recognized that 
source-of-income discrimination “continues as a significant fair housing 
issue,” retained a local civil rights organization to conduct a tester-
based study of this type of discrimination,142 the results of which were 
published in 2018 and showed substantial on-going source-of-income 
discrimination.143 It also seems noteworthy—and perhaps ironic—that 
New York City and Chicago, despite their substantial efforts to reduce 
source-of-income discrimination, remain among the most racially 
segregated metropolitan areas in the country.144 
 
140. See N.Y. City Comm’n on Human Rights, supra note 138, at 38 
(reporting that source-of-income complaints accounted for over one-third 
(94 of 274) of the total housing complaints received); Chi. Comm’n on 
Human Relations, 2017 Annual Report 11 (2018) [hereinafter Chi. 
2017 Report] (reporting that almost half of the housing discrimination 
complaints received (30 of 64) “alleged source of income discrimination, 
most of which involve Housing Choice Vouchers”); Chi. Comm’n on 
Human Relations, Annual Report: 2009, at 8 (2010) (reporting that 
two-thirds (40 of 60) of the housing discrimination complaints received 
claimed source-of-income discrimination); see also Isabelle M. Thabault 
& Eliza P. Platts-Mills, Discrimination Against Participants in the 
Housing Choice Voucher Program: An Enforcement Strategy, 15 
Poverty & Race 11, 12 (2006) (reporting that, although the Washington, 
D.C. Human Rights Act had prohibited source-of-income discrimination 
since 1977, a 2003–05 testing program showed that 58% of landlords there 
either refused to accept vouchers or placed significant limitations on their 
use). 
141. N.Y. City Comm’n on Human Rights, supra note 138, at 22, 33–34 
(reporting that the N.Y.C. Commission launched its own investigations, 
including testing, in almost 200 housing cases, the vast majority of which 
involved source-of-income discrimination). 
142. Chi. 2017 Report, supra note 140, at 10. 
143. See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights, 2018 Fair Housing 
Testing Report 2 (2018) (reporting that, even though Chicago’s law 
has banned source-of-income discrimination since 1990, tests continue to 
show such discrimination); see also Laramore v. Ritchie Realty Mgmt. 
Co., 397 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2005) (dealing with Chicago apartment 
management company that, in 2002, allegedly had a policy against renting 
to Section 8–voucher users); Lawyers’ Comm. for Better Housing, 
Inc., supra note 86, at 10–11 (finding in an earlier Chicago study that 
“[v]oucher holders are denied access to approximately 70% of the market 
rate units that are supposedly available to them”). 
144. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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2. Cases Against Landlords 
Source-of-income cases against landlords fall into two categories: 
(1) those in which the defendant admits its source-of-income 
discrimination, but tries to justify the practice; and (2) those in which 
the landlord denies the charge altogether. In the former, landlords have 
argued that the burdens of dealing with the Section 8 program (e.g., 
additional paperwork, required lease provisions, inspections by 
government agencies) justify their non-participation in this program. 
Some states and localities allow such a defense, while others do not, 
either because their laws explicitly foreclose it or their courts have 
interpreted their laws to do so.145 
Cases in which a landlord denies the source-of-income-discrim–
ination charge may arise from a variety of practices, including: outright 
refusals to rent;146 discrimination in the rental’s terms or conditions;147 
“steering” (e.g., narrowing a prospective tenant’s options to certain 
properties that already accept vouchers); 148  or discriminatory ads, 
 
145. See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text. 
146. State and local fair-housing laws modeled on the FHA ban not only 
outright refusals to rent on a prohibited basis, but also discriminatory 
negotiations and other practices that make housing unavailable. See 42 
U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012); Schwemm, supra note 11, § 13:2. 
147. State and local laws modeled on the FHA also outlaw harsher terms, 
stricter application requirements, and other discriminatory rental 
conditions. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2012); Schwemm, supra note 11, 
§ 14:2 & nn.1–5; see also Memorandum Regarding Source of Income 
Protections Under Cook County Human Rights Ordinance from Ranjit 
Hakin, Executive Director, Cook County Department of Human Rights 
and Ethics (Nov. 20, 2013) (found in Housing Authority of Cook County 
Ownership Packet) (advising landlords and property managers that they 
should not treat “voucher holders less favorably than other potential 
tenants by inflating rents or screening such applicants more stringently” 
or by applying rent-to-income-ratio requirements in a manner that 
discriminates against voucher holders); Brown v. Tam Khuong An 
Nguyen, Chicago Comm’n on Human Rts. (CCHR) No. 15-H-7, at 4 (Jan. 
12, 2017) (noting that a prima facie case of illegal discrimination under 
Chicago’s source-of-income ordinance may be made by showing that the 
complainant “was offered housing on terms different from the offers made 
to others”). 
148. A landlord’s “steering” has long been understood to make housing 
“unavailable” in violation of the FHA and similarly worded state and local 
laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012); Schwemm, supra note 11, §§ 13:5–
:6, 14:2 n.20 (noting that this practice may also violate other provisions 
of these statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2012)); see also Hawkins 
v. Village Green Holding Co., LLC, CCHR No. 14-H-35, at 9 (July 12, 
2018) (rejecting source-of-income-steering claim due to inadequate proof). 
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statements, and other communications in which the defendant 
announces its policy of not renting to government-assisted tenants.149 
All of these claims present issues of proof that can be decided using 
familiar and long-established principles, as demonstrated by the 
eighteen decisions issued by Chicago’s CCHR over the past two 
decades.150 For instance, a plaintiff may prove a defendant’s unlawful 
motivation by direct evidence,151 and claims proven by direct evidence 
generally involve a defendant’s ads or statements that would also be 
unlawful.152 In the absence of direct evidence, a plaintiff may use the 
prima-facie-case, burden-shifting approach to prove illegal intent.153 If 
a prima facie case cannot be established because the plaintiff did not 
apply to rent from the defendant, she may use the “futile gesture” 
theory to excuse this failure.154 And testers may be used to show that 
a defendant’s proferred justification for not dealing with a protected-
class member is really a pretext for discrimination rather than a 
legitimate excuse.155 
 
149. Ads, statements, and notices that indicate a discriminatory preference or 
limitation violate state and local laws if those laws include a provision 
similar to that in 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012). See Schwemm, supra note 
11, § 15; infra Part IV.C (regarding possible § 3406(c) violations involving 
source-of-income discrimination). 
150. The CCHR has consistently interpreted Chicago’s fair-housing ordinance 
in line with FHA precedent. See, e.g., Nibbs v. PT Chicago, LLC, CCHR 
No. 14-H-61, at 14 n.8 (May 11, 2017). This is also true for most states 
and localities with fair-housing laws. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 30:2 
n.4. 
151. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 10:2 & nn.6–8; see also Hall v. Woodgett, 
CCHR No. 13-H-51, at 4–5 (Oct. 8, 2015); Shipp v. Wagner, CCHR No. 
12-H-19, at 7 (July 16, 2014); Rankin v. 6954 N. Sheridan, Inc., CCHR 
No. 08-H-49, at 7 (Aug. 18, 2010); Diaz v. Wykurz, CCHR No. 07-H-28, 
at 6–7 (Dec. 16, 2009). 
152. See Schwemm, supra note 11, §§ 10:2 n.7 and accompanying text, 32:3; 
see also Shipp, CCHR No. 12-H-19, at 7; Hutchison v. Iftekaruddin, 
CCHR No. 09-H-21, at 7 (Feb. 17, 2010). 
153. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 10:2 nn.25–26 and accompanying text; 
see also Hawkins, CCHR No. 14-H-35, at 6; Gardner v. Ojo, CCHR No. 
10-H-50, at 10 (Dec. 19, 2012); Hutchison, CCHR No. 09-H-21, at 6. 
154. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 10:2 n.35; see also Rankin v. 6954 N. 
Sheridan, Inc., CCHR No. 08-H-49, at 7–8 (Aug. 18, 2010); cf. Hawkins, 
CCHR No. 14-H-35, at 8–9 (ruling against futile-gesture theory on the 
facts here); Gardner, CCHR No. 10-H-50, at 12 (same). 
155. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 32:2 (discussing the use of testers to 
prove housing discrimination). In places where local fair-housing laws 
have banned source-of-income discrimination, some enforcement agencies 
and advocacy groups have already used testing to produce evidence of this 
form of discrimination. See, e.g., supra notes 137–140 and accompanying 
text; Fair Housing Ctr. of West Mich., 50 Years of Fair Housing: 
A Constellation of Opportunities, 2018 Annual Report 4 (2019) 
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Although less common than claims of intentional discrimination, 
disparate-impact claims based on source-of-income discrimination have 
also been dealt with in CCHR decisions. These cases usually involved 
a voucher-holder’s challenge to a landlord’s minimum-income require–
ment (e.g., that a tenant’s income must be at least three times the 
rent), with the CCHR—based on FHA precedents—recognizing that 
such a theory may succeed, but requiring proper statistical evidence to 
support the claim.156 
B. Source-of-Income Claims Under the Fair Housing Act 
1. Overview 
Although the FHA does not ban source-of-income discrimination, 
it has often been invoked to challenge policies that bar tenants who rely 
on vouchers, Social Security, or other forms of non-wage income. Most 
of these claims allege that the defendant’s policy has a disparate impact 
on racial minorities or other FHA-protected groups, but some allege 
intent-based discrimination, and still others challenged refusals to 
accommodate disabled tenants. These FHA claims have yielded mixed 
results. 
2. Impact Claims: Race and National Origin 
Blacks, Latinos, and other FHA-protected groups are dispropor–
tionately represented among HCV recipients nationwide157—although 
 
(reporting on source-of-income tests in which over 60% showed evidence 
of discrimination); Fair Housing Justice Ctr., Source of Income 
Discrimination Lawsuit Filed, Opening Acts Newsletter (Oct. 26, 
2018), http://www.fairhousingjustice.org [https://perma.cc/22GA-XHZ3] 
(reporting that the Center’s “testing investigation . . . corroborated the 
alleged source of income discrimination” in the referenced lawsuit); see 
also Fred Freiberg & Gregory D. Squires, Changing Contexts and New 
Directions for the Use of Testing, 17 Citiscape 87, 91 (2015) (describing 
testing for racial discrimination in a municipality’s Section 8 rental-
assistance program). 
156. See Nibbs v. PT Chicago, LLC, CCHR No. 14-H-61, at 18 (May 11, 2017) 
(ruling against impact claim due to inadequate proof); see also Chicago 
Comm’n on Human Rts., Subject Matter Index 167 (2015) 
(describing the use of the disparate-impact theory in the 1992 CCHR 
decisions McClinton v. Antioch Haven Homes/Haynes and Campbell v. 
Brown/Dearborn Parkway Realty), available at https://www.chicago.gov/ 
 content/dam/city/depts/cchr/AdjSupportingInfo/AdjFORMS/2015%20
Adjudication%20Forms/SubjectMatterIndexMay2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
 ZKU5-KFSS]. See generally Schwemm, supra note 11, § 10:6 (describing 
disparate-impact claims under the FHA). 
157. See, e.g., 2017 HUD Report, supra note 58, at 66 (reporting that in the 
eighteen-month period ending September 30, 2017, voucher-receiving 
heads-of-households were 48.5% black, 17.3% Latino, 79.3% female, and 
43.6% disabled). 
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the demographics vary from place to place158—and landlords with anti-
voucher policies have been sued in a number of FHA-impact cases. The 
earliest reported decision was in 1989 in Bronson v. Crestwood Lake 
Section 1 Holding Corp. 159  There, the court awarded preliminary 
injunctive relief to two black voucher holders who had been rejected by 
an apartment complex in Yonkers, New York, based on the court’s view 
that the defendants’ anti-voucher and other screening policies “do 
indeed have a substantial disparate impact on minority persons.”160 
 A more recent example is Fair Housing Justice Center, Inc. v. 
Kosova Properties, Inc.,161 where a large New York City landlord was 
sued in 2016 for racial discrimination under the FHA and for source-of-
income discrimination under the local fair-housing law.162 One of the 
advantages of having such a local law is that a claim under it can be 
brought along with a FHA claim in federal court based on supplemental 
jurisdiction.163 Conversely, because FHA claims may be asserted in 
 
158. See Deborah J. Devine et al., U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban 
Dev., Housing Choice Voucher Location Patterns: Implications 
for Participant and Neighborhood Welfare, app. B at 101 (2003) 
(providing the race/ethnicity and age of the HCV populations of the nation’s 
fifty largest metropolitan areas), available at https://www.huduser.gov/ 
 publications/pdf/location_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3QA-SXSP]; 
see also Mazzara & Knudsen, supra note 92, at 1 (finding that “figures 
vary widely among the 50 largest metro areas” regarding the opportunity 
levels of neighborhoods where vouchers are used by families with children). 
159. 724 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
160. Id. at 149, 154 (“Application of Crestwood’s policy of rejecting holders of 
Section 8 vouchers, alone, would have the effect of disqualifying from 
tenancies 6.06% of the minority households in the applicant pool, but only 
0.25% of non-minority households in the pool. Stated another way, the 
odds of being excluded from Crestwood on the basis of the Section 8 policy 
is over twenty-five times greater for minority persons than for non-
minorities. These figures are hardly surprising given the fact that, while 
only 16.7% of the total applicant pool represents minority households, 
82.6% of the Section 8 voucher holders within that pool are minorities.”) 
(citations omitted). The defendants’ other challenged requirement—that 
a tenant’s income be at least three times the rent—was also found to have 
“a substantially disparate impact upon otherwise qualified minority 
households.” Id. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants applied 
their screening policies in a racially discriminatory manner. Id. at 157. 
161. Complaint at 1, No. 1:16-cv-03537 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2016). 
162. Id. at 19, 22. The complaint also alleged intentional racial discrimination 
in violation of the FHA and intentional and impact-based racial 
discrimination in violation of the local human-rights law. Id. at 17–21. 
The New York City Human Rights Law, unlike the FHA, explicitly bans 
source-of-income discrimination. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-
107(5)(a)(1) (2019). 
163. See, e.g., Viens v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 555, 
560 (D. Conn. 2015) (“Plaintiffs . . . assert claims . . . under both federal 
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state courts,164 a case involving both a race-based FHA claim and a 
source-of-income claim under a state or local law can be brought in 
state court.165 In Kosova Properties, the defendants, after a year and a 
half of pre-trial activities, agreed to a judgment that included injunctive 
relief and $620,000 in monetary relief.166 
Another recent successful use of the FHA was Crossroads Residents 
Organized for Stable and Secure Residencies v. MSP Crossroads 
Apartments LLC,167 where the court upheld an impact-based challenge 
to a Minneapolis landlord’s plan to stop accepting voucher users—
allegedly disproportionately people of color—as part of its effort to 
upgrade its large apartment complex.168 The case was settled in 2018 
for some $600,000.169 
But many FHA-based challenges to landlords’ anti-voucher policies 
have failed. Indeed, in Knapp v. Eagle Property Management Corp.,170 
the Seventh Circuit opined that, because “participation in the section 
8 program is voluntary,” landlords could not be held liable under the 
 
and state law.”); L.C. v. Lefrak Org., 987 F. Supp. 2d 391, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (describing claims brought under local law along with federal 
claims). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2018) (providing federal courts 
with supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims that are factually 
related to a federal-question claim in the same case). 
164. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (2018); see also Schwemm, supra note 11, 
§ 25:1 n.2 (providing examples of state-court cases in which FHA claims 
were asserted). 
165. See Daniel J. Sernovitz, D.C. Construction and Property Management 
Firm Settles Housing Discrimination Suit, Wash. Bus. J. (Dec. 11, 2017, 
12:02 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/washington/news/2017/12/11/ 
 management-firm-settles-discrimination-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/ 
 3GNJ-EFX3] (describing six-figure settlement of a case brought in local 
court that alleging race and source-of-income discrimination under both 
the FHA and local fair-housing law based on defendant’s refusal to rent 
to voucher holders); Burbank Apartments Tenant Ass’n v. Kargman, 48 
N.E.3d 394, 398 (Mass. 2016) (describing claims brought under both the 
FHA and Massachusetts law). 
166. See Settlement Agreement and Order at 3–4, Fair Hous. Justice Ctr., Inc. v. 
Kosova Prop., Inc., No. 1:16-cv-03537-LGS (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2017). 
167. No. CV 16-233 ADM/KMM, 2016 WL 3661146 (D. Minn. July 5, 2016). 
168. The Crossroads Residents plaintiffs also alleged disability-impact and 
intentional discrimination under the FHA. Id. at 6–8. 
169. See Soderstrom v. MSP Crossroads Apartments LLC, No. 16-233 
ADM/KMM, 2018 WL 692912, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb. 2, 2018) (authorizing 
settlement that included $300,000 for the individual tenants, $200,000 for 
the housing-organization plaintiffs, and $110,000 in attorneys’ fees and 
costs). 
170. 54 F.3d 1272 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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FHA “for racial discrimination under the disparate impact theory.”171 
Since then, two other circuits—the Second and Fifth, both in split 
decisions—have agreed with this position.172 
The Sixth Circuit took a different approach in 2007, holding that a 
FHA-impact claim might lie for a landlord’s withdrawal from the 
voucher program, 173  but that the claim there failed because of 
inadequate proof of disparate racial impact.174 In a similar vein, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled in 2017 that, although a 
FHA-impact claim could be brought to challenge a Section 8 project-
based landlord’s decision to withdraw from the program,175 the specific 
 
171. Id. at 1280. 
172. The Second Circuit’s decision in Salute v. Stratford Greens Gardens 
Apartments, 136 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1998), came three years after Knapp. 
In Salute, the plaintiffs asserted a disability-based impact claim that 
challenged the defendant-landlord’s refusal to accept vouchers. The 
Second Circuit rejected this claim: 
     We agree with the Seventh Circuit’s observation that because 
the Section 8 program is voluntary and non-participating owners 
routinely reject Section 8 tenants, the owners’ “non-participation 
constitutes a legitimate reason for their refusal to accept section 
8 tenants and . . . we therefore cannot hold them liable 
for . . . discrimination under the disparate impact theory.”  
 Id. at 302 (alteration in original) (quoting Knapp, 54 F.3d at 1280 (7th 
Cir. 1995)).  
 The Fifth Circuit’s decision came in a race-based challenge to a “No 
Section 8” policy. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 
F.3d 890 (5th Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 930 F.3d 660 (5th 
Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1234 (2020). There, the majority noted 
“the voluntary nature of landlord participation in the voucher program,” 
id. at 901, and concluded that to uphold plaintiff’s impact claim “would 
effectively mandate a landlord’s participation in the voucher program any 
time the racial makeup of multi-family rental complex does not match the 
demographics of a nearby metropolitan area,” id. at 909. 
173. Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro. Hum. 
Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 377 (6th Cir. 2007). The majority agreed 
with Knapp “that a landlord should never face disparate-impact liability 
for non-participation in Section 8,” but held that “withdrawal” by the 
landlord was different from “non-participation” and could be subject to a 
FHA-impact challenge. Id. 
174. Id. at 377–78. In dissent, Judge Moore argued that the landlord had 
conceded the disparate-impact point and thus the case should be 
remanded to consider the landlord’s “business necessity” justification for 
withdrawing from the voucher program. Id. at 393 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
175. Burbank Apartments Tenant Ass’n v. Kargman, 48 N.E.3d 394, 409, 411 
(Mass. 2016). 
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allegations in that case did not satisfy the requirements of such a 
claim.176 
Other recent decisions have ruled against similar FHA-impact 
claims based on inadequate allegations or proof.177 Noteworthy here is 
the Fifth Circuit’s 2019 decision in Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. 
v. Lincoln Property Co., which, by a 2-1 vote, affirmed the dismissal of 
an impact-based challenge to a Dallas-area landlord’s refusal to accept 
voucher users.178 The majority held that the plaintiff’s allegations were 
inadequate to establish a causal connection between any racial impact 
and the defendant’s anti-voucher policy,179 a conclusion the dissent 
vigorously disputed.180 
In a variation on these cases against landlords, FHA-impact claims 
have succeeded in a series of cases against insurance companies that 
denied coverage to landlords who do rent to voucher holders. The first 
decision was in 2015 in Jones v. Travelers Casualty Insurance Co. of 
America, where a California landlord alleged that the defendant’s anti-
voucher policy had a disparate impact on racial minorities and other 
 
176. Id. at 412 (holding that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to adequately allege 
a sufficient causal connection between the defendant’s withdrawal from 
the voucher program and the alleged negative impact on minorities). 
177. See Wadley v. Park at Landmark, LP, 264 F. App’x. 279, 281–82 (4th 
Cir. 2008) (affirming summary judgment for defendant-landlord who 
withdrew from a voucher program while facing claims of intentional and 
impact-based discrimination against racial minorities and disabled 
persons); Lincoln Property, 920 F.3d at 906 (describing the district court’s 
denial of the plaintiff’s claim due to a lack of causation evidence). 
178. 920 F.3d at 895. In addition, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, without dissent, 
the dismissal of the plaintiff’s FHA racial-intent claim, as well as its claim 
regarding discriminatory statements under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012). Id. 
at 909–12; see also infra Part IV.C (regarding claims under § 3604(c)). 
179. 920 F.3d at 906, 909. The district court ruled not only that the plaintiff 
failed to allege the necessary causal connection, but also that its 
allegations were inadequate to show a disparate racial impact because 
they were based on statistics for census tracts rather than neighborhoods 
or communities. See id. at 906. The Fifth Circuit’s opinion did not rely 
on this distinction, although it expressed skepticism about using census-
tract data for such an impact claim. Id. at 907 n.9. The majority also did 
not find it necessary to review an alternative ground for the district 
court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s impact claim: that the defendants’ 
justification for their anti-voucher policies—avoiding the burdens of the 
Section 8 program—was adequate to rebut an impact claim and that the 
plaintiff had failed to allege a less discriminatory alternative. See id. at 
906. 
180. Id. at 913 (Davis, J., dissenting); see also Inclusive Cmtys. Project v. 
Lincoln Prop. Co., 930 F.3d 660, 661 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 140 S. Ct. 1234 (2020) (Haynes, J., dissenting) (disputing the 
panel majority’s reasoning in rejecting the plaintiff’s impact claim). 
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FHA-protected groups.181 The court denied the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment on all claims,182 noting, with respect to the impact 
claims, that the plaintiffs’ evidence showed that the defendant’s “No 
Section 8 rule [had] a statistically significant disparate impact on the 
basis of race, sex, age, and familial status,” and thus “Travelers’ 
conduct predictably falls more heavily on protected classes and results 
in discrimination.”183 Similar decisions were later issued in Viens v. 
America Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Co.184 and National Fair 
Housing Alliance v. Travelers Indemnity Co.185 
3. Impact Claims: Disability and Other Protected Classes 
As discussed above, some of the successful FHA-impact challenges 
to anti-voucher policies have alleged not only race and national-origin 
discrimination, but also discrimination against other FHA-protected 
groups.186 Disability, in particular, has been involved in a number of 
these cases. 
One noteworthy example is L.C. v. Lefrak Organization, Inc.,187 
where a prospective tenant tried to use a New York City housing 
subsidy for persons with HIV/AIDS and was refused by the defendant-
 
181. Complaint at 1–2, 6–7, No. 5:13-CV-02390 (N.D. Cal. May 28, 2013) 
(alleging FHA-impact claims based on race, sex, familial status, and 
disability, as well as FHA-based intent and interference claims). 
182. Transcript of Proceedings at *5, Jones, No. 5:13-CV-02390, 2015 WL 
5091908 (May 7, 2015). 
183. Id. 
184. 113 F. Supp. 3d 555 (D. Conn. 2015). The plaintiffs alleged FHA-impact 
claims based on race and national origin, and source-of-income claims 
under Connecticut’s fair-housing law, all of which survived the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 558–60. After the court denied that 
motion, the parties settled the case for $475,000 and injunctive relief. See 
Consent Decree at 2, Viens v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 3:14-
cv-00952-JBA (D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2015). 
185. 261 F. Supp. 3d 20 (D.D.C. 2017). The complaint alleged FHA violations 
of race, sex, and familial-status discrimination based on the claim that 
families using vouchers in the D.C. area are “disproportionately headed 
by African-American women.” Id. at 23. The court denied the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss, id. at 35, and the parties subsequently settled for 
$450,000 and injunctive relief. See National Fair Housing Alliance Settles 
Disparate Impact Lawsuit with Travelers Indemnity Company, Nat’l Fair 
Housing Alliance (Feb. 23, 2018), https://nationalfairhousing.org/2018/ 
 02/23/travelers/ [https://perma.cc/FB5L-YYMN]; see also Sisemore v. 
Master Fin., Inc. 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 719, 724–25 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) 
(upholding source-of-income claim against a finance company that refused 
Sisemore a mortgage for a home she intended to use as a day care). 
186. See supra notes 168, 181, and 185 (describing cases involving allegations 
of disability, sex, familial-status, and color discrimination). 
187. 987 F. Supp. 2d 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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landlord. As in Kosova Properties, the plaintiff in LeFrak alleged 
impact-based and intentional discrimination in violation of the FHA 
and a source-of-income claim under the city’s fair housing law, all of 
which prevailed in a 2013 decision.188 A year after this ruling, the case 
was settled for $262,500.189 
Another type of FHA-disability impact claim is illustrated by Fair 
Housing Rights Center in Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Morgan 
Properties Management Co., LLC. 190  There, a large apartment 
company’s requirement that rent be paid on the first day of the month 
could not be met by tenants who relied on Social Security Disability 
Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits because those benefits did not arrive until 
later in the month.191 The plaintiff alleged both impact and reasonable-
accommodation claims under the FHA, both of which survived the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment.192 As for the impact claim, 
the court held that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of 
disparate impact against disabled persons 193  and that fact issues 
 
188. Complaint at 18–22, Fair Hous. Justice Ctr., Inc. v. Kosova Properties, 
Inc., No. 1:16-cv-03537 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2016); LeFrak Org., 987 F. 
Supp. 2d at 401–02, 404; see also Cales v. New Castle Hill Realty, 1:10-
cv-03426-DAB-KNF, 2011 WL 335599, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2011) 
(denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim that landlord 
refused prospective tenant because she used the city’s disabled-person 
housing subsidy). In upholding the FHA-impact claims in LeFrak, the 
court noted that the complaint states: 
[A]s of 2010, New York City had a population of approximately 
eight million individuals, the HIV population in New York City 
was approximately 67,000 people, 49% of which are HASA 
[HIV/AIDS Services Administration] clients, the “vast majority” 
of which utilize a HASA housing subsidy. This adequately puts 
defendants on notice that plaintiffs’ alleged basis for disparate 
impact is that the percentage of the HIV population in New York 
City on housing subsidies exceeds the percentage of the non-HIV 
New York City population on housing subsidies. 
 987 F. Supp. 2d at 402–03. 
189. See Settlement Agreement at 9, Chacon v. LeFrak Org., No. 1:13-CV-
02759 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2014). 
190. No. 16-4677, 2018 WL 3208159 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2018). 
191. Id. at *1. 
192. Id. at *5–11. 
193. The plaintiff’s expert noted that “many if not most SSDI recipients live 
benefit check to benefit check while being tied to the government’s 
disbursal schedule, and so are unable to rent apartments from Defendants 
which they would otherwise be able to afford.” Id. at *10. The court 
continued:  
FHRC argues that nearly all SSDI recipients, or close to one-
hundred percent, are negatively impacted by this policy. It seems 
clear that this policy does not impact non-disabled but otherwise 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 3·2020 
Source-of-Income Discrimination and the Fair Housing Act 
609 
remained as to whether a less discriminatory alternative could serve the 
defendants’ legitimate business interests.194 Similarly, in 1996, in Ryan 
v. Ramsey,195 the court upheld FHA impact and intent claims against 
a Texas landlord who rejected the plaintiff because his income came 
from SSDI and he did not have a job.196 In the same vein is Connecticut 
Fair Housing Center, Inc. v. Rosow,197 which involved a FHA-disability 
claim based on the impact theory that challenged a Hartford landlord’s 
“Must Be Employed” requirement.198 And in recent years, HUD and 
 
similarly situated tenants at any rate even close to one-hundred 
percent. Therefore, FHRC has established a prima facie case of 
disparate impact. 
 Id. at *10–11. 
194. Id. at *11. The court rejected the defendants’ proffered legitimate reasons 
for the policy: 
[The defendants] argue that they have imposed their challenged 
rental policy because their business model is set up to receive rent 
in the beginning of the month, all of their systems are coordinated 
to collect rent on the first of the month, and making their 
properties’ mortgage payments and utility bills requires a certain 
amount of cash reserves which would be upset by variable rental 
due dates. These are legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for 
their stated policy. 
Defendants have failed to show[, however,] that any alternatives 
to their inflexible policy would impose an undue hardship under 
the circumstances of this specific case. [Plaintiff]’s proposed 
alternative is to institute a flexible, fact-specific, individualized 
assessment for each SSDI recipient who requests a changed due 
date based on their benefits schedule. Defendants argue that this 
proposed alternative would fundamentally alter their business and 
create undue financial and administrative hardship. Defendants 
offer little substantive evidence to support their argument. They 
offer no real calculation of the cost of changing this policy, 
and . . . their “fundamentally altered business practices” 
arguments are contradicted by the evidence submitted by 
[plaintiff] that Defendants already make similar accommodations 
for many of their tenants. 
 Id. at *10–11. 
195. 936 F. Supp. 417 (S.D. Tex. 1996). 
196. Id. at 423–27. In upholding the impact claim, the court noted that “an 
individual’s status as a Social Security disability benefit recipient is 
inextricably linked to his status as a disabled person.” Id. at 427. 
197. See Complaint at 1, No. 3:10-cv-01987-MRK (D. Conn. Dec. 17, 2010). 
198. Id. at 8. This case settled in 2013 for $150,000. See Jenna Carlesso, 
Property Manager Settles Fair Housing Lawsuit, Hartford Courant 
(May 15, 2013), https://www.courant.com/community/hartford/hc-xpm-
2013-05-15-hc-hartford-settlement-0516-20130515-story.html [https://perma 
 .cc/TQ4G-HZB5].  
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other federal agencies with regulatory authority over mortgage 
providers have issued guidance designed to curb similar types of 
discrimination against SSDI recipients.199 
The FHA has also been invoked in non-disability cases. 200  A 
prominent example is Gilligan v. Jamco Development Corp.,201 where 
the Ninth Circuit upheld FHA impact and intent claims based on 
familial status that challenged a landlord’s refusal to accept tenants 
receiving Aid-to-Families-with-Dependent-Children (“AFDC”) bene–
fits, which only go to families with children.202 
 
199. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Bulletin 2014-03, 
Social Security Disability Income Verification 4 (2014) (describing 
HUD and other agencies’ guidance to lenders that they should consider 
SSDI benefits “likely to continue,” and thus they “should not request 
additional documentation from the borrower to demonstrate continuance” 
of such income); see also id. at 2–3 (describing similar CFPB advice 
regarding lenders’ obligations under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
and its implementing regulations). 
200. See cases cited supra notes 181, 185, and infra note 202. 
201. 108 F.3d 246 (9th Cir. 1997). 
202. Id. at 248–51; see also Green v. Sunpointe Assocs., Ltd., No. C96-1542C, 
1997 WL 1526484, at *1, *7 (W.D. Wash. May 12, 1997) (ruling in favor 
of a Section 8 tenant class’s FHA-impact claims against their landlord 
who sought to evict them as part of a decision to stop participating in the 
program). Statistics played an important role in the court’s ruling: 
     The figures show that extremely high percentages (81.1 to 
100[%]) of members of the protected classes at issue belong to the 
group of current Section 8 tenants who would be excluded from 
[defendant’s complex] Avalon Ridge . . . . The figures show a 
similarly high percentage (49.3 to 84.8[%]) of these protected class 
members among prospective Section 8 tenants who are registered 
with the [local housing agency]. Moreover, the figures demonstrate 
that the percentage of protected class members among both 
current and prospective tenants are substantially higher than the 
percentages of those groups in the general populations of Renton 
and the Seattle metropolitan area. 
     Plaintiff also presents figures . . . regarding the rates at 
which members of the protected classes and members outside the 
protected classes are impacted. Plaintiff’s numbers indicate that 
the no-Section 8 policy would have terminated the leases of 
13.5[%] of the African–American tenancies at Avalon Ridge, but 
would have terminated the leases of only 6.7[%] of the Caucasian 
households. More tellingly, the policy would have evicted 17.5[%] 
of the households with children, but would have evicted 0[%] of 
the households without children. Finally, plaintiffs maintain that 
the policy would have evicted 31.9% of the households headed by 
women, but would have evicted 0[%] of the households headed by 
men. 
 Id. at *5 (footnotes omitted). The court also held that the defendant’s 
proferred justification for its new anti-voucher policy was inadequate and 
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4. Disability: Reasonable Accommodation Claims 
In some of the disability-impact cases discussed in the previous 
section, the plaintiffs also asserted a claim based on the FHA’s 
reasonable-accommodation (“RA”) mandate, which requires housing 
providers to modify their rules and policies in order to provide equal 
housing opportunities for persons with disabilities. 203  The judicial 
response to these RA claims has been mixed, in part because, in 
contrast to impact claims that focus on a challenged policy’s broad 
statistical effect, RA claims generally depend on the particular facts of 
a disabled person’s situation.204 
One example of a plaintiff’s successful RA claim is Edwards v. Gene 
Salter Properties. 205  There, the Eighth Circuit reversed summary 
judgment against would-be tenants who received SSDI benefits and 
thus could not show pay stubs, tax returns, or other indicia of financial 
worthiness required by the defendant-landlord.206 The appellate court 
concluded that “the requested accommodation was necessary and 
reasonable” and that the defendant’s suggested alternatives of “allowing 
a co-signer or prepaying the full lease term were not substitutes for 
accommodating plaintiffs, who had sufficient income to rent the 
apartment, because those options did not level the playing field but 
instead posed an additional burden on the disabled applicant.”207 
By way of contrast, a FHA-RA claim failed in Batista v. 
Cooperativa de Vivienda Jardines de San Ignacio,208 where a disabled 
tenant whose Section 8 benefits no longer qualified her to stay in a 
three-bedroom apartment sought to remain there without paying the 
full rent. The First Circuit upheld the landlord’s denial of this request:  
[T]he Cooperativa[’s denial] rested solely on Batista’s inability to 
pay, which she appears to concede arises only from her need for 
 
that genuine issues remained as to plaintiff’s intentional-discrimination 
claims. Id. at *7. 
203. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2018). 
204. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 11D:8 n.12 and accompanying text. 
205. 739 F. App’x 357 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1271 (2019). 
206. Id. at 358 (“Plaintiffs could not provide the required documentation 
because their only sources of income were social security disability income 
(SSDI), retirement benefits, and rental income. Plaintiffs offered to 
provide proof of these income sources, but defendants refused to accept 
such proof.”). 
207. Id. On remand, the district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff’s 
reasonable-accommodation claim and awarded her $1,380 in damages. 
Edwards v. Gene Salter Props., No. 4:15CV00571, 2019 WL 2651109, at 
*1 (E.D. Ark. June 27, 2019). 
208. 776 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2015). 
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federal rental support . . . . [S]he does not contend the 
denial . . . resulted from any policy of the Cooperativa that 
would prevent her from acquiring the funds necessary to make 
the rent, which she does not contend must be lowered.209 
The mixed results in FHA-RA cases also reflect a judicial split in 
principle between the Second and Ninth Circuits. In Salute v. Stratford 
Greens Garden Apartments,210 a divided panel of the Second Circuit 
ruled against FHA and other claims by two disabled plaintiffs who 
received Section 8 assistance and were rejected by a large apartment 
complex in suburban New York that did not accept applicants with 
vouchers.211 The majority held that the defendants did not violate the 
FHA-RA mandate by not accepting plaintiffs’ Section 8 vouchers,212 
because a landlord’s participation in the voucher program was 
sufficiently burdensome to render the plaintiffs’ request unreasonable213 
 
209. Id. at 43 (citing Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 
293, 302 (2d Cir.1998) (“impecunious people with disabilities stand on the 
same footing as everyone else”)). The court found no evidence of 
intentional disability discrimination, but it upheld the plaintiff’s 
retaliation claim. Id. at 43–45. 
210. 136 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1998). 
211. Id. at 297–302. In addition to their FHA-RA claim, the plaintiffs asserted 
a FHA-disability impact claim and a claim under Section 8’s “Take One, 
Take All” requirement, all of which the majority rejected. Id. Judge 
Calabresi vigorously disagreed with all three rulings. See id. at 302–13 
(Calabresi, J., dissenting). 
212. Id. at 299–302 (majority opinion). 
213. The court reasoned: 
We think . . . the burdens of Section 8 participation are 
substantial enough that participation should not be forced on 
landlords, either as an accommodation to handicap or otherwise 
. . . . A landlord may consider that participation in a federal 
program will or may entail financial audits, maintenance 
requirements, inspection of the premises, reporting requirements, 
increased risk of litigation, and so on . . . . Moreover, the Section 
8 program could end, leaving the landlord with the dilemma of 
evicting the participating tenants or keeping tenants who lack the 
wherewithal to pay the full rent—both major commercial risks. 
The landlord here explained the refusal to accept Section 8 tenants 
in terms of a general reluctance to become involved with the 
federal government and its rules and regulations . . . . 
In short, it is easy to conclude that, for landlords who reject 
voluntary Section 8 participation, the contract with the federal 
government, the retention of counsel to make the Section 8 
arrangements, the requirements for compliance, and the 
limitations on use (actual and potential), are “unreasonable 
costs,” an “undue hardship,” and a “substantial burden,” which 
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and, more fundamentally, that the plaintiffs were inappropriately 
claiming “an entitlement to an accommodation that remedies their 
economic status” rather than their disabilities.214 The Salute majority 
deemed it “fundamental that the law addresses the accommodation of 
handicaps, not the alleviation of economic disadvantages that may be 
correlated with having handicaps,”215 concluding that the FHA-RA 
mandate “does not elevate the rights of the handicapped poor over the 
rights of the non-handicapped poor.”216 
Five years later, the Ninth Circuit took a decidedly different 
approach in Giebeler v. M & B Associates.217 The landlord there did 
not refuse vouchers, but it did require prospective tenants to have a 
gross income of at least three times the monthly rent, a standard that 
the plaintiff, who received SSDI and other disability benefits and 
support from his mother, could not meet.218 The plaintiff’s mother 
offered to rent the apartment or serve as a co-signer for her son, but 
the landlord rejected this proposal, citing a policy against allowing co-
signers on leases, and then refused to waive this policy as an 
accommodation for the plaintiff.219 The district court granted summary 
judgment for the landlord on the plaintiff’s FHA-RA claim,220 but the 
Ninth Circuit reversed in an opinion that specifically “reject[ed] the 
 
are not required by the [FHA]’s reasonable accommodation 
provision. 
 Id. at 300–01 (citation omitted). Judge Calabresi, on the other hand, 
argued that the FHA-RA analysis required a fact-based balancing of both 
the landlord’s and the disabled applicants’ interests. Id. at 311 (Calabresi, 
J., dissenting). 
214. Id. at 301–02 (majority opinion). 
215. Id. at 301. 
216. Id. at 302 (“Congress could not have intended the [FHA] to require 
reasonable accommodations for those with handicaps every time a neutral 
policy imposes an adverse impact on individuals who are poor . . . . 
Economic discrimination—such as the refusal to accept Section 8 
tenants—is not cognizable as a failure to make reasonable 
accommodations, in violation of § 3604(f)(3)(B).”). 
 The dissent noted that the plaintiffs claimed “their disabilities prevent 
them from working, which necessarily makes them poor,” and thus they 
rely on Section 8 “as a direct result of their handicap.” Id. at 310 
(Calabresi, J., dissenting). 
217. 343 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2003). 
218. Id. at 1145. 
219. Id. at 1145–46. 
220. Id. at 1146. In addition, the district court allowed the plaintiff’s disability-
intent claim to proceed, but dismissed his other claims. Id. Thereafter, 
the parties settled all claims except for the FHA-RA one, the dismissal of 
which plaintiff appealed. Id. at 1146 n.1. 
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reasoning of Salute.”221 The appellate court reasoned that “Giebeler’s 
request that he be permitted to reside in an apartment rented by his 
financially qualified mother is a request for an accommodation 
that . . . he was entitled to receive,” provided two other key elements 
of a FHA-RA claim were met.222 The Ninth Circuit ruled that they 
were, holding that “defendants’ relaxation of their no cosigner policy 
‘may be necessary’ to afford Giebeler equal opportunity” in housing223 
and that the requested accommodation was “reasonable.”224 The court 
concluded: “Giebeler’s modest request that his financially qualified 
mother be allowed to rent an apartment for him to live in, affording 
him the opportunity to live in a suitable dwelling despite his 
disability, . . . should have been honored.”225 
Although the RA requested in Giebeler differed from the one in 
Salute,226 the two opinions reflect a fundamental disagreement about  
221. Id. at 1154, 1159. 
222. Id. at 1155. 
223. Id. at 1156. 
224. Id. at 1156–59. In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit noted that 
the purpose of the defendants’ “minimum income requirement is to ensure 
that tenants have sufficient income to pay rent consistently and promptly. 
This interest is, of course, considerable.” Id. at 1157. But the court held 
that this interest is protected so long as someone can meet the financial 
requirements on the tenant’s behalf:  
[A]llowing a financially eligible relative to rent an apartment for 
a disabled individual who, except for his current financial 
circumstances, is qualified to be a tenant does not unreasonably 
threaten this interest. The rental arrangement requested by 
Giebeler would not require [defendant] Branham to accept less 
rent, would not otherwise alter the essential obligations of tenancy 
at Branham (such as appropriate behavior and care of the 
premises), and would provide a lessee with the proper financial 
qualifications and credit history. 
 Id.; see also id. at 1159 (noting that “Giebeler was in no way trying to 
avoid payment of the usual rent for the apartment he wanted to live in, 
nor was he proposing to leave [defendants] without a means of ascertaining 
that an individual with the means to pay that rent would be responsible 
for doing so”). 
225. Id. at 1159. 
226. The court noted that the RAs differed in two potentially significant ways: 
  In Salute, the accommodation requested was waiver of an established 
policy against accepting vouchers under Section 8 . . . as payment for 
the rent. Salute emphasized that Congress had recognized the considerable 
bureaucratic entanglement entailed by Section 8 and consequently 
included in Section 8 an explicit policy against compelling landlords to 
accept Section 8 tenants. Here, conversely, the [FHA] . . . appears 
affirmatively to protect arrangements whereby a disabled person lives in 
an apartment rented by another. 
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how to evaluate a FHA-RA claim involving a prospective tenant’s 
source of financial support. Courts outside the Second and Ninth 
Circuit are divided over which approach to follow.227 
5. Intentional Discrimination Claims 
Some of the cases discussed in the previous sections have also 
upheld claims of intentional discrimination based on race or other FHA-
prohibited factors. 228  Evidence of such discrimination in source-of-
income cases may take either of two forms. First, to the extent that the 
defendant’s policy is shown to have an unjustified negative impact on 
minorities, this fact may be an indicator of the defendant’s illegal intent 
under the familiar analysis of Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.229 An example is Williams v. 
City of Antioch,230 where a California municipality’s hostility to Section 
8 users was alleged to be race-based.231 Second, a defendant’s source-of-
income policy may be shown to have been applied in a discriminatory 
manner (e.g., black Section 8 users were rejected while comparable 
whites were accepted). In Bronson v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding 
 
  Additionally, unlike the tenants in Salute, Giebeler proffered a 
proposed lessee, Ann Giebeler, who more than met the economic 
qualifications required to rent at [defendants’ property] and demanded no 
special, burdensome rights as a condition of her tenancy. In contrast, the 
Salute court was concerned that “participation in a federal program will 
or may entail financial audits, maintenance requirements, increased risk 
of litigation, and so on.” 
 Id. at 1158 n.12 (citations omitted). 
227. Compare Fair Hous. Rights Ctr. in Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Morgan 
Props. Mgmt. Co., No. 16-4677, 2018 WL 3208159 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 
2018), with Batista v. Cooperativa de Vivienda Jardines de San Ignacio, 
776 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2015). Cf. Edwards v. Hopkins Plaza Ltd. P’ship, 
783 N.W.2d 171, 180–81 (Minn. App. 2010) (rejecting, as not 
“reasonable,” disabled tenant’s RA request that defendant-landlord 
accept plaintiff’s Section 8 voucher). 
228. See cases cited supra notes 161–162, 167–168, 181, 187, 195–196. 
229. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
266–67 (1977) (explaining that discriminatory intent in an Equal 
Protection claim may be proved in part with evidence that the defendant’s 
action had a discriminatory effect). Courts have often applied this analysis 
in FHA-intent cases. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 13:12 n.13 and 
accompanying text. 
230. No. C 08-02301 SBA, 2010 WL 3632197 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010). 
231. Id. at *1–2 (certifying class-action suit asserting both a race-based impact 
claim for defendants’ alleged harassment of local Section 8 renters and an 
intent claim alleging that this harassment was directed particularly 
toward African-Americans). 
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Corp., 232  for example, the court enjoined a landlord’s anti-voucher 
policy based on the policy’s racial impact, and also noted that the 
defendant’s harsher application of this policy to the two black plaintiffs 
suggested intentional racial discrimination.233 
6. Summary: Mixed Results 
Numerous FHA decisions dealing with source-of-income claims have 
been reported over the past thirty years. Many have survived motions 
to dismiss or summary judgment motions, and some of these have 
resulted in substantial settlements for the plaintiffs. Others have failed, 
some because of the absence of necessary proof and some because the 
courts took a different view of the proper standards to apply in such 
FHA claims. Taken together, these decisions provide examples both of 
the FHA’s ability to challenge landlords’ policies that oppose vouchers 
and other non-traditional sources of income and of its failure to 
eliminate those policies. 
III. Amending the FHA: Arguments For and Against 
A. Overview 
Many of the arguments both in favor of and opposed to amending 
the FHA to prohibit source-of-income discrimination have already been 
identified in the debates and court opinions dealing with state and local 
 
232. 724 F. Supp. 148, 157–58 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
233. Regarding the evidence of the defendant’s discriminatory intent, the court 
noted: 
[D]efendant’s inconsistent articulation and application of its 
tenant selection policies cast the sincerity of those policies in a 
somewhat questionable light. Throughout the course of their 
application process, for example, plaintiffs were never made aware 
of Crestwood’s triple income test. It was not until well after she 
had submitted her credit check application, moreover, that 
Bronson was informed of Crestwood’s Section 8 policy. 
Carter . . . was never told that such a policy existed. Indeed, 
defendant’s post hoc objections to the Section 8 lease were, 
themselves, never articulated until after the Temporary 
Restraining Order hearing, although Crestwood was certainly 
given an opportunity to present such objections . . . . Moreover, 
despite these very objections, it does in fact appear that 
Crestwood currently rents apartment units to four Section 8 
recipients. It is not insignificant that all four of these tenants are 
white. 
 Id. A later decision in this case held that the defendant’s anti-voucher 
policy also violated the FHA’s prohibition of familial-status 
discrimination. See Glover v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corp., 
746 F. Supp. 301, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
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laws that have previously taken this step.234 As the variety of these laws 
shows, the first step in considering their pros and cons is to determine 
how broadly the ban on this type of discrimination should apply; that 
is, does it cover just voucher holders in rental situations or does it 
extend to all types of source-of-income discrimination in a full range of 
housing-related transactions? The FHA, of course, is not limited to 
rental transactions. 
As for the voucher-only versus all-types-of-income issue, proposals 
to amend the FHA have included both versions,235 but the leading 
proposals call for a broad amendment that bans all source-of-income 
discrimination and specifically includes vouchers within its definition of 
this term.236 A related issue—one that the states have taken different 
approaches to—is whether such an amendment should allow landlords 
to rely on their antagonism to voucher-program requirements as a 
defense in a voucher-holder-discrimination claim.237 For the purposes of 
this discussion, we will assume that the FHA amendment under 
consideration provides for the broadest possible coverage, including 
explicitly foreclosing such a defense. 
B. Arguments For 
A number of goals have been articulated for the various state and 
local source-of-income laws. Their basic objective is “to curb discrim–
ination against individuals paying rent with non-traditional sources.”238 
Relatedly, they aim to increase the success rate of low-income families 
who use government vouchers in obtaining housing.239 This, in turn, 
would lead to the de-concentration of poverty and more economically 
 
234. See supra Part I.C. 
235. See infra app. III. 
236. See id. 
237. See supra notes 107–108 and accompanying text. 
238. Tamica H. Daniel, Bringing Real Choice to the Housing Choice Voucher 
Program: Addressing Voucher Discrimination Under the Federal Fair 
Housing Act, 98 Geo. L. J. 769, 778 (2010); see also Franklin Tower One, 
L.L.C. v. N.M., 725 A.2d 1104, 1106 (N.J. 1999) (noting that New Jersey’s 
source-of-income-law’s purpose was “to protect from housing 
discrimination welfare recipients, spouses dependent on alimony and child 
support payments and tenants receiving governmental rental assistance”). 
239. See, e.g., Cunningham et al., supra note 86, at 11–12 (noting a lower 
voucher-denial rate in jurisdictions with voucher non-discrimination 
laws); Bell et al., supra note 97, at 1 (“Voucher non-discrimination 
laws appear to be associated with substantial reductions in the share of 
landlords that refuse to accept vouchers.”); J. Rosie Tighe et al., Source 
of Income Discrimination and Fair Housing Policy, 32 J. Plan. Lit. 3, 
8 (2017) (“Early research shows promise for SOI antidiscrimination laws 
both increasing the likelihood of HCV recipients finding a place to live 
and moving to a higher-opportunity neighborhood.”). 
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mixed neighborhoods, 240  because voucher holders would not be 
relegated to high-poverty, low-opportunity areas. 241  Stated more 
broadly, barring source-of-income discrimination is designed to provide 
greater opportunities generally for low-income individuals, giving them 
more housing choices and making it more likely they will obtain decent 
homes.242 
In addition, these laws outlaw a form of discrimination that 
disproportionately harms many of the classes protected by existing fair 
housing laws.243 This is particularly true of racial minorities,244 which 
means that banning source-of-income discrimination would advance the 
FHA’s goals of reducing racial discrimination and barriers to residential 
integration.245 An analogous situation occurred in 1988 when Congress 
added “familial status” to the FHA’s prohibited bases of discrimination, 
which was done in part because discrimination against families with 
children was being used as a proxy for racial and national-origin 
discrimination.246 Other FHA-protected groups would also benefit from 
 
240. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
241. See, e.g., City of Austin v. Paxton, 325 F. Supp. 3d 749, 753 (W.D. Tex. 
2018) (noting that one of the Austin ordinance’s purposes was to prevent 
“relegat[ing] voucher holders to lower opportunity areas of the City”); see 
also Daniel, supra note 238, at 784. 
242. See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Sullivan Assocs., 
739 A.2d 238, 248 (Conn. 1999) (noting that Connecticut’s law was 
“designed to provide that low income families ‘may not be rejected or 
denied a full and equal opportunity’” for housing based on their lawful 
source of income); see also Daniel, supra note 238, at 784. 
243. See, e.g., Paxton, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 753 (noting that one of the Austin 
ordinance’s purposes was to prevent a practice that “disproportionately 
impacts minority residents, children, and the disabled”); see also Austin 
K. Hampton, Vouchers as Veils, 1 U. Chi. Legal F. 503, 525 (2009) 
(concluding that “mak[ing] actionable the practice of refusing housing 
choice vouchers . . . ensures that the protected classes currently defined 
are not discriminated against under the veil of [voucher] 
nonparticipation”). 
244. See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights, supra note 143 (reporting 
that landlords who advertise “No Section 8” are more likely to discriminate 
against African-American renters); Michael Lepley & Lenore 
Mangiarelli, The Housing Ctr., Housing Voucher Discrimination 
and Race Discrimination in Cuyahoga County 20 (2017) (reporting the 
same), available at http://www.thehousingcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
 2017/12/Voucher-and-Race-Discrimination.pdf [https://perma.cc/DF9G-
EEFN]. 
245. See, e.g., Lepley & Mangiarelli, supra note 244, at 9–10 (reporting 
that the majority of voucher holders are concentrated in racially 
segregated areas). 
246. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 21 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2182 (describing FHA cases in which defendants 
accused of racial discrimination claimed that they refused to deal with the 
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outlawing source-of-income discrimination, particularly disabled 
persons, women, and families with children.247 
Adding source-of-income as a prohibited basis of discrimination 
would also help resolve a number of FHA issues that have divided the 
courts. One prominent example is the Salute/Geibeler dispute over 
whether a landlord’s discriminatory source-of-income policy should be 
waived in favor of a disabled tenant’s reasonable-accommodation 
claim;248 banning source-of-income discrimination would allow disabled 
tenants to prevail in this situation without having to litigate a RA 
request. Similarly, the need for impact-based claims as a predicate to a 
source-of-income challenge would end, thereby eliminating a type of 
claim that has produced mixed judicial responses.249 Other FHA issues 
would also be clarified or resolved, such as whether a landlord’s 
announced “No Section 8” policy violates the statute’s ban on 
discriminatory ads and statements.250 
C. Arguments Against 
The main push-back against a source-of-income amendment is 
likely to come from rental-housing providers, who have been the target 
of most source-of-income claims.251 In particular, landlords have often 
objected to their forced participation in the “voluntary” Section 8 
program, 252  which they see as imposing a variety of bureaucratic 
difficulties and costs on them.253 A number of courts have endorsed 
 
plaintiffs because the plaintiffs had children); 134 Cong. Rec. H4688 
(daily ed. June 23, 1988) (statement of Rep. Jeffords Dellums) (noting 
that one purpose of the familial-status amendment was to eliminate a 
form of discrimination that has a negative effect on black and Latino 
households and that “is often used as a smokescreen to exclude minorities 
from housing”). 
247. See supra Part II.B.3. 
248. See supra notes 210–227 and accompanying text. 
249. See supra Part II.B.2–.3. 
250. See infra Part IV.C. 
251. See supra notes 134–139 and accompanying text. 
252. See supra note 83 and accompanying text; see also Cunningham et al., 
supra note 86, at 10–12 (noting that a significant percentage of landlords 
oppose participating in the voucher program). 
253. See, e.g., Philip Garboden et al., Johns Hopkins U. Poverty & 
Ineq. Res. Lab, Urban Landlords and the Housing Choice 
Voucher Program 26–31 (2018), available at https://www.huduser.gov/ 
 portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Urban-Landlords-HCV-Program.pdf [https:// 
 perma.cc/WM6N-7DRV] (recounting some of the difficulties for landlords 
in participating in the Section 8 program); Lepley & Mangiarelli, 
supra note 244, at 7 (reporting that over 50% of the landlords who 
participated in the voucher program “reported dissatisfaction with [it]”). 
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their objections.254 For example, in 2017, a federal judge in Texas 
rejected a FHA race-impact challenge to a landlord’s anti-voucher 
policy, noting that the defendant’s desires to avoid Section 8’s 
“regulatory requirements” and to not “be subjected to increased costs, 
administrative delays for payment, and various other financial risks,” 
along with “the possibility of increased litigation,” all were “substantial, 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests.”255 
Some of these concerns can be discounted. For one thing, the FHA’s 
exemptions for single-family and “Mrs. Murphy” landlords, 256  who 
account for almost half of all units rented in the United States,257 mean 
that these exempt housing providers would not be subject to a FHA 
ban on source-of-income discrimination.258 Further, those landlords who 
are covered by the FHA would not thereby be required to participate 
in the Section 8 program. As courts construing state and local source-
of-income laws have noted: “Landlords remain free not to rent to 
voucher holders provided they do so on other legitimate, non-
discriminatory grounds, such as an applicant’s rental history or criminal 
history.” 259  Indeed, given the HCV program’s ceiling on assistance 
 
254. See, e.g., cases discussed supra note 213. 
255. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., No. 3:17-CV-206-K, 
2017 WL 2984048, at *11 (N.D. Tex. July 13, 2017), aff’d, 920 F.3d 890 
(5th Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 930 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2019), 
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1234 (2020). 
256. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (2012) (providing exemptions under certain 
circumstances for single-family-home rentals and for units in buildings 
where the owner lives and that contain four or fewer units). 
257. See Joint Ctr. for Housing Studies of Harvard Univ., America’s 
Rental Housing 2017, at 14 (2017) (reporting that single-family homes 
make up 39% of the nation’s rental units and another 18% are located in two- 
to four-unit multifamily buildings), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/ 
 sites/default/files/harvard_jchs_americas_rental_housing_2017_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X9F5-LG6B]. 
258. These exempt landlords would, however, be subject to the ban on 
discriminatory advertising and statements in 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012). 
See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 15:1 nn.10–11 and accompanying text. 
For more on the FHA’s ban on such ads and statements, see infra Part 
IV.C. 
259. Bourbeau v. Jonathan Woodner Co., 549 F. Supp. 2d 78, 87 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(citing Montgomery Cnty. v. Glenmont Hills Assocs., 936 A.2d 325, 330 
(Md. 2007)); see also Waller, supra note 100, at 433 (noting that “the 
realities of the Section 8 program [are such that] landlords may still reject 
tenants for non-discriminatory reasons”). 
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payments, 260  landlords whose units rent for higher amounts would 
simply be beyond the reach of voucher users.261 
And housing providers who do participate in the HCV program 
enjoy some benefits that might at least partly offset the perceived 
burdens. Voucher holders are incentivized to maintain their vouchers 
and to pay rent on time, and the government-assisted rent payments 
are reliable.262 Further, participating landlords remain free to charge 
their regular rents, security deposits, and other fees, and can use their 
regular screening criteria regarding tenant history.263 Such landlords 
can also evict voucher users for “good cause,” just as they do all other 
tenants.264 
 
260. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
261. See, e.g., Bourbeau, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 87; see also Waller, supra note 
100, at 433 (“[I]f a unit’s fair market value rent exceeds the area median, 
the property is too expensive for a Section 8 recipient and the landlord 
may not participate in the program.”). This assumes that landlords charge 
higher rents on a non-discriminatory basis; that is, not just to voucher 
users—a practice that would, of course, violate a ban on source-of-income 
discrimination. See id.  
 An additional issue is whether a landlord could set rents too high for 
voucher users just to avoid dealing with them. Some FHA decisions have 
found a defendant liable when he used otherwise legitimate economic 
methods to block a protected-class-member’s opportunity to obtain 
housing. See, e.g., Phillips v. Hunter Trails Cmty. Ass’n, 685 F.2d 184, 
187 (7th Cir. 1982); see also infra note 286. As the Sixth Circuit recently 
noted: “The existence of economic . . . motivations does not protect the 
defendants from housing discrimination claims when their actions had a 
clear discriminatory effect. Economic motivation does not cleanse 
discrimination.” Linkletter v. W. & S. Fin. Grp., Inc., 851 F.3d 632, 640 
(6th Cir. 2017); see also infra Part IV.G.3 (discussing the implications of 
a source-of-income amendment on gentrification, e.g., by landlords who 
raise rents after upgrading their properties). 
262. See Bell et al., supra note 97, at 13–14; see also Hampton, supra note 
243, at 525 (noting that landlords that participate in the voucher program 
benefit from having “an increased pool of available tenants” and a 
“guarantee of income” by the government). 
263. See, e.g., Bell et al., supra note 97, at 12–13. 
264. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.310(d)(1) (2018). “Good cause” to evict a tenant 
includes: 
(i) Failure by the family to accept the offer of a new lease or 
revision; 
(ii) A family history of disturbance of neighbors or destruction of 
property, or of living or housekeeping habits resulting in damage 
to the unit or premises; 
(iii) The owner’s desire to use the unit for personal or family use, 
or for a purpose other than as a residential rental unit; or 
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Still, landlords faced with a national mandate not to discriminate 
against voucher holders would no doubt incur some additional costs 
and burdens.265 Would this provide a defense to a FHA claim based on 
refusing to rent to such tenants? Stated another way: would a landlord 
violate the FHA if her refusal was prompted by both an outlawed reason 
(e.g., source of income) and a legitimate one (e.g., avoiding regulatory 
burdens)? The problem is exacerbated by the fact that this “mixed 
motive” issue, historically, has been a difficult one in FHA cases, and 
it remains so today.266 
As noted above, the administrative-burden defense has been 
addressed a number of times and in different ways by states and 
localities with source-of-income laws.267 Their courts have generally not 
allowed such a defense, because to allow it would create such a large 
exception as to essentially nullify these laws.268 A FHA amendment 
would presumably need to do the same, 269  both to avoid needless 
litigation under the new mandate and to allow the law to fully achieve 
its goal of banning discrimination against voucher-assisted families. 
 
(iv) A business or economic reason for termination of the tenancy 
(such as sale of the property, renovation of the unit, or desire to 
lease the unit at a higher rental). 
 Id. 
265. See supra notes 213, 255 and accompanying text. 
266. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 10:3 nn.23–37 and accompanying text. 
Congress, in the 1991 amendments to Title VII, clarified the mixed-motive 
issue for employment discrimination cases, but not for cases brought 
under other statutes, thereby leaving the FHA standard for this type of 
case uncertain. See id. § 10:3 n.25 and accompanying text; see also Gross 
v. FML Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (declining to apply Title 
VII’s amended mixed-motive standard to a claim under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act). 
267. See supra notes 107–108 and accompanying text. 
268. See cases cited supra note 107. Other cases rejecting landlords’ 
administrative-burden defenses in source-of-income claims based on state 
and local laws include Cales v. New Castle Hill Realty, No. 10 Civ. 
3426(DAB), 2011 WL 335599, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2011) (New York 
City law), and Diaz v. Wykurz, CCHR No. 07-H-28 (Dec. 16, 2009) 
(Chicago law). See generally Armen H. Merijan, Attempted Nullification: 
The Administrative Burden Defense in Source of Income Discrimination 
Cases, 22 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 211, 212–13 (2015) (arguing 
that allowing an administrative-burden defense would effectively nullify 
source-of-income laws). 
269. One way this could be done is by adding language to the FHA’s definition 
of source-of-income discrimination similar to that adopted by 
Massachusetts in 1990, which prohibits discrimination “because of any 
requirement of such public assistance, rental assistance, or housing 
subsidy program.” See DiLiddo v. Oxford St. Realty, Inc., 876 N.E.2d 
421, 428–29 (Mass. 2007). 
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While the advantages of explicitly dealing with this issue in an amended 
FHA are apparent, doing so would likely create even more opposition 
from the housing-provider community. At the very least, therefore, a 
FHA amendment should be accompanied by congressional and HUD 
efforts that make the Section 8-participation burdens less onerous on 
landlords.270 
In addition to administrative burdens, landlords may object to 
participating in the Section 8 program based on its perceived added 
costs.271 To the extent the added financial burdens are real, a landlord 
would presumably be able to try to recoup those costs by charging 
higher rents. This would, of course, have to be done across the board 
for all tenants, not just for those using vouchers.272 If banning source-
of-income discrimination would, in fact, result in higher rent levels and 
thus possibly a net loss of affordable-housing units,273  a legitimate 
policy issue would be raised. But this added-cost issue has not been a 
major concern in cities and states that have already banned source-of-
income discrimination, and assuming otherwise at the national level is 
speculative at this stage. Moreover, Congress has previously shown 
itself willing to impose some modest costs on housing providers when 
adding new protected classes to the FHA.274 
IV. An Amended Fair Housing Act – Implications and 
Applications 
The Fair Housing Act “prohibits a wide range of conduct” and is a 
“far reaching [statute that] . . . takes aim at discrimination that might 
be found throughout the real estate market and throughout the process 
 
270. See, e.g., Nisar et al., supra note 86, at 23–44 (identifying the primary 
reasons that landlords choose not to participate in the voucher program, 
and potential improvements to that program to address these reasons, 
such as increased payment standards, security-deposit assistance, 
streamlined inspections, and education programs). 
271. See id. at 23–24. A third concern—having to deal with low-income 
tenants—is less important, and, in any event, would be illegal under a 
source-of-income amendment to the FHA. See id. at 29. 
272. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
273. See supra notes 260–261 and accompanying text. 
274. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 11D:8 n.13 and accompanying text 
(regarding the reasonable-accommodation requirement in disability 
cases); H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 18 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179 (regarding the accessibility requirements in 
disability cases); cf. Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 
187, 210–11 (1991) (interpreting Title VII’s ban on gender discrimination 
as not allowing for an extra-cost defense except perhaps in “a case in 
which costs would be so prohibitive as to threaten the survival of the 
employer’s business”). 
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of buying, maintaining, or selling a home.” 275  This Part reviews 
potential applications of a FHA amendment that would add source-of-
income (including vouchers and other forms of governmental assistance) 
to the statute’s prohibited bases of discrimination. Separate sections 
cover: (A) refusals to rent and landlords’ other discriminatory practices; 
(B) exclusionary-zoning policies and other local-government land-use 
restrictions on affordable housing; (C) discriminatory ads, notices, and 
statements; (D) sales, mortgage, and home-insurance discrimination; 
(E) harassment and retaliation; and (F) other applications and issues. 
A. Rental Discrimination 
1. Overview 
As noted above, claims based on state and local housing laws that 
ban source-of-income discrimination have been brought, almost 
exclusively, against landlords and their agents.276 Also, experience in 
cities with such laws shows that they are not a panacea for this type of 
discrimination, as substantial non-compliance by housing providers 
continues years after the law’s enactment. 277  This may not be 
surprising, in light of the widespread racial discrimination that still 
occurs in rental markets decades after the FHA’s passage in 1968.278 
Another, more optimistic experience is suggested by the 1988 FHA 
amendment banning familial status discrimination,279 which initially 
resulted in large numbers of rental complaints, but has since settled 
into a period of modest litigation that involves mainly a few recurring 
issues.280 As in the racial and familial-status areas, compliance with a 
 
275. City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 923 F.3d 1260, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 
2019), vacated on other grounds, 140 S. Ct. 1259 (2020). 
276. See supra Part II.A.1. 
277. See supra notes 134–139 and accompanying text. 
278. See supra notes 140–143 and accompanying text. 
279. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
280. In the early 1990s, familial status was the second-most frequently claimed 
basis of discrimination in FHA complaints to fair-housing agencies, 
accounting for 35.4% of the total claims in FY 1992, 26.2% in FY 1993, 
and 24.7% in FY 1994. See U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 
Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity Annual Report 
to Congress 14 (1996). In recent years, however, familial-status claims 
have accounted for just over 10% of total claims. See HUD 2017 Report, 
supra note 58, at 15 (10.6% in FY 2017); U.S. Dep’t of Housing & 
Urban Dev., Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity 
Annual Report to Congress 25 (2016) (12.5% in FY 2015, and 12.4% 
in FY 2014). 
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national source-of-income law will likely take some years of litigation 
and other enforcement and educational efforts.281 
Source-of-income cases against landlords fall into two categories: 
(1) those in which the landlord admits its source-of-income discrim–
ination, but tries to justify the practice; and (2) those in which a 
landlord denies the charge.282 The latter cases can present a variety of 
prohibited practices under the FHA, but all of them are governed by 
well-established principles developed over decades of FHA litigation 
involving other protected classes;283 the former requires a more detailed 
consideration of FHA law. 
 
2. Landlord Justifications for Admitted Source-of-Income Discrimination 
This type of case would involve facially illegal discrimination, with 
the litigation focusing on whether the landlord’s justification provides 
a legally sufficient defense. A key issue will be whether the FHA’s 
source-of-income ban includes an explicit provision outlawing a “cost-
and-administrative burden” defense in voucher cases; if it does not, as 
noted above, a good deal of litigation may be expected over this issue.284 
Even if the amended FHA resolves this particular issue, housing 
providers may assert other justifications for continuing to engage in 
source-of-income discrimination. Again, it is worth noting that, in this 
type of case, it will be easy to prove intentional (“disparate treatment”) 
discrimination. As Judge Posner pointed out some thirty years ago,285 
 
281. See Nisar et al., supra note 86, at 32–38; see also Memorandum 
Regarding Source of Income Protections Under Cook County Human 
Rights Ordinance from Ranjit Hakin, supra note 147. 
282. See supra Part II.A.2. 
283. See supra notes 146–155 and accompanying text. This includes 
discriminatory-effect claims, more about which is discussed infra Part 
IV.G.2. 
284. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 107–108, 268. 
 A compromise is also possible, as demonstrated by Congress’s decision in 
the 1988 Fair Housing Amendment Act, which added disability and 
familial status to the FHA’s protected classes and provided a narrow 
exemption for each of these two newly outlawed bases of discrimination. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9) (2012) (providing a “direct threat” defense in 
disability cases); id. § 3607(b)(1)–(3) (2012) (exempting “housing for 
older persons” from the familial status provisions). In both of these 
situations, courts have made clear that the exemptions are to be construed 
narrowly and that a defendant has the burden of showing its situation 
comes within the exemption. See infra note 297 and accompanying text; 
Schwemm, supra note 11, § 11D:3 nn.21–22 and accompanying text 
(regarding the “direct threat” defense); id. § 11E:5 n.5 and accompanying 
text (regarding the “housing for older persons” defense).  
285. Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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a FHA defendant who acts on the basis of a forbidden factor has 
engaged in intentional discrimination, even if he has no malice toward 
the group involved and even if his motivation for such discrimination 
is economic.286 
Thus, a would-be tenant who is rejected because he uses a housing 
voucher will be able to prove “disparate treatment through explicit 
facial discrimination.”287 The court will not have to focus on whether 
the defendant’s obvious discrimination deprived the plaintiff of a 
housing opportunity,288 but only on whether the defendant can justify 
it. 
Note that the defendant’s opportunity here is different from that in 
disparate-impact claims, where a FHA violation is not established until 
 
286. According to Judge Posner’s opinion in Dwivedi: 
Suppose a merchant refuses to hire black workers not because he 
is racist but because he believes that his customers do not like 
blacks and will take their business elsewhere if he hires any. The 
refusal is nevertheless discrimination, because it is treating people 
differently on account of their race. It is intentional 
discrimination, because it necessarily is based on the merchant’s 
awareness of racial difference and his decision to base employment 
decisions on that awareness. And it is actionable discrimination, 
regardless of its effects and notwithstanding the merchant’s own 
freedom from racial animus. 
The parallel in [the Fair Housing Act] . . . is the broker who refuses 
to show the customer a property in which the customer is 
interested and does so not because he dislikes persons of the 
customer’s race but because he fears being boycotted by persons 
of a different race if he refuses to abide by the community’s racial 
mores. Such a broker is discriminating against his customer on 
grounds of race and therefore violates the statute.  
 Id. at 1530–31; see also Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1501 
(10th Cir. 1995) (noting that a FHA plaintiff may prove intentional 
discrimination “merely by showing that a protected group has been 
subjected to explicitly differential—i.e., discriminatory—treatment,” and 
that she is not required to prove the defendant’s conduct was motivated 
by “malice or discriminatory animus”); cf. Equal Emp’t Opportunity 
Comm’n v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 899 F.3d 428, 436 (6th Cir. 2018) (noting 
that a defendant’s illegal intent could be shown “even if all of the evidence 
showed that cost-savings, not animus . . . , motivated the company”). 
287. Cornerstone Residence, Inc. v. City of Clairton, 754 F. App’x 89, 91–92 
(3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Wind Gap Mun. Auth., 421 
F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2005)); accord Curto v. A Country Place Condo. 
Ass’n, Inc., 921 F.3d 405, 410 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[A] showing of malice is 
not required ‘where a plaintiff demonstrates that the challenged action 
involves disparate treatment through explicit facial discrimination . . . . 
Rather, the focus is on the explicit terms of the discrimination.’”) (quoting 
Wind Gap, 421 F.3d at 177) (alteration in original). 
288. See Cornerstone Residence, 754 F. App’x at 91–92. 
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the court evaluates the landlord’s proffered justification. 289  Indeed, 
regarding intentional-discrimination claims based on race and some 
other FHA-prohibited factors, it is not clear that a defendant can ever 
prevail through a justification defense.290 
Still, in FHA cases based on familial status and disability, some 
courts have held that, in limited circumstances, defendants may be able 
to justify their facially discriminatory rules.291 For example, some FHA 
cases involving challenges to landlords’ rules that restrict children have 
recognized a “legitimate safety concerns” defense.292 
The Tenth Circuit’s 1995 decision in Bangerter v. Orem City 
Corp.293 is instructive on this point. There, in the course of reviewing a 
city’s facially discriminatory restrictions on group homes for disabled 
persons, the court opined that these restrictions might be justified if 
they were shown to be either required by “public safety” or “benign 
discrimination” favoring the disabled residents.294 As to the “public 
safety” defense, the court noted that the FHA explicitly addresses 
safety concerns in disability cases by providing that housing need not 
be “made available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a 
direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or whose 
tenancy would result in substantial physical damage to the property of 
others.” 295  According to the Tenth Circuit, this provision permits 
landlords to impose “reasonable restrictions on the terms or conditions 
of housing when justified by public safety concerns,”296 but, like all 
 
289. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522–24 (2015). 
290. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(d) (2017) (explaining in a HUD regulation 
governing FHA-impact claims that “[a] demonstration that a practice is 
supported by a legally sufficient justification . . . may not be used as a 
defense against a claim of intentional discrimination”); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(k)(2) (2012) (providing that a defendant’s “demonstration that 
an employment practice is required by business necessity may not be used 
as a defense against a claim of intentional discrimination”). 
291. See Curto, 921 F.3d at 412 (Fuentes, J., concurring) (noting that the 
Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits found that “in certain circumstances, 
there may be legal justifications for facial discrimination under the 
FHA”). 
292. See, e.g., Belcher v. The Grand Reserve MGM, No. 2:15-CV-834-KS-WC, 
2019 WL 469900, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 6, 2019) (upholding defendant-
landlord’s rules that facially discriminated against families with children, 
because they were prompted by “legitimate safety concerns”); see also 
Schwemm, supra note 11, § 11E:2 n.27. 
293. 46 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1995). 
294. Id. at 1503. 
295. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9) (1994)). 
296. Id. 
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other exceptions to the FHA, it “should be narrowly construed.”297 As 
to the possible “benign discrimination” defense, the Tenth Circuit 
opined that the FHA “should not be interpreted to preclude special 
restrictions upon the disabled that are really beneficial to, rather than 
discriminatory against, the handicapped.” 298  Yet the court also 
cautioned against a wholesale acceptance of this defense: “We should 
be chary about accepting the justification that a particular restriction 
upon the handicapped really advances their housing opportunities 
rather than discriminates against them in housing.”299 Beyond these 
possible “public safety” and “benign discrimination” justifications, 
Bangerter left open the possibility that other defenses based on such 
benign motives might also be permissible.300 
 
297. Id. Thus: 
Restrictions predicated on public safety cannot be based on 
blanket stereotypes about the handicapped, but must be tailored 
to particularized concerns about individual residents . . . . 
“Generalized perceptions about disabilities and unfounded 
speculations about threats to safety are specifically rejected as 
grounds to justify exclusion.” [H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 18 
(1988).] Any special requirements placed on housing for the 
handicapped based on concerns for the protection of the disabled 
themselves or the community must be “individualiz[ed . . . to the 
needs or abilities of particular kinds of developmental disabilities,” 
Marbrunak, Inc., v. City of Stow, 974 F.2d 43, 47 (6th Cir. 1992), 
and must have a “necessary correlation to the actual abilities of 
the persons upon whom it is imposed,” Pontiac [Grp. Home Corp. 
v. Montgomery Cty., 823 F. Supp. 1285, 1300 (D. Md. 1993)]. 
 Id. at 1503–04. The court did not opine as to whether a defendant accused 
of intentional disability discrimination could successfully assert “safety 
concerns” that go beyond those covered by § 3604(f)(9). Id. at 1503. 
298. Id. at 1504. 
299. Id. Explaining its caution, the Tenth Circuit noted: 
Restrictions that are based upon unsupported stereotypes or upon 
prejudice and fear stemming from ignorance or generalizations, for 
example, would not pass muster. However, restrictions that are 
narrowly tailored to the particular individuals affected could be 
acceptable under the [FHA] if the benefit to the handicapped in 
their housing opportunities clearly outweigh whatever burden may 
result to them.  
 Id. On the “benign discrimination” point, the court concluded by 
recognizing “the importance of leaving room for flexible solutions to 
address the complex problem of discrimination and to realize the goals 
established by Congress in the Fair Housing Act.” Id. at 1505. 
300. Id. at 1503 (noting that the “public safety” and “benign discrimination” 
defenses were among the “potential justifications [that] seem relevant for 
inquiry here”); see also Larkin v. Mich. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 89 F.3d 285, 
290 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that facially discriminatory restrictions on 
housing for disabled persons violate the FHA unless justified “by the 
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B. Exclusionary Zoning 
Throughout the FHA’s history, a key part of its litigation has 
involved challenges to local governments’ zoning and other land-use 
restrictions on affordable housing.301 In its 2015 decision endorsing the 
FHA’s disparate-impact theory of liability, the Supreme Court referred 
to these cases as being “at the heartland of” of this theory.302 The gist 
of FHA law is that a local government cannot block housing of 
particular value to minorities if that action is motivated by race or has 
an unjustified racial effect.303 And because the 1988 amendments to the 
FHA banned disability discrimination, the same principles have been 
applied in numerous cases challenging municipal restrictions on group 
homes for people with disabilities.304 
 
unique and specific needs and abilities” of people with disabilities) 
(quoting Marbrunak, 974 F.2d at 47). 
301. “Affordable housing” is generally understood to mean housing that 
“requires no more than 30% of a household’s income for households 
earning 80% or less” of the median income in the local metropolitan area. 
See Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. Cty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 588 n.1 (2d Cir. 
2016). 
302. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2511 (2015) (“Suits targeting unlawful zoning laws and 
other housing restrictions that unfairly exclude minorities from certain 
neighborhoods without sufficient justification are at the heartland of 
disparate-impact liability.”); see also id. at 2521–22 (explaining that 
FHA-outlawed practices “include zoning laws and other housing 
restrictions that function unfairly to exclude minorities from certain 
neighborhoods without any sufficient justification”). 
303. See, e.g., Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Props. Co., 920 F.3d 
890, 908 (5th Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 930 F.3d 660 (5th 
Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1234 (2020) (noting that the 
“heartland” decisions described by the Supreme Court in Inclusive 
Communities “employed the FHA to remove indefensible government 
policies that operated to perpetuate segregation by unreasonably 
restricting private construction of multi-family housing that would 
increase affordable housing options for minorities”); Mhany Mgmt., 819 
F.3d at 606–15; Avenue 6E Invs., LLC v. City of Yuma, 818 F.3d 493, 
503–13 (9th Cir. 2016). See generally Schwemm, supra note 11, § 13:8–
:10 (describing FHA exclusionary-zoning claims). 
304. See, e.g., Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1216–18 
(11th Cir. 2008); Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 573–
80 (2d Cir. 2003). See generally Schwemm, supra note 11, § 11D:5 nn.20–
21. In addition to disparate-treatment and disparate-impact claims, group 
homes may also challenge such restrictions based on the defendant’s duty 
to reasonably accommodate housing for disabled persons, a FHA mandate 
that does not apply to other protected classes. See, e.g., Schwarz, 544 
F.3d at 1218–28; Tsombanidis, 352 F.3d at 578–580; see also Schwemm, 
supra note 11, § 11D:5 n.22. 
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But proving a municipality’s discriminatory intent or unjustified 
impact is often difficult, and absent such proof, a challenged restriction 
is generally upheld.305 Even when a plaintiff ultimately prevails, the 
case may take years and millions of dollars to litigate,306 and even then 
may not result in the proposed housing actually being built.307 Thus, 
while FHA race-based claims challenging municipal restrictions on 
affordable housing have often succeeded as a matter of law, they have 
not been all that effective in opening up segregated areas of opportunity 
to racial minorities. And HUD’s long-delayed efforts to use the FHA’s 
“affirmatively furthering” mandate to require local governments to 
accept more affordable housing has now been derailed by the Trump 
Administration.308 
How would a source-of-income amendment to the FHA affect this 
type of litigation? A typical claim accuses a town of illegal 
discrimination in blocking a proposed multi-family affordable-housing 
development. If, for example, the proposal calls for a substantial 
number of Section 8 units309 and the developer can show that the town 
treated market-rate projects more favorably,310 this would prove at least 
a prima facie case of intentional source-of-income discrimination.311 As 
 
305. See, e.g., Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton Cty., 466 F.3d 1276, 1283–
88 (11th Cir. 2006). 
306. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 590–91 (describing key events 
beginning in 2003 in a 2016 appellate decision); Avenue 6E, 818 F.3d at 
498 (describing key events beginning in 2002 in a 2016 appellate decision); 
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 928 
(2d Cir.) (describing the dispute’s key events beginning in 1981 in a 1988 
appellate decision); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 
558 F.2d 1283, 1286 (7th Cir. 1977) (describing key events beginning in 
1971 in a 1977 appellate decision). 
307. See, e.g., Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 605 F.2d 1033, 
1037 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1979); see also Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of 
Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1007, 1009 (7th Cir. 1980) (approving 
a settlement calling for a different project to be built at an alternative 
site adjacent to defendant-village). 
308. See Nat’l Fair Hous. Alliance v. Carson, 330 F. Supp. 3d 14, 22–23, 32–
34 (D.D.C. 2018) (describing 2018 HUD directives that effectively blocked 
key provisions of HUD’s “Affirmatively Furthering” regulations 
promulgated in 2013 by the Obama Administration), motion to amend 
denied, 397 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019); see also supra notes 22–23 and 
accompanying text. 
309. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 597; Huntington Branch, NAACP, 
844 F.2d at 929–31. 
310. See, e.g., Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1216–17 
(11th Cir. 2008). 
311. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 606–12; see also Schwemm, supra 
note 11, §§ 10:2, 11D:5 nn.45–48 and accompanying text. 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 3·2020 
Source-of-Income Discrimination and the Fair Housing Act 
631 
in all such intent-based FHA cases, liability would then turn on whether 
the defendant-town could articulate a non-discriminatory reason for its 
action (e.g., the site chosen for plaintiff’s development is zoned for 
single-family homes), and if so, whether this rationale is then shown to 
be merely pretextual.312 
In most exclusionary-zoning cases, however, the town’s illegal 
intent has not been focused on the developer, but rather the people 
likely to live in the proposed development, with the town being accused 
of hostility to the race or other protected-class status of these 
prospective residents.313 Under an amended FHA, the alleged violation 
could be based on the future residents’ source of income, as well as their 
race, national origin, disability, or familial status. 
But having a particular source-of-income is not the same as having 
an income low enough to qualify for affordable housing.314 Thus, while 
showing that a town discriminated against a proposed low-income 
project might demonstrate hostility to the prospective residents’ 
economic status, it would not necessarily prove discrimination based on 
their source of income.315 In other words, establishing an intent-based 
FHA violation in such a case would involve the same types of 
evidentiary issues that arise in racial-discrimination cases: the plaintiffs 
would need to produce additional evidence connecting the defendant’s 
hostility to low-income people with a FHA-protected class (e.g., 
statements by town officials or the public that equate low-income 
persons with voucher users).316 A source-of-income FHA amendment 
would not make this type of intent-based case any easier to win, except 
for the fact that local officials and citizens may, at least in the early 
years of such an amendment, be less circumspect about making 
explicitly hostile remarks about voucher users than racial minorities.317 
 
312. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 612–13; see also Schwemm, supra 
note 11, §§ 10:2 nn.49–52 and accompanying text, 11D:5 n.49 and 
accompanying text. 
313. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 606–07; Avenue 6E Invs., LLC v. 
City of Yuma, 818 F.3d 493, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2016). 
314. See supra notes 10–12, 68–70, 188, 198, 218–225, 238, 253–261 and 
accompanying text. 
315. This presumes that the town has not discriminated against the proposed 
subsidized development vis-à-vis other affordable, albeit non-subsidized, 
multi-family developments. If it has, then its blocking of the subsidized 
development might well run afoul of a source-of-income amendment. 
316. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 608–10; Avenue 6E, 818 F.3d at 504–
07. See generally Schwemm, supra note 11, § 13:12 n.21. 
317. Such hostile remarks may include code words for FHA-protected class 
members. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 608–11; Avenue 6E, 818 
F.3d at 505–07; see also infra note 334 and accompanying text. 
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In addition to intent-based claims, the FHA allows for 
discriminatory-effect claims in exclusionary-zoning cases based on two 
independent theories: (1) that the defendant-town’s action has a 
disproportionate impact on minorities or other FHA-protected groups; 
and (2) that the action perpetuates residential segregation based on a 
FHA-prohibited factor. 318  The former focuses on the fact that the 
blocked project would include disproportionate numbers of racial 
minorities, families with children, persons with disabilities, and the like. 
The success of such a claim depends on statistical proof of this disparate 
impact.319 The would also be true under an amended FHA for a claim 
that persons whose source of income includes government assistance 
might make up a large portion of the development’s residents. In other 
words, such a claim’s success, whether based on source-of-income or 
some other prohibited factor, would depend on the particular 
demographics of the local market for the proposed development.320 
A segregative-effect claim also depends on statistical proof, but its 
focus is on how the town’s current, segregated population would be 
changed by the influx of hitherto underrepresented groups who are 
likely to live in the new development.321 At first blush, it might seem 
that every rich suburb would be subject to liability under this theory—
regardless of whether it objects to the project just at a particular site 
or whether it forbids all multi-family housing—because the project 
would introduce at least some low-income people into the town.322 But, 
again, this confuses the new residents’ economic status with their source 
of income. If, for example, there is no evidence that the newcomers are 
likely to have anything but traditional wage-based income (albeit less 
than the suburb’s current residents), then their arrival would not 
necessarily “integrate” the town vis-à-vis sources of income. Still, if the 
proposal itself were for a project-based Section 8 development323—
 
318. See Schwemm, supra note 11, §§ 10:6–:7, 13:10. 
319. See, e.g., Oviedo Town Ctr. II, L.L.L.P. v. City of Oviedo, 759 F. App’x 
828, 833–36 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming summary judgment for the city 
against FHA disparate-impact claim due to the inadequacy of plaintiff’s 
statistical evidence). See generally Schwemm, supra note 11, § 10:6 
nn.14–20 and accompanying text (describing the statistical-evidence 
requirement for disparate-impact FHA claims and gathering cases). 
320. See, e.g., Oviedo Town Ctr., 759 F. App’x at 833–36. 
321. See, e.g., Mhany, 819 F.3d at 608, 619–20; Huntington Branch, NAACP 
v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 937–38 (2d Cir.); see also 
Schwemm, supra note 11, § 10:7 nn.28–30 and accompanying text. 
322. See Robert G. Schwemm, Segregative-Effect Claims Under the Fair 
Housing Act, 20 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 709, 742–43 (2018). See 
generally Schwemm, supra note 11, § 10:7 (describing segregative-effect 
theory in exclusionary-zoning cases). 
323. For a description of project-based Section 8 housing, see supra note 61. 
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meaning that all of its residents would be Section 8 users—then a town 
that has no or few residents receiving government assistance could not 
block such a proposal absent a substantial justification without inviting 
a segregative-effect claim.324    
C. § 3604(c): Discriminatory Ads, Notices, and Statements 
Section 3604(c) of the FHA outlaws housing notices, statements, 
and advertisements that indicate a preference, limitation, or 
discrimination based on a prohibited factor.325 Some advocates have 
tried to use the current law to challenge “No Section 8” policies as 
conveying an anti-minority message, but these efforts have generally 
failed.326 Obviously, such claims could be sustained under an amended 
FHA, as they already have been in states and localities that have 
banned “source-of-income” discrimination under their fair-housing 
laws.327 The same would also be true for rental policies that block 
would-be tenants based on their use of Social Security, welfare, or other 
government-assistance programs.328  A noteworthy feature of 
§ 3604(c) is that it applies to all housing ads and statements, even 
those by “Mrs. Murphy” and other small landlords who are otherwise 
exempt from the FHA.329 This means that such a landlord, although 
free to refuse to rent to voucher holders or otherwise discriminate based 
 
324. This would also be true for affordable-housing developers whose funding 
source is some other government assistance program. See, e.g., note 84 
and accompanying text (describing the LIHTC program). 
325. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012). 
326. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 912 
(5th Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 930 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2019), 
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1234 (2020) (affirming dismissal of § 3604(c) claim 
alleging that an apartment manager’s ads announcing its “no vouchers” 
policy “appeal to the stereotype that because voucher tenants are Black, 
voucher tenants are undesirable as tenants and that the exclusion of 
voucher households makes the complex a more desirable place for White 
non-Hispanic tenants to live”).  
327. Examples from the Chicago Commission on Human Relations include Hall 
v. Woodgett, CCHR No. 13-H-51, at 3–4 (Oct. 8, 2015) (finding violation 
based on landlord’s statement to applicant that she would not be 
approved because she used a voucher), and Shipp v. Wagner, CCHR No. 
12-H-19, at 2–4 (July 16, 2014) (finding violations based on landlord’s ads 
stating “No Section 8” and “Not Section 8 Approved”). 
328. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 247–48 (9th Cir. 
1997) (welfare benefits); Edwards v. Gene Salter Props., 739 F. App’x 
357, 358 (8th Cir. 2018) (SSDI, retirement benefits, and rental income), 
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1271 (2019); Green v. Sunpointe Assocs., Ltd., 
No. C96–1542C, 1997 WL 1526484, at *5 (W.D. Wash. May 12, 1997) 
(Section 8); see also supra text accompanying notes 202 and 206. 
329. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 15:1 n.10 (gathering cases). 
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on a prospect’s source-of-income, could not advertise or make 
statements to this effect. Further, § 3604(c) covers not only explicitly 
discriminatory communications, but also those that would be under–
stood by an ordinary reader or listener to convey a discriminatory 
message330—such as a landlord's statements that her units are “not 
Section 8 approved” or that she has had “bad experiences with Section 
8” in the past—331even if such statements do not result in the landlord 
actually following a “No Section 8” policy.332 
The fact that § 3604(c) violations do not require explicit references 
to the FHA’s protected classes means that code words and phrases 
understood to refer to these groups may also be problematic. This was 
the plaintiff’s theory in Lincoln Properties, i.e., that “No Section 8” 
would be taken to mean racial minorities.333 Adding source-of-income 
as a FHA-outlawed basis of discrimination would mean that other 
phrases might be understood to refer to this factor and thus violate 
§ 3604(c). Examples might include hostile statements about “low-
income people,” “low-income housing,” and “welfare types”; or, on the 
other hand, favorable references in ads for “high-class” or “exclusive” 
neighborhoods or complexes.334 
Could a landlord even inquire about a prospective tenant’s source 
of income? In the racial context, courts have opined that § 3604(c) bars 
housing providers from asking about a prospect’s race, on the theory 
that “[t]here is simply no legitimate reason for considering an 
 
330. See, e.g., Miami Valley Fair Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. Connor Grp., 725 F.3d 
571, 577 (6th Cir. 2013); Soules v. U.S. Dep’t Hous. & Urban Dev., 967 
F.2d 817, 824 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Schwemm, supra note 11, §§ 15:3 
n.4, 15:6 nn.18–21, 15:8 n.2 (gathering cases). 
331. See, e.g., Shipp, CCHR No. 12-H-19, at 2–4; Hutchison v. Iftekaruddin, 
CCHR No. 09-H-21, at 4–7, 7 n.8 (Feb. 17, 2010) (finding violations based 
on landlord’s statements to applicant that “he didn’t think Section 8 
would pay for [the unit]” and that a Section 8 inspection “would take at 
least three weeks,” as well as his statements to applicant’s representative 
that he had “bad experiences with Section 8” in the past). 
332. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 15:9 nn.15–16 and accompanying text. 
333. See supra note 326 (describing Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln 
Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 910 (5th Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 
930 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1234 (2020)). 
334. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.75 (2018); see also Schwemm, supra note 11, § 15:5 
n.4 and accompanying text (noting HUD’s view that words like 
“restrictive,” “private,” and “traditional” in housing ads might violate 
§ 3604(c) if used in a discriminatory context); cf. Hawkins v. Vill. Green 
Holdings Co., CCHR No. 14-H-35, at 9 (July 12, 2018) (noting that “use 
of code words such as, we do not accept your form of payment, could be 
a means of proving” violation of local fair-housing ordinance that bans 
source-of-income discrimination). 
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applicant’s race.”335 In an early familial status case,336 however, the 
Second Circuit held that a landlord could ask about the number and 
age of a prospect’s children without violating § 3604(c), because there 
are situations that might constitute a valid reason for asking such 
questions.337 Similarly, a landlord’s mere inquiry about an applicant’s 
source of income should not violate § 3604(c), because, as in Soules, 
there may be legitimate reasons for this inquiry (e.g., whether the unit 
must be government-inspected before rental).338 Still, although such an 
inquiry may be justified, context matters,339 and a § 3604(c) violation 
may occur if the inquiry is accompanied by negative comments about 
the voucher program or a prospect’s other sources of income.340 
 
335. Soules, 967 F.2d at 824 (agreeing that race is never a valid consideration); 
see also Schwemm, supra note 11, § 15:9 n.5 (gathering cases). 
336. Soules, 967 F.2d 817. 
337. Id. at 824. These situations, according to the Soules opinion, might include 
“local zoning regulations.” Id. Also: 
Conditions in the neighborhood known to be either ideally suited 
to or inherently dangerous to occupancy by families with children 
might well permit an inquiry about the ages of the family 
members. [Thus], standing alone, an inquiry into whether a 
prospective tenant has a child does not constitute an FHA 
violation.  
 Id.; see also Schwemm, supra note 11, § 15:9 nn.12–14 and accompanying 
text (discussing Soules and other § 3604(c)–statement cases involving 
familial status). 
338. See supra note 77 and accompanying text; see also Inclusive Cmtys. 
Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., No. 3:17-CV-206-K, 2017 WL 2984048, 
at *11 (N.D. Tex. July 13, 2017) (referring to the possibility of 
“administrative delays for payment” due to the tenant’s receiving certain 
forms of government assistance), aff’d, 920 F.3d 890 (5th Cir.), reh’g and 
reh’g en banc denied, 930 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. 
Ct. 1234 (2020). 
339. See, e.g., Soules, 967 F.2d at 825 (noting that in § 3604(c)–statement 
cases, the context of the defendant’s remarks and the speaker’s intent may 
be examined, “not because a lack of design constitutes an affirmative 
defense to an FHA violation, but because it helps determine the manner 
in which a statement was made and the way an ordinary listener would 
have interpreted it”). 
340. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Vill. Green Holdings Co., CCHR No. 14-H-35, at 9–
10 (July 12, 2018) (finding no violation based on apartment agent’s 
comment to Section 8 applicant that her “form of payment” might not be 
acceptable, because it was unclear whether this referred to applicant’s 
check, money order, or credit or debit card (which would be justified) or 
to applicant’s voucher use (which would not)). 
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D. Discriminatory Sales, Financing, and Home Insurance 
A source-of-income amendment to the FHA seems unlikely to 
generate much litigation involving refusals to sell. By definition, the 
Section 8 voucher program is limited to rentals, as are most other 
government-housing assistance programs.341 It is hard to imagine why 
home sellers would care about the source of their buyers’ income (as 
opposed to the amount of this income). Indeed, no sales case has been 
reported under a state or local source-of-income law or as an impact 
claim under the FHA.342 
A real estate broker may be concerned about a home-buyer’s ability 
to secure a traditional mortgage, and thus may be less inclined to 
provide equal service to those using VA or other federal mortgage 
assistance. A realtor may also steer clients who rely on Social Security, 
AFDC, or other government benefits to less affluent areas, and such 
steering would violate an amended FHA.343 
Mortgage providers themselves may be inclined to treat welfare 
recipients less favorably than traditional wage-earners. Countering this 
expectation, however, is the fact that such creditors have for decades 
been subject to the 1974 Equal Credit Opportunity Act,344 which has 
always banned discrimination not only on the basis of race, color, 
religion, national origin, and sex, but also on the basis that “all or part 
of the applicant’s income derives from any public assistance 
program.”345 Few cases have been reported under this provision,346 but 
its mandate has prompted federal regulators to regularly issue guidance 
reminding mortgage providers and other creditors of their 
responsibilities to treat SSDI and similar sources of income as just as 
reliable as wages.347 The very fact that regulators feel the need to issue 
such “reminders” suggests that some lenders are likely to run afoul of a 
 
341. See supra Part I.B. 
342. See, e.g., Chi. Comm’n on Human Relations, supra note 137 (reporting 
no such cases under Chicago’s ban on source-of-income discrimination 
during a sixteen-year period ending in 2018). 
343. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 13:5 nn.9–12 and accompanying text 
(describing the FHA’s ban on realtor steering). 
344. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2012). 
345. Id. § 1691(a)(1)–(2). The ECOA also outlaws discrimination based on 
marital status, age, and the exercising of any right under the Consumer 
Credit Protection Act. Id. § 1691(a)(1), (3). 
346. One interesting example is Laramore v. Ritchie Realty Mgmt. Co., 397 
F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2005), where the court rejected a claim against an 
apartment manager who refused Section 8 voucher users on the ground 
that the ECOA does not apply to residential leases. Id. at 547. 
347. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
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FHA amended to outlaw source-of-income discrimination in dealing 
with individual applicants.348 
But the other major type of FHA mortgage litigation—“redlining,” 
in which whole neighborhoods are discriminated against because their 
residents are mostly members of a protected class—seems an unlikely 
candidate for source-of-income litigation. This is because, as noted 
above with respect to exclusionary-zoning cases, being poor is not the 
same as having a particular source of income.349 Thus, while lenders 
may well provide inferior services for home mortgages in poor 
neighborhoods, their doing so would not necessarily relate to the sources 
of income of those neighborhoods’ residents. And, although making out 
a source-of-income impact claim might be possible in this situation, 
assembling the necessary statistical support for such a claim would be 
no easier—and perhaps harder—than doing so for a race or national-
origin discrimination claim. 
The home-insurance industry has long fought against FHA 
coverage, but with limited success.350 By now, it is well established that 
the FHA bans insurance discrimination against both individual 
protected-class homeowners and minority neighborhoods (“insurance 
redlining”). 351  In addition to intent-based claims, plaintiffs have 
challenged insurance companies’ policies for having a negative impact 
on minorities or minority neighborhoods. Indeed, as noted above, 
hostility to the Section 8 program has already prompted some FHA 
race-impact claims against insurers that refused to provide coverage for 
landlords who rented to voucher users. 352  A source-of-income 
amendment to the FHA would make clear the illegality of such policies 
without the need for statistical proof of their race-based disparate 
impact. 
 
348. Cf. Sisemore v. Master Fin., Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 719 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2007) (upholding source-of-income claim under California’s fair-housing 
law against finance company that refused to finance a home Sisemore 
intended to use as a day care). 
349. See supra note 314 and accompanying text. 
350. See Application of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effect Standard 
to Insurance, 81 Fed. Reg. 69012 (Oct. 5, 2016); Property Cas. Insurers 
Ass’n of Am. v. Donovan, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1031–32 (N.D. Ill. 2014) 
(describing insurance industry’s objections to being subject to the FHA 
and its disparate-impact standard). 
351. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 13:15 nn.19–32 and accompanying text. 
352. See supra notes 181–185 and accompanying text. 
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F. Harassment and Retaliation 
The FHA’s prohibition of discriminatory terms and conditions, in 
§ 3604(b), covers housing providers’ harassment of residents.353 Among 
other things, this prevents landlords from threatening to evict tenants 
because of their or their guests’ protected-class status.354 
Further, § 3617, which bans interference with those who exercise 
FHA rights, extends the anti-harassment mandate to everyone, 
including neighbors and municipalities.355 Hostility to Section 8 users 
by up-scale municipalities has been alleged in a number of race-based 
FHA cases.356 A FHA source-of-income amendment would make such 
harassment practices unlawful without the need for proof of their race-
based impact.357 
Section 3617 also bans retaliation against persons who file a 
discrimination complaint or otherwise engage in FHA-protected 
activities.358 Indeed, retaliation claims have grown in popularity to the 
point where they now make up the fourth-largest category of FHA 
complaints.359 
A variety of practices under these anti-harassment and anti-
retaliation provisions could be challenged under a FHA amendment 
 
353. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 14:3 nn.1–28 and accompanying text; see 
also id. § 11C:2 n.36 and accompanying text (gathering sex-harassment 
cases under § 3604(b)). 
354. See id. § 14:3 n.29 and accompanying text. 
355. See id. § 20:3 n.11 and accompanying text. 
356. See Complaint at 1–3, Long Island Hous. Services, Inc. v. Vill. of Mastic 
Beach, No. 2:15-cv-00629 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2017), 2015 WL 4751374 
(ultimately settled for $387,500); Cmty. Action League v. City of 
Palmdale, No. CV 11-4817 ODW VBKX, 2012 WL 10647285, at *6–7 
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2012) (upholding FHA-intent and -impact claims 
against two municipalities based on defendants’ hostility to Section 8 
tenants); Williams v. City of Antioch, No. C 08–02301 SBA, 2010 WL 
3632197 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010) (certifying a class of African-Americans 
in Antioch, California who hold Section 8 housing vouchers). See generally 
Priscilla A. Ocen, The New Racially Restrictive Covenant: Race, Welfare, 
and the Policing of Black Women in Subsidized Housing, 59 U.C.L.A. L. 
Rev. 1540, 1572–81 (2012) (describing police harassment and other 
actions undertaken by certain predominantly white California 
communities in response to their growing number of Section 8 
households). 
357. See supra notes 350–352 and accompanying text. 
358. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 20:5 nn.3–5 and accompanying text. 
359. See HUD 2017 Report, supra note 58, at 15 (reporting that retaliation 
accounted for 10.2% of all FHA complaints received by HUD and 
substantially equivalent state and local agencies in FY 2017, making it 
the fourth-most frequent complaint of eight categories (after disability, 
race, and familial status; before national origin, sex, religion, and color)). 
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banning source-of-income discrimination, but all of these cases would 
be governed by well-established principles developed over decades of 
FHA litigation involving other protected classes. 360  For present 
purposes, it is sufficient to note that these new opportunities for 
litigation would exist and to highlight one example: a landlord could 
not evict or threaten to evict a tenant under an amended FHA for 
seeking to use a Section 8 voucher or some other housing assistance.361 
G. Other Applications 
1. Standing to Sue 
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has broadly interpreted 
standing to sue under the FHA to include not only the direct targets of 
a defendant’s unlawful practices, but also a variety of others who are 
injured by these practices, including housing providers, fair-housing 
organizations, municipalities, and local residents.362 As with much of 
modern FHA litigation, suits by fair-housing organizations will likely 
be important in enforcing a source-of-income amendment.363 The same 
is true for housing providers, at least in those source-of-income claims 
that challenge exclusionary land-use practices.364 
The most intriguing type of plaintiff in FHA source-of-income cases 
would be local residents who, ever since the Supreme Court’s 1972 
decision in Trafficante,365 have been allowed to challenge a landlord’s 
discrimination against outsiders as a deprivation of their right to live 
in an integrated community. Although most of these claims have alleged 
racial discrimination, the Trafficante theory has also been used in 
 
360. See supra notes 146–155 and accompanying text; see also infra Part 
IV.G.2 (discussing discriminatory-effect claims). 
361. Cf. Gorski v. Troy, 929 F.2d 1183, 1187–90 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that 
would-be foster parents who had not yet been assigned any children may 
challenge their eviction based on the FHA’s prohibition of familial-status 
discrimination). 
362. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text. 
363. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378–79 (1982); see 
also supra notes 139, 161, 165, 169, 185, and 190 (discussing cases in which 
fair-housing organizations brought source-of-income claims either under a 
state or local fair-housing law banning this type of discrimination or as 
impact-based claims under the current FHA). 
364. See supra Part IV.B. 
365. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); see also Havens 
Realty, 455 U.S. at 375–78; Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 
U.S. 91, 111–15 (extending Trafficante’s standing rationale to local 
residents who challenged realtors' steering). 
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familial-status and disability cases.366 A source-of-income version of 
Trafficante would likely see current, affluent resident-plaintiffs 
objecting to, say, their landlord’s refusal to rent to Section 8 or other 
government-assisted tenants. A variation on this claim, also recognized 
in early FHA race cases,367 might be a suit brought by local residents 
in an area already heavily populated by voucher users in which the local 
residents object to a further influx of subsidized housing as perpetuating 
source-of-income segregation. 
Among other things, these types of claims under an amended FHA 
might succeed in cases similar to Inclusive Communities, where, on 
remand from the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs’ challenge to the 
disproportionate siting of subsidized projects in poor areas of Dallas 
failed as a race-impact claim. 368  The caveat here, as it has been 
throughout this Article, is that having a particular source-of-income is 
not the same as being low income. Thus, a claim based on local 
residents’ being deprived of integrated opportunities or on having 
source-of-income segregation reinforced would have to be proved by 
showing the benefits of integration not just regarding poorer people, 
but regarding people who receive certain sources of income. 
2. Discriminatory-Effect Claims; Income-to-Rent Policies 
Challenges to a housing practice based on its unjustified 
discriminatory effect on a protected class have become a well-
established part of FHA litigation. In the 1970s, appellate courts began 
to apply this theory in FHA cases, based on the Supreme Court’s 
approval of it in Title VII employment-discrimination cases beginning 
with Griggs v. Duke Power Co.369 By 2015, when the Court endorsed 
disparate-impact claims under the FHA in Inclusive Communities,370 
the lower courts had produced dozens of FHA decisions dealing with 
 
366. See, e.g., Hamad v. Woodcrest Condominium Ass’n, 328 F.3d 224, 229–
31 (6th Cir. 2003) (familial status); Ventura Vill. Inc. v. City of 
Minneapolis, 318 F. Supp. 2d 822, 824–26 (D. Minn. 2004) (disability). 
367. See Jorman v. Veterans Admin., 830 F.2d 1420, 1424 (7th Cir. 1987); 
Shannon v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 811–12 (3d 
Cir. 1970). 
368. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. 
Affairs, No. 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2016 WL 4494322, at *11–12 (N.D. Tex. 
Aug. 26, 2016). 
369. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432–33 (1971). For early 
appellate cases applying Griggs to the FHA, see supra note 9 and 
accompanying text. 
370. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015). 
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this theory,371 and HUD had provided detailed guidance for it in a 2013 
regulation.372 
As the Inclusive Communities opinion noted, many of the FHA’s 
disparate-impact cases—as the Court put it, those at the “heartland” 
of this theory 373 —have involved challenges to local governments’ 
restrictions on housing proposals of particular value to racial 
minorities.374 These “exclusionary zoning” cases—and how a source-of-
income amendment to the FHA would affect them—were discussed 
earlier in Part IV.B,375 and similar issues involving home financing and 
insurance were dealt with in Part IV.D. 
Another type of disparate-impact claim that is likely to arise under 
a FHA source-of-income amendment would be challenges to landlords’ 
requirements that prospective tenants have a certain minimum income-
to-rent ratio (e.g., that their income be at least three times the rent). 
This is a common type of tenant-screening requirement, and there is a 
long history of its being targeted in FHA-impact claims that allege 
racial discrimination. 
Indeed, such a claim was involved in one of the earliest appellate 
cases to consider Griggs’s applicability to the FHA. In Boyd v. Lefrak 
Organization,376 the defendant-landlord operated 119 buildings with 
over 15,000 apartments and required applicants to have a weekly net 
income of at least 90% of the monthly rent for their desired unit.377 A 
 
371. See, e.g., id. at 2519 (noting the consensus among the federal appellate 
courts that the FHA encompassed disparate-impact claims). 
372. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects 
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. 
§ 100.500). For HUD’s recent proposed changes to its 2013 impact 
regulation, see HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s 
Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 42,854, 42,857 (Aug. 19, 2019). 
373. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2521–22. 
374. See id.; see also supra notes 301–304 and accompanying text. 
375. See also supra note 304 and accompanying text (discussing similar issues 
involving municipal restrictions on group homes for disabled people). 
376. Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1975). 
377. Id. at 1111. As an alternative to satisfying this 90% rule, an applicant 
could provide a co-signer whose weekly net income was equal to 110% of 
the monthly rent. Id. 
 The defendants’ 90% rule appears to have been prompted by an earlier 
FHA case in which they had been accused of racial discrimination by the 
Justice Department in a “pattern and practice” suit. This suit ended in a 
1971 consent decree that called for the defendants, inter alia, to use the 
90% rule. Id. at 1112. This consent decree was later amended to allow 
welfare recipients, in lieu of meeting the 90% rule, to provide a legally 
enforceable guarantee by a government agency, but no such guarantee 
was ever used. Id. at 1112 n.3. 
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class of black welfare recipients challenged this 90% rule on the ground 
that it excluded a disproportionately high percentage of minorities.378 
After a bench trial, the district judge, retired Supreme Court Justice 
Tom Clark, ruled for the plaintiffs and enjoined the defendants’ use of 
the 90% rule, but a divided panel of the Second Circuit reversed.379 The 
majority held that the Griggs theory was “inapposite here,”380 and thus 
a “private landlord in choosing his tenants is free to use any grounds 
he likes so long as no discriminatory purpose is shown.”381 
 
378. See id. at 1112 (describing the basis of plaintiffs’ claim as being that the 
90% rule excludes most public assistance recipients and “that a large 
majority of public assistance recipients in New York City are black or 
Puerto Rican”). 
379. Id. at 1111–12. 
380. Id. at 1114 (calling plaintiffs’ reliance on Griggs “misplaced”); see also id. 
at 1113 (concluding that a disparate-impact “analysis is inappropriate in 
the context of a purely private action asserting a claim of racial 
discrimination” under the FHA). 
 The dissent determined that “[t]his case should be governed by the 
[Griggs] principle.” Id. at 1115 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Judge Mansfield 
noted that the evidence showed that defendants had a policy of not 
renting to welfare recipients, and that their 90% rule had a 
disproportionately high racial impact, given that 77% of all such recipients 
in New York City “were minority persons.” Id. at 1117. He also noted 
that white-household eligibility under the 90% rule “would be four times 
as great as that of Black households and ten times as great as that of 
Puerto Rican households.” Id. The dissent concluded that, although no 
one questions either “the importance to a landlord of a prospective 
tenant’s payment of rent” or that a landlord “may adopt reasonably 
appropriate economic standards or tests designed to assure the tenant’s 
future ability to pay rent on an on-going basis,” defendants had failed to 
show that the 90% rule “was reasonably necessary to insure tenants’ 
payment of rent . . . [or] that welfare recipients as tenants have a greater 
incidence of rent failures or defaults than other tenants.” Id. at 1116, 1118. 
Indeed, the evidence showed that a “welfare recipient’s ability to 
pay . . . is not properly measurable by his or her aggregate income” and 
that, unknown to defendants, hundreds of welfare recipients actually lived 
in their apartments, which suffered few rent defaults. Id. at 1118. Based 
on this evidence, Judge Mansfield concluded that Griggs “mandates 
affirmance of the district court’s decision.” Id. 
381. Id. at 1114 (majority opinion). According to the majority: 
A businessman’s differential treatment of different economic 
groups is not necessarily racial discrimination and is not made so 
because minorities are statistically overrepresented in the poorer 
economic groups. The fact that differentiation in eligibility rates 
for defendants’ apartments is correlated with race proves merely 
that minorities tend to be poorer than is the general population.  
 Id. at 1113. 
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By the late 1980s, however, the Second Circuit, along with other 
courts of appeals, had come to accept the discriminatory-effect theory’s 
applicability to the FHA.382 Thus, in 1989, a district court in New 
York383 felt free to, and did, approve an impact-based challenge by 
black applicants against a landlord’s requirement that tenants have 
income equal to at least three times the rent.384 As discussed above, the 
Bronson court also enjoined the defendant-landlord’s “No Section 8” 
policy because it found that the policy had an unjustified racial impact 
and was perhaps prompted by racially discriminatory intent.385 But the 
case's significance here is that the court independently determined that 
the defendant’s “triple rent” policy ran afoul of FHA because of its 
unjustified negative impact on racial minorities. 386  Later decisions, 
however, provided a mixed response to impact-based challenges to “No 
Section 8” policies based on racial discrimination,387 and few, if any, 
subsequent plaintiffs brought this type of claim against a landlord’s 
income-to-rent-ratio policy.388 
 
382. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 
934 (2d Cir.) (doubting Boyd’s continued validity while ruling in favor of 
discriminatory-effect challenges to a municipality’s exclusionary-zoning 
practices); see also supra notes 9, 371 (discussing other 1970s and 1980s 
decisions). 
383. Bronson v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corp., 724 F. Supp. 148 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
384. Id. at 154–56. 
385. See supra notes 160, 232–233 and accompanying text. 
386. In Bronson, the court found that defendant’s “triple income” requirement 
resulted in a disparate impact because “non-minorities qualify [for 
defendant’s complex] at a rate of more than twice that for minorities.” 
724 F. Supp. at 154 (14% of minority households, compared to 28% of 
non-minority households). As for the defendant’s justification, the court 
noted that the FHA allows a landlord to seek “assurance that prospective 
tenants will be able to meet their rental responsibilities.” Id. at 156 
(quoting Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110, 1114 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
Nevertheless, the court held that the defendant failed to show its triple-
income policy was “reasonably necessary to insure payment of rent 
or . . . [to avoid] losses or defaults.” Id. at 154. 
387. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
388. Cf. supra notes 217–225 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth 
Circuit’s endorsement of a reasonable-accommodation challenge to a 
landlord’s triple-income requirement). 
 In 1991, the California Supreme Court interpreted California’s Unruh 
Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civil Code § 51 (2016), to not bar a landlord’s 
requirement that prospective tenants have gross monthly incomes of at 
least three times the rent, both because such a requirement was not a 
form of arbitrary economic discrimination and because the Unruh Act did 
not include a disparate-impact standard (thus defeating plaintiff’s claim 
that the triple-income requirement had an unlawful impact on women). 
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How would such claims fare under a FHA amended to outlaw 
source-of-income discrimination? Clearly, such a law would prohibit 
landlords from having “No Section 8” or “No Welfare” policies.389 But 
would such an amendment also support an impact-based challenge to a 
landlord’s income-to-rent-ratio requirement? The answer will likely 
depend—as it does with FHA-impact claims generally—on the specific 
statistical proof offered by the plaintiff and the defendant’s proferred 
justifications for its policy. 
For example, in Nibbs v. PT Chicago, LLC,390 the Chicago Com–
mission on Human Relations approved the theory of an impact-based 
challenge by a Section 8 voucher holder to a landlord’s requirement 
that prospective tenants have a rent-to-income ratio of 34% or less,391 
but ultimately held that the proof of disparate impact was in–
adequate.392 This case was complicated by the fact that the landlord 
accepted some voucher holders (e.g., those with a guarantor who met 
the “34% rule”), making it difficult for the complainant to produce data 
about how this policy impacted voucher holders.393 But even accepting 
the complainant’s view that the landlord’s “minimum-income require–
 
See Harris v. Capital Growth Inv’rs XIV, 805 P.2d 873, 878–81, 893 (Cal. 
1991). A year later, the state legislature amended the Unruh Act to allow 
disparate-impact claims in some circumstances, and in 1999, it amended 
the state’s fair-housing law to ban source-of-income discrimination. 
See Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 208 P.3d 623, 627–28 (Cal. 2009); infra 
app. I. 
389. See supra notes 146–149 and accompanying text. 
390. CCHR No. 14-H-61 (May 11, 2017). 
391. Id. at 11–13. The CCHR distinguished two earlier decisions—Boyd v. 
Parkview Mgmt. Corp., CCHR No. 10-H-48 (June 18, 2013), and Jackson 
v. Wilmette Realty, CCHR No. 99-H-32 (Sept. 27, 1999)—in which it had 
rejected challenges to similar income-to-rent-ratio requirements brought 
by Social Security recipients. Nibbs, CCHR No. 14-H-61, at 11–13. 
According to the CCHR, the analysis of minimum-income requirements 
differs depending on whether the applicant’s source of income is Social 
Security or the voucher program, because: 
The Housing Choice voucher covers a portion, and in some cases 
all, of the recipient’s rent, which is cash income. Therefore, the 
property owner can reasonably expect that any income in addition 
to the voucher can be used to cover the obligations of tenancy and 
living expenses. On the other hand, Social Security benefits are 
cash income paid to the recipient. Thus, if a rental applicant does 
not have income sufficient to cover the obligations of tenancy and 
the rent, a property owner can reasonably refuse to rent to that 
applicant.  
 Boyd, CCHR No. 10-H-48, at 3. 
392. Nibbs, CCHR No. 14-H-61, at 13–15, 18. 
393. Id. at 15-17, 17 n.12. 
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ment would automatically exclude at least 75% of Chicago Voucher 
holders if strictly applied,”394 the CCHR ruled that the evidence failed 
to establish a disparate impact because it did not also show how this 
requirement impacted “market rate applicants.”395 Because a prima 
facie case of disparate impact was not established, the CCHR did not 
go on to address “the remaining questions of whether Respondents have 
a business justification for their policy and—if so—whether a less-
discriminatory alternative was available to achieve Respondents’ 
legitimate objectives.”396 
Nibbs nicely demonstrates how impact-based challenges to 
landlords’ income-to-rent-ratio policies, though proper in theory under 
a law that prohibits source-of-income discrimination, will succeed or fail 
depending on each case’s particular facts. Key facts include: whether 
the landlord strictly enforces such a policy or allows exceptions to it; 
the plaintiff’s ability to produce statistics showing that the landlord’s 
policy has a greater adverse impact on government-assisted prospective 
renters compared to those without government-assisted incomes; and 
the alternatives available to the landlord to insure that those who fail 
to meet its required ratio will still be able to meet their rental 
obligations. The upshot is that this type of screening device may have 
to be adjusted in some instances to avoid liability under an amended 
FHA.397 
 
394. Id. at 15. 
395. Id. at 17. This gap, according to Nibbs, distinguished this case from 
Bronson v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corp., 724 F. Supp. 148 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), which the CCHR seemed to accept as good law. See 
Nibbs, CCHR No. 14-H-61, at 15–16. 
396. Nibbs, CCHR No. 14-H-61, at 18. In earlier cases, the CCHR had 
recognized that landlords have some leeway In setting income-ratio 
policies:  
A property owner . . . may establish and enforce reasonable 
policies as to the amount of income a potential tenant must have 
in relation to the amount of rent . . . . [S]uch policies have the 
legitimate, non-discriminatory purpose of assuring the property 
owner that the prospective tenant of a dwelling unit will be able 
to pay the rent.  
 Id. at 11–12 (quoting Jackson v. Wilmette Realty, CCHR No. 99-H-32, at 
4 (Sept. 27, 1999)). 
397. An analogous situation has played out in recent years involving landlords’ 
“No Criminal Record” screening rules. Those rules’ disparate racial impact 
allegedly violates the FHA unless they are narrowed to more precisely 
advance the landlord’s legitimate interest in quality tenants. See, e.g., 
Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle Towers Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 388 F. Supp. 
3d 145, 172–77 (E.D.N.Y. 2019); Sams v. Ga. W. Gate, LLC, No. CV415-
282, 2017 WL 436281 at *1–2, *5 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 30, 2017); see also 
Housing Opportunities Made Equal of Virginia, HOME Settles 
Race Discrimination Lawsuit Against Sterling Glen Apartments (Aug. 6, 
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The FHA’s discriminatory-effect theory of liability may produce 
other types of claims if the statute is amended to ban source-of-income 
discrimination.398 In these situations, as well as the income-to-rent-ratio 
cases, it is worth noting that a landlord’s continued articulation and 
enforcement of a policy that has a discriminatory effect can also run 
afoul of the statute’s prohibition against discriminatory notices and 
statements,399 and can ultimately be the target of serious sanctions.400 
3. Gentrification 
A major fair-housing issue in recent years has been “gentrification,” 
which refers to the movement of middle-class, mostly white residents 
into city neighborhoods whose residents, before this influx, were 
predominantly low-income minorities.401 In terms of racial movement, 
gentrification is the opposite of the old “changing neighborhood” 
 
2019) (describing settlement of such a case in which the defendant-
landlord agreed to a less restrictive policy, limited to “relevant criminal 
background screening” for “specific categories of offenses”), available at 
https://homeofva.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/190806-NR-Sterling-
Glen-settlement-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/FH5U-ASAT]. 
398. See, e.g., Fulk v. Lee, 31 Conn. L. Rptr. 375 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2002) 
(holding that landlord’s refusal to rent to Section 8 voucher user “because 
she had no employment” violated Connecticut’s source-of-income law, 
because “[b]y rejecting her on the basis that she had no employment, the 
defendants accomplished indirectly what they could not do directly”); see 
also Cohen v. Monroe Cty., 749 F. App’x 855 (11th Cir. 2018) (rejecting 
FHA disability-discrimination claim challenging the county’s requirement 
that 70% of resident’s current income must derive from local 
employment). 
399. See supra Part IV.C. 
400. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Ctr. of Wash. v. Breier-Scheetz Props., LLC, No. 
C16-922 TSZ, 2019 WL 1987055, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 6, 2019) 
(imposing civil-contempt sanctions based on landlords’ continued use of 
occupancy restrictions after earlier ruling that the restrictions violated the 
FHA based on their disparate impact on families with children). 
401. See NYU Furman Ctr., How NYCHA Preserves Diversity in New 
York’s Changing Neighborhoods 9 (2019) (describing “gentrifying 
neighborhoods” as those that were “low-income in 1990 and experienced 
rent growth above the median SBA rent growth between 1990 and 2010–
2014,” and identifying fifteen of New York City’s twenty-two low-income 
neighborhoods in 1990 as currently gentrifying), available at https:// 
 furmancenter.org/files/NYCHA_Diversity_Brief_Final_4-30-2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/97QE-55WQ]; see also Ingrid Gould Ellen & Gerard 
Torrats-Espinosa, Gentrification and Fair Housing: Does Gentrification 
Further Integration? 4 (Aug. 19, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) 
(available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10511482 
 .2018.1524440) (labeling a census tract “as gentrifying if it experienced an 
increase in the ratio of its median income to the median income of the 
[Core-based Statistical Area] of at least 0.1 over a decade”). 
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scenario that has existed for much the FHA’s history, in which blacks 
move out of a city’s heavily minority areas into whiter, more affluent 
communities.402 
In one respect, gentrification advances a core goal of the FHA by 
helping to integrate some city neighborhoods.403 But too often, critics 
assert, this is accomplished by displacing minority families. Those 
families are often unable to afford the rising rents and other costs 
associated with this phenomenon, forcing them to leave communities 
they have long called home, perhaps becoming homeless or having to 
move to areas that are not only less familiar, but offer fewer 
opportunities and, ultimately, a racially impacted demographic of their 
own.404 Thus, while few argue that gentrification can or should be 
stopped, many advocate that government should try to reduce its 
negative impact on the long-time residents of newly-gentrified-areas.405 
The FHA has occasionally been invoked on behalf of families facing 
displacement by gentrification, but with limited success. 406  To the 
 
402. See Sander, supra note 44, at 873–74, 888. 
403. See, e.g., Gould Ellen & Torrats-Espinosa, supra note 401, at 1, 8 (noting 
that “gentrification . . . offers a glimmer of hope, as the moves that higher-
income, white households make into predominantly minority, lower-income 
neighborhoods are moves that help to integrate those neighborhoods, at 
least in the near-term” and concluding that the “long-term picture 
suggests that gentrification has spawned some stable, racially integrated 
neighborhoods”); Lance Freeman, Creating Integrated Communities Is 
More Than Preventing Displacement, in The Dream Revisited, supra 
note 50, at 327, 327 (describing research showing that neighborhoods 
experiencing gentrification in the 1980s and 1990s “were more diverse, 
both in racial and ethnic terms and in terms of socioeconomic status, than 
other central-city neighborhoods that did not experience gentrification”). 
404. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Black, Poor, and Gone: Civil Rights Law’s 
Inner-City Crisis, 54 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 629, 652–56 (2019); 
Rachel D. Godsil, Transforming Gentrification Into Integration, in The 
Dream Revisited, supra note 50, at 322, 322–23. 
405. See, e.g., Sander, supra note 44, at 898–900; Freeman, supra note 403, at 
327–29; Brad Lander, It Will Take More Than a Voucher, in The Dream 
Revisited, supra note 50, at 330, 332–33; see also Alfieri, supra note 404, 
at 698 (noting Richard Rothstein's assertion that “housing proposals for 
segregated neighborhoods that purport to contribute to ‘revitalization’ must 
be part of a concerted plan of revitalization that includes . . . preserving 
affordability for those with moderate and lower incomes”) (quoting 
Richard Rothstein, The Supreme Court’s Challenge to Housing 
Segregation, Am. Prospect (July 5, 2015), https://prospect.org/article/ 
 supreme-courts-challenge-housing-segregation [https://perma.cc/6E9F-
5ZVG]). 
406. See Wadley v. Park at Landmark LP, 264 F. App’x 279, 280–82 (4th Cir. 
2008) (affirming summary judgment against FHA-race claim based on 
landlord’s decision to phase out its Section 8 tenants through non-renewal 
of their leases so it could pursue market-rate tenants); Barry Farms 
Tenants v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 311 F. Supp. 3d 57, 68–69 (D.D.C. 2018) 
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extent that displacement can be ameliorated with the use of Section 8 
vouchers or other government assistance for current residents,407 it is 
possible that a source-of-income FHA amendment would add some 
protection against the eviction of these residents by housing providers 
intent upon “upgrading” their developments. The success of such 
litigation would likely turn on the degree to which displaced tenants 
are afforded sufficient relocation assistance so that they can maintain 
comparable housing.408 
Conclusion 
The 1968 Fair Housing Act, last significantly amended in 1988, has 
advanced the interests of countless minority home-seekers, but it has 
fallen short in fulfilling its primary goal of reducing racial discrimination 
and segregation. One reason for this is that the FHA allows housing 
providers to discriminate against people who rely on Section 8 vouchers 
and other forms of governmental assistance. Such source-of-income 
discrimination not only undercuts the federal government’s principal 
housing-assistance program, but it also disproportionately harms racial 
minorities and other FHA-protected groups. A growing number of 
states and localities have now addressed this problem by amending their 
fair-housing laws to ban source-of-income discrimination. The time has 
come for Congress to do the same. 
This Article has reviewed the various state and local source-of-
income laws, as well as the FHA-impact cases that have challenged 
 
(dismissing on ripeness grounds a FHA familial-status claim challenging 
landlords’ plan to transform large public housing complex into a mixed-
income community); cf. Crossroads Residents v. MSP Crossroads 
Apartments LLC, No. CV 16-233 ADM/KMM, 2016 WL 3661146 (D. 
Minn. July 5, 2016). See generally Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Unjust Cities? 
Gentrification, Integration, and the Fair Housing Act, 53 U. Rich. L. 
Rev. 835, 848–61 (2019) (concluding that “the FHA is an important but 
limited tool for addressing the potential harms of gentrification”); Alfieri, 
supra note 404, at 667–88 (surveying FHA litigation theory’s possible 
responses to gentrification). 
407. See, e.g., Godsil, supra note 404, at 323 (arguing that cities undergoing 
gentrification “should use rental vouchers or low-interest loans to restore 
the autonomy of current residents”); NYU Furman Ctr., supra note 
401, at 1 (describing how the availability of public housing helps maintain 
diversity in gentrifying neighborhoods in New York City). 
408. See City of Alameda v. FG Managing Member, Inc., No. C 04-04010 
WHA, 2004 WL 2403848, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2004) (rejecting 
California Fair Housing Act claim, which alleged that defendant-
landlord’s renovation of a complex housing many Section 8 users had 
caused a “loss of housing for minorities, disabled, and especially families 
who rely on government rent subsidies,” primarily because all current 
tenants, though temporarily displaced, were assured by the defendant that 
they would be relocated); see also Crossroads Residents, 2016 WL 
3661146, at *11. 
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source-of-income discrimination because of its negative effect on the 
FHA’s current protected classes. This review demonstrates some of the 
advantages—and disadvantages—of adding source-of-income to the 
FHA’s list of prohibited bases of discrimination. The Article has also 
identified and analyzed the various types of FHA claims that are likely 
to arise if such an amendment is adopted. 
A source-of-income amendment, though not a panacea, would be 
an important step forward in expanding housing opportunities for all, 
in ending arbitrary limits on housing choice, and in helping the FHA 
achieve its core mission of reducing segregation. Such an amendment is 
the next logical step in the evolution of the FHA, an Act whose ultimate 
measure of success depends on how much it can reduce the long-
entrenched patterns of residential segregation that continue to divide 
the nation. 
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Appendix I 
State Laws Outlawing Housing Discrimination Based on Source-of-
Income 
[year enacted in brackets] 
 
California: CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12955 [1999]: “source of income” 
made part of state’s fair housing law and defined in subsec. (p)(1) as 
meaning “lawful, verifiable income paid directly to a tenant or paid to 
a representative of a tenant.” This definition was amended in 2019 to 
include Section 8 vouchers and other government assistance “paid to a 
housing owner or landlord on behalf of a tenant.” 
– this provision and cases dealing with it are discussed supra notes 
98 and 119-20 and accompanying text; see also supra note 388 (dealing 
with California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 51-52). 
 
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64c [1989]: “lawful 
source of income” regarding housing transactions made part of state’s 
public accommodations law in 1989 and, in 1990, made part of state’s 
fair housing law (which uses prohibitory language that is virtually 
identical to the federal FHA) and defining, in § 46a-63(3), “‘Lawful 
source of income’ as meaning “income derived from Social Security, 
supplemental security income, housing assistance, child support, 
alimony or public or state-administered general assistance.” 
– this provision and cases dealing with it are discussed supra notes 
99, 104, 112-13, 116, and 242 and accompanying text). 
 
Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4603(b) [2016]: “source of 
income” added to five prohibitions of state’s fair housing law and 
defined to mean “any lawful source of money paid directly, indirectly, 
or on behalf of a renter or buyer of housing including: . . . (b) Income 
or rental payments derived from any government or private assistance, 
grant, or loan program.” § 4602(25). 
– allows landlords not to accept vouchers (§ 4607(j)): “A landlord 
is not required to participate in any government-sponsored rental 
assistance program, voucher, or certificate system. A landlord’s 
nonparticipation in any government-sponsored rental assistance 
program, voucher, or certificate system may not serve as the basis for 
any administrative or judicial proceeding under this chapter.” 
 
Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4581-A [1975]: in separate 
provision from state fair housing law’s main prohibitions; (4): “Receipt 
of public assistance. For any person furnishing rental premises or public 
accommodations to refuse to rent or impose different terms of tenancy 
to any individual who is a recipient of federal, state or local public 
assistance, including medical assistance and housing subsidies, 
primarily because of the individual’s status as recipient.” 
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– this provision and cases dealing with it are discussed supra notes 
102, 105, and 111. 
 
Maryland: MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 20-705 [2020]: “source 
of income” made part of state’s fair housing law and defined to mean 
“any lawful source of money paid directly or indirectly to or on behalf 
of a renter or buyer of housing [including income from any] government 
or private assistance, grant, loan, or rental assistance program, 
including low-income housing assistance certificates and vouchers issued 
under the United States Housing Act of 1937.” § 20-701(j). 
 
Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4.10 [1971]: limited 
to rental accommodations (not part of state’s main fair housing law), 
which, as amended in 1990, provides: 
 It shall be an unlawful practice . . . [f]or any person furnishing 
credit, services or rental accommodations to discriminate against 
any individual who is a recipient of federal, state, or local public 
assistance, including medical assistance, or who is a tenant 
receiving federal, state, or local housing subsidies, including rental 
assistance or rental supplements, because the individual is such a 
recipient, or because of any requirement of such public assistance, 
rental assistance, or housing subsidy program.  
– this provision and cases dealing with it are discussed supra notes 
104, 106-11, and 172-73 and accompanying text. 
 
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.09 subd. 1 [1990]: “status 
with regard to public assistance” made part of state’s civil rights laws 
and defined as meaning “the condition of being a recipient of federal, 
state, or local assistance, including medical assistance, or of being a 
tenant receiving federal, state, or local subsidies, including rental 
assistance or rent supplements.” § 363A.03 subd. 47. 
– this provision and cases dealing with it are discussed supra notes 
97 and 227 and accompanying text. 
 
New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4, 10:5-12g [1981 (covers 
vouchers); amended in 2002 to add “source of lawful income used for 
rental or mortgage payments” to state’s civil rights laws]: 
 10:5-4: All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain 
employment, and to obtain all the accommodations, advantages, 
facilities, and privileges of any place of public accommodation, 
publicly assisted housing accommodation, and other real property 
without discrimination because of race, . . . or source of lawful 
income used for rental or mortgage payments, subject only to 
conditions and limitations applicable alike to all persons. This 
opportunity is recognized as and declared to be a civil right. 
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10:5-12g. For any person, including but not limited to, any owner, 
lessee, sublessee, assignee or managing agent of, or other person 
having the right of ownership or possession of or the right to sell, 
rent, lease, assign, or sublease any real property or part or portion 
thereof, or any agent or employee of any of these: 
(1) To refuse to sell, rent, lease, assign, or sublease or otherwise 
to deny to or withhold from any person or group of persons any 
real property or part or portion thereof because of race, . . . or 
source of lawful income used for rental or mortgage payments.  
– these provisions and cases dealing with them are discussed supra 
notes 99, 104, 116, and 238 and accompanying text. 
 
New York: N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296.2-a(a)-(e) [2019]: “source of 
income” added to state’s fair housing law applicable to rental accom–
modations: 
 2-a. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for the owner, 
lessee, sub-lessee, assignee, or managing agent of publicly-assisted 
housing accommodations or other person having the right of 
ownership or possession of or the right to rent or lease such 
accommodations: 
(a) To refuse to sell, rent or lease or otherwise to deny to or 
withhold from any person or group of persons such housing 
accommodations because of the race, . . . lawful source of 
income or familial status of such person or persons . . . .  
North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 14-02.5.02(1)-(2) [1999]: 
“status with regard to . . . public assistance” added to state’s fair 
housing law and defined to mean “the condition of being a recipient of 
federal, state, or local assistance, including medical assistance, or of 
being a tenant receiving federal, state, or local subsidies, including 
rental assistance or rent supplements” (§ 14-02.4-02 (19)). 
 
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1452.A.8 [1985]: not part 
of state’s main fair housing prohibitions; makes it unlawful “To refuse 
to consider as a valid source of income any public assistance, alimony, 
or child support, awarded by a court, when that source can be verified 
as to its amount, length of time received, regularity, or receipt because 
of race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, familial status, or 
handicap.” 
 
Oregon: OR. STAT. ANN. § 659A.421(2)-(6) [1995; 2013 amendment 
deleted exemption for vouchers]: “source of income” made a part of 
state’s fair housing law and now defined to include Section 8 vouchers 
and any other government “housing assistance” in 
§ 659A.421(1)(d)(A). 
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Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-21-5 [1993]: “source of income” 
defined to mean “the verifiable condition of being a recipient of federal, 
state, or local assistance, including medical assistance, or of being a 
tenant receiving federal, state, or local subsidies, including rental 
assistance or rent supplements.” § 57-21-2(24). 
 
Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 36-96.1 [2020]: “source of funds” made 
part of state’s fair housing law and defined to mean “any source that 
lawfully provides funds to or on behalf of a renter or buyer of housing, 
including any assistance, benefit, or subsidy program, whether such 
program is administered by a governmental or nongovernmental 
entity.” § 36-96.1.1. 
 
Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4503(a) [1987]: “because a 
person is a recipient of public assistance” added to state’s fair housing 
law; not defined. 
 
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18 [2018]: prohibits discrim–
ination by landlords based on a tenant’s source-of-income (defined to 
include subsidy programs) using prohibitory language similar to the 
FHA’s. 
 
Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 106.50(1) [1980]: “lawful source of 
income” added to state’s fair housing law, but not defined in the statute 
(definition in state administrative regulations include “public 
assistance” and any “coupon or voucher representing monetary value 
such as food stamps” (Wis. Admin. Code DWD § 202.02(8))). 
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Appendix II 
Selected Local Laws Outlawing Housing Discrimination Based on Source-
of-Income409 
[year enacted in brackets] 
 
Austin, Texas: AUSTIN ORD. NO. 20141211–050 [2014]; invalidated 
by subsequent state law. 
 
Boston, Massachusetts: BOS. MUN. CODE § 10-3.1 [1982]: amends 
the City’s fair housing code to prohibit housing discrimination on the 
basis of “source of income.” 
 
Chicago, Illinois: CHI. MUN. CODE § 5-8-030 § 5-8-030 (basic 
prohibition), -040 (definition of “source of income”) [1990]. 
 
Cook County, Illinois: COOK CNTY. CODE § 42-38(b) [2013]: fair 
housing law (§ 42-30 et seq.) amended to bar discrimination based on 
housing-choice-voucher status. 
 
Dallas, Texas: DALL. CITY CODE Vol. 1, Ch. 20A [2016]; invalidated 
by subsequent state law. 
 
Denver, Colorado: DEN. REV. MUN. CODE Ch. 3, Art. IV, § 28-95 
[2018]. 
 
Los Angeles City, California: L.A. MUN. CODE Ch. IV Sec. 1 Art. 
5.6.1 [2019]: prohibits rental discrimination based on source of income 
(Sec. 45.67) and defines “source of income” to include “the Section 8 
voucher program . . . or any other housing subsidy program, homeless 
assistance or prevention program or security deposit assistance 
program.” (Sec. 45.66) 
 
Los Angeles County, California: L.A. CNTY. CODE OF ORD.S Ch. 
858 [2019]: prohibits rental discrimination based on source of income 
(Sec. 8.58.030) and defines “source of income” to include the Section 8 
Housing Choice Vouchers program and other government-funded rental 
assistance programs (Sec. 8.58.020). 
 
Miami-Dade County, Florida: MIAMI-DADE CNTY. CODE OF ORD.S 
§ 11A-12 [2009]. 
 
409. The jurisdictions listed here are those with the largest populations (e.g., 
New York, Los Angeles, Chicago) and those that have produced cases 
discussed elsewhere in this Article. For a full list of the places with such 
laws, see Poverty & Race Research Action Council, supra note 84, 
at app. B. 
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Memphis, Tennessee: MEMPHIS CODE OF ORD.S § 10-36 [2002]. 
 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin: MILWAUKEE CODE OF ORD.S Ch. 109 
[2018]. 
 
Minneapolis, Minnesota: MINN. CODE OF ORD.S Tit. 7, Ch. 139 
[2017]. 
 
Montgomery County, Maryland: MONTGOMERY CNTY. CODE Part 
II, Ch. 27, Art. I [1991]. 
 
New York City, New York: N.Y.C. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW §§ 8-
107(5)(a)(1)+(3) [2008]: defines “lawful source of income” as including 
“without limitation income derived from social security, or any form of 
federal, state or local public assistance or housing assistance including 
section 8 vouchers.” 
 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: PHILA. CODE, FAIR HOUSING ORD. Ch. 
9-800 [1980]: making it illegal for landlords to discriminate against 
tenants because of their source of income. 
 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: PITTS. CODE OF ORD.S Tit. Six, Art. V, 
Ch. 659.03 [2015]. 
 
San Diego, California: SAN DIEGO MUN. CODE Ch. 9, Art. 8, Div. 
8 [2018]: “source of income” added to city’s fair housing ordinance and 
defined to include government rent subsidies. 
 
San Francisco, California: S.F. POLICE CODE § 3304, subd. (a) 
[1998]: “source of income” added to city’s fair housing ordinance and 
defined to include government rent subsidies. 
 
St. Louis, Missouri: ST. LOUIS CITY ORD. Title 3 Ch. 44 Sec. 
3.44.080 [2015]: “Source of income” means the point or form of the 
origination of legal gains of income accruing to a person in a stated 
period of time; from any occupation, profession or activity, from any 
contract, agreement or settlement, from federal, state or local 
payments, including Section 8 or any other rent subsidy or rent 
assistance program, from court ordered payments or from payments 
received as gifts, bequests, annuities or life insurance policies.” 
(Sec.344.010). 
 
Seattle, Washington: SEATTLE MUN. CODE Tit. 14, Ch. 14.08 
[1989]. 
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Washington, D.C.: D.C. CODE § 2–1402.21(a), § 2–1401.02(29): 
1997: added “source of income” to local fair housing law (which makes 
it unlawful to discriminate “wholly or partially for a discriminatory 
reason based on [identified factors]”) and defined to “source of income” 
include “federal payments”; 2002: amended to expressly include HCV 
program assistance within law’s “source of income” (D.C.Code § 42–
2851.06); 2005: technical amendments to correct an error that had 
applied this provision to public accommodations rather than to private 
housing (D.C.Code § 2–1402.21(e))]: this provision and cases dealing 
with it are discussed supra notes 100, 116, 259, and 261. 
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Appendix III 
Proposed Source-of-Income Amendments to the Fair Housing Act 
2019: 
American Housing and Economic Mobility Act of 2019, S. 787, 
116th Cong. § 301 (2019) (Senator Warren and others), and H.R. 1737, 
116th Cong. § 301 (2019) (Rep.s Richmond and others): adds source of 
income and three other protected classes (sexual orientation, gender 
identify, and marital status) to the FHA; “‘Source of income’ includes 
income for which there is a reasonable expectation that the income will 
continue from— 
“(1) a profession, occupation or job; 
“(2) any government or private assistance, grant, loan or rental 
assistance program, including low-income housing assistance certificates 
and vouchers issued under the United States Housing Act of 1937 (42 
U.S.C. 1437 et seq.); 
“(3) a gift, an inheritance, a pension, an annuity, alimony, child 
support, or other consideration or benefit; or 
“(4) the sale or pledge of property or an interest in property.” 
** 
Landlord Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 232, 116th Cong. (2019) 
(Rep. Velazquez): adds new subsection (g) to § 3604 outlawing rental-
only discrimination because “tenant is the holder of a housing voucher.” 
** 
Fair Housing Improvement Act of 2019, S. 1986, 116th Cong. (2019) 
(Senators Kaine and Rosen), and H.R. 3516, 116th Cong. (2019) (Rep.s 
Peters and others): adds source of income and military status as 
protected classes under the FHA; defines, in Sec. 2(a)(1)(q), “source of 
income” to include— 
“(1) a housing voucher under section 8 of the United States Housing 
Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. 1437f) and any form of Federal, State, or local 
housing assistance provided to a family or provided to a housing owner 
on behalf of a family, including rental vouchers, rental assistance, and 
rental subsidies from nongovernmental organizations; 
“(2) income received during a taxable year as Social Security 
benefits, as defined in section 86(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986, or as supplemental security income benefits under title XVI of 
the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.); 
“(3) income received by court order, including spousal support and 
child support; 
“(4) any payment from a trust, guardian, or conservator; and 
“(5) any other lawful source of income.” 
** 
A Just Society: A Place to Prosper Act of 2019, H.R. 5072, 116th Cong. 
§ 4 (2019) (Rep.s Ocasio-Cortez and others): adds source of income as 
a protected class to the FHA; provides, in Sec. 4(a)(1), the same 
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definition of “source of income” as in S. 1986 (Kaine and Rosen) and 
H.R. 3516 (Peters and others) supra. 
 
Before 2019: 
American Housing and Economic Mobility Act of 2018, S. 3503, 
115th Cong. § 301 (2018) (Senator Warren), and H.R. 7262, 115th 
Cong. § 301 (Dec. 11, 2018) (Rep. Richmond and others) (see “2019” 
above for description). 
** 
Landlord Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. 202, 115th Cong. (2017), 
and H.R. 5401, 114th Cong. (2016) (Rep. Velazquez) (see “2019” above 
for description). 
** 
Fair Housing Improvement Act of 2018, S. 3612, 115th Cong. sec. 
2(p) (2018) (Senators Hatch and Kaine): virtually identical to Senator 
Kaine’s S. 1986 (see “2019” above for description). 
** 
Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME) Act of 2013, S. 1242, 
113th Cong. § 2 (2013) (Senator Brown and others): adds source of 
income and three other protected classes (sexual orientation, gender 
identify, and marital status) to the FHA; “‘Source of income’ means 
the receipt of Federal, State, or local public assistance including medical 
assistance, or the receipt by a tenant or applicant of Federal, State, or 
local housing subsidies, including rental assistance under section 8 of 
the United States Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. 1437f) or other rental 
assistance or rental supplements.” 
 
